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Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the abnormal returns for the acquiring firms 
surrounding M&A announcements. The emphasis of the study lies on examining the difference in 
abnormal returns between acquiring public and private firms. Secondly, the study aims to get 
theoretical insights by examining the relationship between the magnitude of abnormal returns and 
different deal characteristics. 
 
Theoretical framework: The concept of M&As is briefly introduced and is then followed by the 
managerial motives behind M&As and their impact on the announcement effect. Further, the 
chapter continues with a discussion about information asymmetry and the differences between 
private and public firms. Moreover, previous research within the field is presented, both 
regarding the announcement effect and value-creating characteristics.  
 
Methodology: An event study is used to determine the announcement effect over the event 
window. Statistical tests are performed to ensure statistical significance of the results. Further, a 
multiple linear regression model examines the effect of the study´s main variable target legal 
status and the method of payment, form of the transaction, relative size, deal size, domestic versus 
cross-border and focused versus diversified.  
 
Empirical foundation: The data sample consists of 17 liquid and highly developed markets in 
Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom) announcing the acquisition of public or private targets from 2009-01-01 to 
2015-02-01.  
 
Conclusion: First of all, the study shows that the announcement of M&As generally results in 
short-term abnormal returns for the acquiring firm in Western Europe. Secondly, the market 
seems to prefer acquisitions of private targets in comparison to public targets, which is supported 
by the theory of a private firm discount. Thirdly, the markets to a greater extent prefer (1) stock 
deals in favor of assets deals, (2) that the relative size between the firms is as large as possible, 
and (3) that the acquisitions are paid in cash instead of stock. The third conclusion is however not 
possible to ensure when only examining private targets.  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
APM   – Arbitrage pricing model 
AR   – Abnormal return  
AAR   – Average abnormal return 
CAPM  – Capital asset pricing model 
CAR   – Cumulative abnormal return 
CAAR  – Cumulative average abnormal return 
DLM   – Discount for lack of marketability 
EBIT   – Earnings before interest and taxes 
EMH   – Efficient market hypothesis 
M&A   – Merger and acquisition 
OLS   – Ordinary least squares 
PCD   – Private company discount 
WACC – Weighted average cost of capital 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
In the introduction the background and concept of mergers and acquisitions is first introduced. 
The interesting aspects of and problems with the subject are presented and explained. This 
further leads to the purpose of the study, the target group, the delimitations and the disposition of 
the study.  
1.1 Background 
In 2014, the M&A activity in Europe increased 40.5 % to an astonishing number of $ 901.4 
billion. Europe has thereby seen its highest levels of M&A activity since the financial crisis 
(Corte et al, 2015). Advantageous conditions, e.g. higher abundant cash resources, availability of 
acquisition financing at good rates and the will of firms to find other growth opportunities than 
organic growth have existed for several years. The year of 2014 stands out - “an improved 
economic environment, combined with financial market support for well-constructed mergers, 
relatively low market volatility, the absence of significant political or economic shocks, and the 
momentum effect of an increasingly active M&A cycle, led increasingly confident boards and 
management teams to move forward with transactions, some of which were long-contemplated.” 
(Kennedy, 2015)    
It is clear that the huge amounts of investments and its strategic importance for firms has made 
M&As an interesting field of studies for researchers. Starting in 2007, the M&A activity declined 
considerably, but since 2010 there is an amounting trend again and the levels of activity are now 
high.  
In a study of 868 corporate leaders McKinsey shows that M&As are a corner stone to growth and 
value creation (Uhlaner & West, 2011). It is also said that a combination of two firms usually 
create higher market value than if the firms are standalone firms (Gaughan, 2011).  
This has led to several questions about M&A activity and deals. The questions concern why 
M&As happen, what kind of motives that drive M&As, who benefits from an M&A, if M&As 
create value and if so, what characteristics create this value? Whether M&As really create value 
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and if it is the acquiring firm´s shareholders or the target firm´s shareholders that obtain this 
value creation are the frequently recurring subjects.   
The value creation in M&As is usually referred to as the synergy effect. If managers and 
investors are rational, the value creation of an M&A announcement should equal the value of the 
synergy effects, adjusted for the probability that the deal in fact will be completed (Malatesta & 
Thompson, 1985). In other words, the share price adjustment of both the acquirer and the target 
firm should never exceed the expected synergies. Therefore, the distribution of value is 
dependent on the premium that is offered to the target firm. A bidder will never be willing to pay 
a higher premium than the expected synergies´ value (Misra & Gupta, 2007). However, this is 
only the case if the managers, of both the bidder and the target firm, and the market have access 
to the same information and are rational. 
If the assumptions are met, the announcement of the M&A should create value for the acquiring 
firm´s shareholders equal to the expected value of the synergy effect between the firms less the 
premium paid for the target. If it turns out that the assumptions are not met, which is often more 
likely, and if the markets behave irrationally, then the managers´ and investors´ expectations 
regarding the synergies could differ. The result of this will be a M&A mispricing in one of two 
directions; either that there is a risk for the premium to exceed the actual synergies because of 
agency problems and behavioral phenomena influencing management, or a discrepancy between 
the managements´ and the shareholders´ expectations, which potentially can cause over- or under 
reactions on the market (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993).  
For the above reasons, among others, M&A activity has been highlighted in the research world, 
where researchers examine both the size of the abnormal returns and also what is driving this 
positive (or negative) value creation (destruction) surrounding M&A announcements.  There are 
also a couple of characteristics in an M&A that have been shown to be significant in creating 
value in previous studies, e.g. the method of payment, relative size and deal size. 
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1.2 Problem Discussion 
The financial market has witnessed large amounts go to waste because of managers´ unattained 
synergies and growth and the “losers” seem to be the acquiring firm´s shareholders.  
The motives behind an M&A are critical and these are also the reasons for the M&A to be value 
creating or value destroying. According to Jensen (1986), managers act in their own interest and 
want to maximize their own wealth, often at the expense of their shareholders. When this 
happens, there is a greater chance of value destruction for the firm´s shareholders.  
Many of the M&As pursued during the 1960-1980s did in fact not create any value for the 
acquirer, and this is explained by the phenomenon of managers acting in their own interest and 
hubris driving their decisions (Roll, 1986). Lately value creation has, however, been shown and 
synergies seem to be the biggest motive to pursue an M&A (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). 
Despite this fact, far from all the M&As undertaken are value creating, and whom the potential 
value accrues is also not converged yet. Though, a great part of the previous studies argue that the 
target´s shareholders obtain the short-term wealth, whereas the value impact for the acquirer´s 
shareholders is negative or close to zero (e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 1983, Andrade et al, 2001, 
Moeller et al, 2003). Researchers such as Asquith et al (1983) and Goergen and Ronneboog 
(2004) have however found slightly positive abnormal returns of 0.2 % and 0.7 % respectively 
for the acquiring firm´s shareholders.  
If both private and public target firms are considered instead, what does the value creation 
(destruction) look like?  
The above studies are all conducted on public firms acquiring only publicly listed firms, which 
also speaks for the majority of previous studies within the field. Analyzing acquisitions of 
privately held firms has to a large extent been ignored, even though the greater part of 
acquisitions on the U.S. market, the UK market and the Western European market are represented 
by privately held firms. When using the time period 1
st
 of January 2009 to the 1
st
 of February 
2015, the percentage of acquisitions of private targets in comparison to public targets are; U.S.: 
69%, UK: 88%, Europe: 84% (based on M&A data from Eikon). 
10 
 
Logically, previous research on publicly listed firms may not be useful in explaining the short-
term announcement effect in acquisitions of private targets (Draper & Paudyal, 2006). This 
mainly since their target status differentiates them from each other in several ways, among them 
information asymmetry, illiquidity in the stock and the average deal size (Capron & Shen, 2007).  
This is supported by the previous studies conducted by e.g. Chang (1998), Conn et al (2005) and 
Faccio et al (2006) who all show significant differences regarding abnormal returns for the 
acquiring firms in acquisitions of privately held firms in comparison to public firms. Koeplin et al 
(2000) refer to this as the private company discount (PCD). The reasons for this discount are still 
discussed, but among the stated reasons are illiquidity, information asymmetry and lower bidder 
competition, as further discussed in section 2.5. 
There are also other characteristics in an M&A that influence the value of the acquiring firm. In 
terms of private versus public targets these are; the method of payment (Asquith et al 1987; 
Travlos, 1987; Andrade et al, 2001, Yook 2003), form of the transaction (Biershaar et al, 2001); 
domestic or cross-border (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004, Conn et al, 2005), focused or diversified 
(Doukas et al, 2002, Goergen & Renneboog, 2004), relative size (Asquith et al, 1983, Loderer et 
al, 1990, Fuller et al 2002, Draper and Paudyal 2006, Madura and Susnjara 2013) and deal size 
(Loderer et al, 1990, Gordon et al, 2009, Fuller et al, 2011).  
This study therefore intends to provide a deeper understanding for the differences in value 
creation depending on whether the bidding firm acquirers a public or a private target and also 
show which of the above characteristics that influence the value of the acquiring firm.   
It is also important to notice that most previous research within the field is conducted on either 
the U.S. or the UK market. This study chooses to investigate the Western European market, since 
the European firms nowadays are a big player in M&A terms and are showing a remarkable 
growth in both numbers and the total value of M&A deals, but still is quite overlooked in the 
empirical research (Martynova & Renneboog, 2011). The M&A market as a whole has also 
started to show an upward trend again since 2010 and the European M&A activity has reached 
astonishing numbers. In addition to this, the Western European market potentially differs in 
comparison to the U.S. or the UK regarding the legal system, the market settings, the corporate 
governance system, the ownership structure and so on.   
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1.3 Research questions 
 Are there abnormal returns following M&A-announcements, and if so, is there a 
difference in the announcement effect depending on if the target is public or private? 
 How much relevance has each deal characteristics, previously found to be value creating, 
for the abnormal returns in public and private deals respectively? 
1.4 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine the abnormal returns surrounding M&A announcements 
for the acquiring firms, with emphasis on the difference between acquiring public versus private 
targets. Secondly, the thesis aims to get theoretical insights by examining the relationship 
between the magnitude of abnormal returns and different deal characteristics. 
1.5 Delimitations 
The area for the study is limited to the 17 markets in Western Europe listed in appendix 2 in 
which M&As announcements have been released from the 1
st
 of January 2009 to the 1
st
 of 
February 2015. This since the study is supposed to be: (1) based on as actual data as possible, (2) 
reflect the M&A activity after the financial crisis and (3) include a sufficient sample to be able to 
draw some generalizable conclusions.  
Post the 2008 crash period, the market value of all firms fell sharply and many firms, both public 
and private, became attractive acquisition targets (Sherman and Badillo, 2010). Although recent 
years have been characterized by uncertainty in terms of economic evolution, financial market 
volatility and sovereign debt crisis, there has been an upward trend in terms of M&As since 2010. 
However, the effect of stock market crashes on the announcement effect for public and private 
acquisitions has not been studied sufficiently. In this paper, a contribution to the existing 
literature on this subject by studying the market returns of acquisition announcement post- 
financial crisis will be made. 
M&As come in waves. Until now, there is evidence of six different waves; the early 1900s, the 
1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s, the 1990s and the last one around 2003 until it abruptly ended in 
2007.  European firms were for the first time a big player in M&A terms in the fifth M&A wave 
12 
 
and they were as eager as U.S. firms to participate in M&A deals, and M&A activity in Europe 
actually hit levels similar to those in the U.S.. Even though European M&As demonstrably have 
shown a remarkable growth in both number and total value, the empirical research on Europe is 
lacking. Most of the research is still confined to the U.S. and the UK (Martynova & Renneboog, 
2011).  
When it comes to delimitations in the methodology, the authors have chosen to use the market 
model to calculate abnormal returns. This is a conscious choice, even though the authors are 
aware that there are other ways to calculate value creation. The market model is chosen since it is 
proven to give more correct results than other models (MacKinlay, 1997). This study also 
chooses to perform a short-term event study, since long-term event studies are less statistically 
appropriate (Andrade et al, 2001) and the authors want to look at the announcement effect which 
should be reflected in the stock price shortly after the announcement according to the efficient 
market hypothesis (Fama, 1970). 
1.6 Target group 
The target groups for this study are academics and decision-makers that are involved in M&As 
and the relevant variables involved that influence the value of acquirer in general.  Therefore, a 
list of abbreviations is found on pp. 3 for those who are not used to the terminology within the 
field of M&As.   
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1.7 Disposition 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
•In the introduction the background and concept of mergers and acquisitions is first 
introduced. The interesting aspects of and problems with the subject are presented and 
explained. This further leads to the purpose of the study, the target group, the delimitations 
and the disposition of the study.  
2. Theoretical 
framework 
•The theoretical framework aims to present the financial theories relevant for this study, 
regarding the announcement effect surrounding an M&A and value-creating 
characteristics. Thereafter a presentation and discussion of previous empirical work within 
the field follows, with emphasize on public versus private firms. Lastly, a discussion of the 
differences between public and private firms is held.   
3. Methodology 
•In this chapter the study´s research approach, sample selection and criteria, models and 
calculations are outlined. Lastly, the reliability and validity of the study is addressed.  
4. Results 
•In chapter four, the empirical results of the study will be presented in the form of tables and 
diagrams with comments to facilitate the interpretation. Statistical tests are also 
performed to examine if the results are statistically significant in regards to abnormal 
returns and characteristics. Outliers are controlled for and the hypotheses and results are 
summarized in the end.   
5. Analysis 
•The analysis aims to compare the results of this study to previous research as well as 
discuss the theories which the study is built on in comparison to the actual result.  
6. Conclusion 
•In this final chapter a concluding discussion regarding the results of the study is held. The 
purpose of the study and our research questions are tied to the results and analysis and 
potential reasons and causes that led us there are reflected over and analyzed in a wider 
perspective. Finally, proposals for future research within the field are presented. .  
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CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework aims to present the financial theories relevant for this study, 
regarding the announcement effect surrounding an M&A and value-creating characteristics. 
Thereafter a presentation and discussion of previous empirical work within the field follows, with 
emphasize on public versus private firms. Lastly, a discussion of the differences between public 
and private firms is held.   
2.1 Definition of mergers and acquisitions 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) is an expression used when referring to different kinds of 
corporate takeovers. A merger implies that two separate firms, operating under similar 
presumptions, merge into an entirely new firm. The new firm then undertakes the previously 
disparate assets and liabilities as its own (Gaughan, 2007). In an acquisition, in contrast, the 
purpose is to purchase the stocks, or the assets of the target firm which then ceases to exist. Once 
acquired, the target firm is fully incorporated in the acquiring firm and thus holds the acquiring 
firm´s vision and purpose (Arnold, 2008).  
In the academic literature, it has been proven difficult to distinguish the two from each other, 
since the original purpose of the acquisition often does not turn out the way it was planned 
initially (Arnold, 2008). Therefore this study will use the common term, M&A.  
2.2 Managerial motives behind M&As 
There are a number of recurring managerial motives to pursue an M&A.  Expanding the business 
is e.g. one of the main reasons for firms to acquire other companies. A firm can grow in two 
ways, either through organic growth or through acquisitions. In order to accomplish one of the 
two, careful planning and execution is needed in order to create future value for the firm 
(Gaughan, 2011 pp. 117). Growing organically involves growth of the firm´s core activities. This 
takes time, due to the fact that extending the operations must be done in a cautious way. Firms 
that grow organically, however, do not face that many internal challenges. Yet, the slow pace of 
the expansion and the external competition bring risks and uncertainties to the firm. Firms may 
also face underinvestment problems, by the abandonment of important investment opportunities. 
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Viewed from this perspective, growing organically may have a negative effect on the firm´s 
competitive position in the long run. Growing through M&As instead allows a firm to expand 
either/or within their industry and into new markets and geographical regions. This may be a less 
risky strategy, and in the longer term, a cheaper alternative for the firm than organic growth 
(Gaughan, 2011 pp. 117).  
According to traditional corporate finance theory, managers are assumed to behave rationally and 
by this aim to maximize shareholder value. Generally, M&A deals are merely motivated by 
economic reasons resulting in increased value. Market reactions surrounding M&A 
announcements show, however, that managers may not be rational. When digging deeper into the 
causes for these market reactions, whilst looking at managers´ motives for M&A activities, it can 
be argued that M&As partly are driven by agency problems or managers acting out of hubris and 
over-confidence. Three different reasons to why managers pursue M&As, besides growth are; 
 Synergy effects 
 Hubris 
 Agency motives 
(Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993) 
2.2.1 The synergy hypothesis 
This hypothesis suggests that M&As happen due to the fact that there are synergies to realize 
since the value of the merged firm is greater than the value of the two separate firms (Seth et al, 
2000). This allows firms to create shareholder value.  
There are essentially two different types of synergies within the literature; operational and 
financial synergies. The operational synergies create value by increasing free cash flow. This is 
done in one of two ways; by revenue enhancement or by decreasing the costs. The financial 
synergies in an M&A are lower tax rates, increased possibility to increase leverage and lower 
cost of capital (Jensen & Ruback, 1983).  
Estimating and valuing synergies 
One of the corner stones of corporate finance addresses value creation for shareholders. This is 
done through investing in capital to obtain future cash flow at a level of return above the firm´s 
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WACC. Thus, to be able to create value, the firm needs to lower the WACC or enhance future 
levels of free cash flow (Koller et al, 2010, pp. 17).  
As stated earlier, the possibility of creating value for the acquiring firms in M&As depends both 
on the premium paid for the target and the synergies created following the acquisition. All 
participants in the acquiring firm, i.e. management and investors, assess the expected synergies 
that an M&A can bring and based on this assessment then determine how much they are willing 
to pay for the firm (Koller et al, 2010, pp. 445).  
A correct valuation can therefore not be neglected since possible biases in the evaluation of the 
expected synergies can destroy, rather than create, value. The biggest risk is that the biases lead 
to a huge overestimation of the synergies which results in overpaying for the target firm (Koller 
et al, 2010, pp. 445). Access to certain information is extremely important to estimate the value 
impact as correctly as possible. As more hypothetical assumptions and uncertain estimations are 
included, the result becomes more unreliable. It also has to be kept in mind that circumstances 
can change prior to closing the deal and these may change the presumptions substantially 
(Schweiger & Very, 2003).  
2.2.2 The hubris hypothesis 
The hubris hypothesis was proposed by Richard Roll (1986) and deals with possible motives 
behind acquisitions and whether or not mergers bring an increase in aggregate market value. In 
his research he finds that acquirers pay too much for their targets on average and that the 
observed takeover premiums overstate the increase in economic value of the combined entity. 
The hubris hypothesis states that managers tend to overpay for acquisitions simply due to an 
overestimation of their ability to realize synergies. This hubris then leads them to paying a larger 
premium than the actual value of the expected synergies and hence destroys value for the 
acquirers´ shareholders (Roll, 1986).  
The implication of this theory is that, around a takeover, the value of the target should increase 
and the value of the bidding firm should decrease as shareholders oppose the deal. All together, 
the combined value of the target and the bidder should fall slightly and if the combined value 
turns out to be positive this is due to an overconfident manager’s overestimation (Gaughan, 2011 
pp. 157; Roll, 1986). Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) state that in acquisitions, due to hubris, 
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the synergy gains are zero, and the potential overpayment simply represents a transfer of wealth 
from the acquiring firm to the target. Furthermore, Roll (1986) argues that the value-destroying 
acquisitions often are made by well-performing managers, since they tend to overestimate their 
personal ability to realize the synergies. 
There are numerous studies trying to estimate how the acquisition bids relate to the target´s true 
value. In a study performed by Varaiya (1988), he finds empirical evidence that the winning bid 
in acquisitions on average substantially overstates the market´s estimation of the expected 
takeover gain and the cumulative average excess return of the bidding firm is significantly 
negative. This supports Roll´s hypothesis that the managers with hubris tend to overpay for 
targets (Varaiya, 1988). 
The relevance of this hypothesis for this study lies in that if managers act out of hubris this could 
cause potentially negative abnormal returns for the acquiring firm´s shareholders.  
2.2.3 The agency theory 
This managerial motive for pursuing M&As is based on the principal-agent theory. The theory 
explains the relationship and problems between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers).  
The main goal for a manager should be to maximize shareholder value. However, the theory 
states that managers sometimes act in their own interest, trying to maximize their own wealth at 
the expense of the shareholders (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). According to the agency 
theory, there are two possible explanations for managers to pursue M&As: 
1. When growth increases, the power and control of the manager increases (Jensen, 1986) 
2. It allows managers to diversify, reducing the firm-specific risk, and thereby reducing their 
own risk (Amihud & Lev, 2001) 
A further example is when managers pursue M&As within their own field of expertise. By doing 
so, the firm becomes dependent of their skills (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993), and thereby their 
position within the combined entity is reinforced (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989) find that M&As pursued on these motives are carried through despite the fact that value is 
destroyed for the shareholders of the acquiring firm. When managers obtain a large enough 
personal gain, the firm´s market value is sacrificed to pursue the M&A. Shareholders, on the 
18 
 
other hand, could achieve the same effect through portfolio management, thus diversification is 
only used to reduce managers´ managerial risk (Amihud & Lev, 2001). An acquirer with 
managerial motives will therefore overpay for the target firm (Morck et al, 1990). All these 
measures lead to agency costs, resulting in a decreasing value of the combined entity. Hence, 
value is destroyed for the acquiring firms´ shareholders (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993).  
Overall, the agency problem constitutes an interest conflict between managers and shareholders 
since managers, theoretically, should act in the shareholders´ interest but instead pursue 
acquisitions for their own welfare at the expense of shareholders (Jensen, 1986). This is another 
potential cause of negative abnormal returns for the acquiring firm´s shareholders.  
2.3 Information asymmetry 
A familiar concept in the financial theory and research is information asymmetry. Information 
asymmetry basically implies that one party has superior information compared to another (Ogden 
et al, 2002). 
Information asymmetry in M&A deals exists between several different parties, but an important 
consideration is the information asymmetry between the acquirer and target concerning the target 
firm. While information asymmetry is present in all forms of acquisitions, the problem is likely to 
be larger when considering acquisitions of private firms. Public firms have to comply with certain 
standards concerning information disclosure to the market and they are also highly monitored by 
other stakeholders such as the media and analysts. In contrast, there is usually less information 
available concerning private firms. (Officer, 2007) 
According to the traditional information asymmetry hypothesis presented by Akerlof (1970), 
asymmetric information puts the buyer at risk of overpaying, and a price discount is therefore 
applied when acquiring assets with uncertain value. When a buyer targets a private firm, the offer 
price may therefore be discounted to reflect higher information asymmetry. (Officer, 2007; Shen, 
2006)  
Furthermore, in M&As, certain information concerning the deal, e.g. synergy effects, growth 
opportunities and financial improvements, may only be known by the managers of the acquiring 
firm but not the market. According to the signaling hypothesis, managers can use this 
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informational advantage to send signals to the market by their statements and actions. Managers 
reveal information regarding the future performance of the firm by acquiring another firm. (Klein 
et al, 2002) 
Two implications regarding information asymmetry are important for this study. First of all, the 
theory suggests that private firms should be bought at a discount compared to publicly traded 
firms due to higher information asymmetry between the participants, as discussed later in this 
chapter. In the end, the discount should lead to higher abnormal returns for the acquiring firm. 
The existing empirical evidence also suggests that a negative relationship between target 
information asymmetry and abnormal returns for the acquirer exists.  
The second implication is that managers can send signals to the market already prior the 
announcement of the M&A. The signals can be sent through statements such as communicating 
the firm’s M&A strategy or acquisition plan, or actions such as the firm´s past M&A record. If 
the managers are credible and the information is of high quality the market should react 
accordingly and the stock price should adjust to the new information available. If the signals are 
credible the market should adapt to this information and the announcement effect should 
therefore be smaller. 
2.4 Previous research 
Previous published research relevant for the study is presented in chronological order below.  
2.4.1 Announcement effect 
The academic research regarding M&As´ announcement effect is comprehensive and the 
evidence suggests that the target´s shareholders generally are the “winners”, earning a significant 
average abnormal return following the announcement. This is already stated in Jensen & 
Ruback´s study from 1983. The evidence for the bidders´ shareholders, on the other hand, shows 
some mixed results – slightly positive, insignificantly different from zero or negative abnormal 
returns (Andrade et al, 2001, Bruner, 2002). Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003) show that 
the acquiring firm´s shareholders are the ones losing in an M&A and that it generally leads to a 1-
3 % decrease in the acquiring firm´s share price after the announcement. The imminent part of 
previous studies show that more than one third of the M&As that are completed are value 
destroying for the bidder´s shareholders (Koller et al., 2011). To further concretize this, 
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McKinsey´s study of 1415 M&As between the years 1997-2009 shows an average combined 
market value increase of 4 % following an M&A. If the market value increase is divided into the 
acquiring firm versus the target firm, the average decrease is -5.8 % for the acquiring firms 
whereas the percentage is +9.8 % for the target firms (Rehm & Sivertsen, 2010). The reaction of 
the market supposedly depends on what expectations the market has about the participants in the 
M&A and the deal characteristics.  
In conclusion, M&As are value creating according to previous research, but the real value 
creation is accredited to the target firm´s shareholders. One main reason for this bias is the 
premium paid to the target´s shareholders around the M&A being approximately equal to the 
value created. Therefore, the target´s shareholders capture the value creation (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2007). 
2.4.2 Private versus public target firms 
When it comes more specifically to the announcement effect considering acquisitions of public 
versus private targets, Chang (1998) examines bidder returns after an M&A announcement where 
the target firm is privately held. The study is done on the U.S. market between the years 1981-
1992. In stock offers, the bidding firm experiences a positive abnormal return, which is contrary 
to the negative abnormal returns for acquiring firms when it comes to acquiring publicly traded 
firms. However, Chang (1998) also states that the bidders do not gain any abnormal returns in 
cash offers. This positive wealth effect is according to Chang (1998) “related to monitoring 
activities by targets shareholders and, to an extent, reduced information asymmetries”.  
Koeplin, Sarin and Shapiro (2000), on the other hand, estimate the private firm discount for a set 
of domestic (U.S.) and foreign transactions in their article. They examine all acquisitions of 
private acquisitions made during 1984-1998. For each private firm transaction, a comparable 
publicly traded firm is found and thereafter different valuation ratios are compared. Koeplin et al 
(2000) find that domestic private firms are acquired at an average of 20-30 % discount relative to 
similar public firms and they also find that the private firm discounts are even larger for foreign 
firms.  
Another study by Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) analyses the relative size by examining 
differences in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for public firms acquiring public versus 
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private targets. They investigate the returns to shareholders of the acquiring firms in the U.S. that 
made five or more successful bids within three years in the period 1990 to 2000. Their study 
shows that bidders in deals with public targets have significantly negative CAR, which is in line 
with Chang (1998). On the contrary, significantly positive returns are found when buying private 
or subsidiary targets. The positive CAR return in acquisitions of private targets is further 
explained through the private firm discount, which implies a discount that investors require for 
the information asymmetry and less liquid assets.  
Kooli, Kortas and L´Hers´ (2003) have yet another angle on their research where they attempt to 
answer how large the discount for lack of marketability (DLM) attached to private firm 
valuations is. They use a large U.S.-sample within the period 1995 to 2002. By using several 
multiples, they find that there is a large discount attached to private firms. Kooli et al (2003) find 
a median earnings multiple DLM of 34 %, a sales multiple DLM of 17 % and a cash flow 
multiple DLM of 20 %. The results show however that the discount varies with firm 
characteristics and industry, e.g.  for large and growth private firms the DLM tends to be smaller.  
Conn, Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005) examine the announcement effect and the share returns 
three years later of UK acquirers in over 4000 acquisitions. The acquisitions are split into 
domestic, cross-border, public and private targets and the acquisitions occurred during 1984-
1998. The authors hypothesize that the acquirer´s return will be higher in an acquisition of a 
private firm in comparison to a public because of; (1) improved due diligence and monitoring by 
shareholders, (2) lack of hubris in the bidding process and (3) the presence of the private firm 
discount. The authors find that domestic, public acquisitions result in a negative announcement 
and post-acquisition returns and cross-border, public acquisitions result in insignificant 
announcement returns and negative post-acquisition returns. On the other hand, both domestic 
and cross-border, private acquisitions are shown to have positive announcement returns but 
insignificant post-acquisition returns. In other words, the returns are short-term.  
Draper and Paudyal (2006) investigate the impact of private takeovers on the risk adjusted return 
of listed UK acquirers over the period 1981 to 2001. Their results show that acquirers earn 
significant positive returns during the announcement period, but the gains depend on mode of 
payment, relative size of the participants and also their target status. These characteristics will be 
discussed further in section 2.4.4. Acquirers of listed targets, on the other hand, do not experience 
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any great change in their share price around the announcement period, according to Draper and 
Paudyal (2006) they break even or suffer a small loss.  
Furthermore, Faccio, McConnell and Stolin (2006) examine the wealth created for the acquirers´ 
shareholders around the announcement of acquisitions of public versus private targets. This is 
done over the period 1996-2001 in 17 European countries. Just as earlier studies on the U.S. 
market has stated, acquirers of listed firms earn zero or slightly negative average abnormal 
returns (-0.38 % on average) and acquirers of private firms earn positive and significant average 
abnormal returns (1.48 % on average). The wealth increase is also significantly greater than that 
of public firms and this is pervasive – it persists both through time and across countries. This 
listing effect is also shown to remain after controlling for the payment method, the size of the 
bidder and Tobin´s Q, eventual information leakage before the announcement is made, if the 
acquisition results in a block holder in the acquirer´s ownership structure, if the deal was 
domestic or cross-border etc. Some of these factors will be more thoroughly discussed in the next 
section.  
Officer (2007) documents in his article “The price of corporate liquidity: Acquisition discounts 
for unlisted targets” that the average acquisition discounts for stand-alone private firms and 
subsidiaries of other firms average 15-30 % relative to comparable multiples paid to acquire 
public firms. These results are close to what Koeplin et al concluded in 2000, but the studied 
period is longer, namely from 1979-2003 and Officer also includes unsuccessful bids. 
Block (2007) follows the approach of Koeplin et al (2000) of comparing privately traded firms´ 
valuation to publicly traded firms in the same industry over a comparable time period. In contrast 
to Koeplin et al (2000), Block (2007) includes financial institutions and regulated utilities in the 
data. The studied period is 1999 to 2006 and the studied market is the U.S.. Conclusions are 
drawn based on five different valuation multiples, e.g. Enterprise value/EBIT and Block finds 
that private firms generally trade at multiples 20-25 % lower than public firms.  
Klein and Scheibel (2012) examine the private firm discount for European countries, especially 
the 11 European countries that were the founding members of the Euro in 1999. The studied 
period is 1999 to 2009. Their findings show that private firms sell at a discount relative to public 
firms since public market valuation ratios are higher than the valuation ratios for private firms. 
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The discount amounts to 5% for these Eurozone private firms in comparison to their publicly 
listed peers. The percentage of the discount is however a bit smaller than studies performed on 
the U.S. market, e.g. Koeplin et al (2000) and Kooli et al (2003).  
Madura and Susnjara (2013) study 8000 targets in the U.S. and Western Europe during the period 
1997-2009. Western Europe is here defined as the pre-2004 European Union plus Norway and 
Switzerland. Madura and Susnjara study both successful and unsuccessful bids. They find that 
private targets receive relatively higher valuation multiples in comparison to public targets. This 
premium is interesting considering the illiquidity and asymmetric information exhibited by 
private targets.  
Overall, it can be concluded from these previous studies that private firms sell at a discount 
relative to public firms and acquirers of private firms earn positive and significantly abnormal 
returns. Interesting is also that the results do not differ that much depending on where the study 
has been performed or during which time period. None of the studies are performed on data after 
the latest financial crisis though, and Western Europe is still rather overlooked when it comes to 
studies within the field of M&As, the short-term announcement effect and which deal 
characteristics that affect the value creation for the acquiring firm.  
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Researcher Sample 
period
Country Sample Size Event Window CAR Bidder Private company 
discount (PCD)
Results/comments
Chang (1998) 1981-1992 US 281 private, 255 public (-1 to 0) Private: Cash 0.09 %
Stock 2.64 % 
Public: Cash -0.02 %
Stock -2.46 %
- When acquiring a private firm, bidders experience a positive 
abnormal return in stock offers, which contrasts with the negative 
abnormal return typically found for bidders acquiring a publicly 
traded target. In cash offers, on the other hand, bidders 
experience no abnormal return. Suggest that the positive wealth 
effect is related to monitoring activities and reduced  information 
asymmetries.
Koeplin et al (2000) 1984-1998 US and foreign 
transactions
84 in the US, 108 foreign - - Domestic firms: 20-30 %
Non-US firms: 40-50 %
Domestic private companies are acquired at an average of 20-30 % 
discount relative to similar public companies. This discount is 
even larger for foreign firms.
Fuller et al (2002) 1990-2000 US 2516 
(456 public targets)
(2060 private targets)
(-2 to + 2) Public: - 1.00 %, 
Private: + 2.08 %
- The study shows that bidders in deals with public targets have 
significantly negative CAR, and it increases the larger the public 
target is relative the bidder. On the contrary, significantly positive 
returns are found when buying private or subsidiary targets. The 
positive CAR return in acquisitions of private targets is further 
explained through the private firm discount, which implies a 
discount investor´s demand for less liquid assets and information 
asymmetry.
Kooli et al (2003) 1995-2002 US 331 private - - Earnings multiple: 34 % 
Sales multiple: 17 %
Cash flow multiple: 20 %
The authors use several multiples to answer how large the 
discount for private firms is. They find that there is a large 
discount attached to private firms, but this discount varies with 
firm characteristics and industry.
Conn et al (2005) 1984-1998 UK 4344 
(131 cross-border public 
targets) (1009 cross-border 
private targets) 
(576 domestic public targets) 
(2628 domestic private targets)
(-1 to 1) Public: 
Domestic: -0.99
Cross-border: -0.09
Private: 
Domestic: 1.05 %,
Cross-border: 0.38 % 
- The authors find that domestic, public acquisitions result in a 
negative announcement and post-acquisition returns and cross-
border, public acquisitions result in insignificant announcement 
returns and negative post-acquisition returns. 
On the other hand, both domestic and cross-border, private 
acquisitions are shown to have positive announcement returns 
but insignificant post-acquisition returns. In other words, the 
returns are short-term. 
Draper & Paudyal 
(2006)
1981-2001 UK 8597 
(7499 private targets)
(1098 public targets)
(-20 to + 20) 
and 
(-1 to +1)
(- 20 to + 20): 
Public: -0.41 % 
Private: 1.99 %
(- 1 to + 1): 
Public: - 0.41 % 
Private: 0.85 %
- The authors´ results show that acquirers earn a significant positive 
return during the announcement period, but the gains depend on 
the mode of payment, relative size and target status. 
Faccio et al (2006) 1996-2001 Western 
Europé
4429 acquisitions 
(735 public targets)
(1956 private targets)
(1738 subsidiaries)
(-2 to + 2) Public: - 0.38 % 
Private: 1.48 %
- The authors show that acquirers of listed firms earn zero or 
slightly negative average abnormal returns and acquirers of 
private firms earn positive and significant average abnormal 
returns. The wealth increase is also significantly greater than that 
of public firms and it is pervasive. This listing effect is also shown 
to remain after controlling for some variables, e.g. relative size.   
Officer (2007) 1979-2003 US Initially 12716 bids - - 15-30 % Officer finds that the acquisition discounts for stand-alone private 
firms and subsidiaries of other firms are on average 15-30 % 
relative to comparable multiples paid to acquire public firms. 
Officer also includes unsuccessful bids, in comparison to previous 
studies.
Block (2007) 1999-2006 US 91 public and private firms - - 20-25 % The study compares privately traded firm´s valuation to publicly 
traded firms within the same industry over a comparable time 
period. They show that private firms generally trade at multiples 
20-25 % lower than public companies. 
Klein & Scheibel 
(2012)
1999-2009 Europé 138 comparable transaction 
pairs
- - 5% Klein and Scheibels´ findings show that private firms sell at a 
discount relative to public firms since public market valuation 
ratios are higher than the valuation ratios for private firms. The 
discount amounts to 5 % for these Eurozone private companies in 
comparison to their publicly listed peers.
Madura & Susnjara 
(2013)
1997-2009 US and 
Western 
Europé
8036 targets - - Private targets receive relatively higher valuation multiples than 
comparable public targets. The private valuation premium is 
intriguing because of the illiquidity and asymmetric information 
that private targets show. Their results support the hypothesis of 
a bidder´s ability to pay a high multiple for a target in which there 
is a lack of transparency.
Table 2.1 Summary of previous research on announcement effect 
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2.4.3 Summary and discussion 
Above, previous studies that are relevant for this study were summarized. In this section these 
studies are discussed and reviewed in order to lead to the study´s hypotheses.  
What needs to be taken into account regarding previous empirical findings is that the studied 
countries´ ownership structure, limited company laws, the liquidity of the stocks and the size of 
the firms differ which may affect the results of the studies. Some previous international empirical 
findings are also getting rather old and both regulations as well as data collection methods differ 
significantly then and now. Moreover, the chosen model, time period, studied market, type of 
transaction, deal characteristics, the size of the firm etc. matter for how the results can differ.  
Several of the previous studies have concluded that M&As are value creating for the target firm´s 
shareholders and rather value destroying for the acquiring firm´s shareholders (e.g. Andrade et al, 
2001; Bruner, 2002; Rehm & Sivertsen, 2010). Further, when more specifically studying the 
announcement effect regarding acquisitions of private versus public targets, as e.g. Chang (1998), 
Fuller et al (2002), Conn et al (2005) and Faccio et al (2006), the findings are also in line with 
each other. The acquiring firm´s shareholders gain significant positive abnormal returns in all of 
the studies when acquiring private targets, in contrast to when acquiring public targets.  However, 
they emphasize different things in their studies and they also use different event windows. Chang 
(1998) uses an event window of t-1 to t0 and his focus is on the method of payment, while Conn 
et al (2005) use an event window of -1 to +1 day and their focus lies on domestic versus cross-
border deals. Furthermore, these two studies also examine two different time periods.   
Another aspect of the previous empirical findings has been to focus solely on the private firm 
discount (Koeplin et al, 2000; Officer, 2007; Klein & Scheibel, 2012). Koeplin et al examine 
domestic and foreign firms, Officer includes unsuccessful bids and Klein & Scheibel look at 
comparable transaction pairs. Still they all find quite a large private firm discount. One study, on 
the other hand, contradicts this result. Madura and Susnjara (2013) conclude that private targets 
receive higher valuation multiples than comparable public targets. The authors choose to 
overlook this, since Madura and Susnjara´s study examines both the U.S. and the European 
market and the majority of the other previous studies show the contrary.  
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It seems like the basic causes for the private firm discount, i.e. information asymmetry, illiquidity 
in private firm stocks and lower bidder competition applies to most markets and studied time 
periods.  
The strength of these studies moreover lies in that the results are from different markets and time 
periods, they use different event windows and emphasize e.g. different deal characteristics and 
finally, the researchers have also used some different models, but nevertheless conclude similar 
results.   
At the same time this strength can also be considered the weakness of the previous studies. This 
since it can be seen as rather odd that the studies all find similar results, considering their studied 
markets, sample, size of the sample, studied time period and so on. Intuitively, the difference 
between the results is expected to be larger, since the markets differ a lot in rules and regulations 
and also what type of investors there are on the market. These differences as well as what the 
ownership structure and the managerial culture looks like should have an economic impact, 
according to La Porta et al (2008).  
The results from previous empirical findings can still be improved and updated and only a few 
studies are made on the European market. This study has, based on the above arguments, 
generated the hypotheses stated in section 2.6. 
2.4.4. Value-creating characteristics 
Theoretical insights can also result from examining the association between the magnitude of 
abnormal returns around the M&A announcement and different target characteristics specific to 
the acquisition. In this section, the most important previous research surrounding value-creating 
characteristics is summarized, which will then form the basis for this study.  
Deal size 
Previous research has studied the correlation between the absolute deal size and the abnormal 
returns surrounding the announcements. The empirical evidence is mixed and the findings cannot 
be generalized. Several researchers have presented their own theories on whether the relationship 
should be positive or negative.  
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Alexandridis et al (2011) argue that larger deals destroy value for the acquiring firms´ 
shareholders, simply because the uncertainty and complexity increases with deal size, and larger 
targets are more difficult to assimilate into a combined organization. Loderer and Martin (1990) 
also claim that larger deals should be less attractive, but their main reason is that there is a higher 
risk of overpayment due to managerial over-confidence in larger deals.  
On the contrary, Tuch and O’Sullivan´s (2007) study finds that larger targets create more value 
for the acquiring company. Gordon, Kahl and Rosen (2009) suggest that the competition for large 
firms should be lower since there are fewer firms capable of buying such large firms. According 
to them, this should mitigate the winner’s curse problem and lead to lower acquisition premiums 
and higher abnormal returns.  
Domestic versus cross-border 
Conn et al (2005) examine the announcement effect and subsequent share returns for UK 
acquirers in over 4000 acquisitions from 1984 to 1998, and specifically focus on the impact of 
whether the target firm is located domestically or abroad. They find that domestic acquisitions of 
public targets in general result in negative abnormal returns. In contrast, both domestic and cross-
border acquisitions of private targets result in positive announcement returns. Overall, they 
conclude that cross-border acquisitions result in both lower abnormal returns and subsequent 
lower performance compared to domestic acquisitions.  
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) perform a similar study, analyzing the short-term wealth effect 
of large European takeover bids from 1993 to 2000. They also found that domestic M&As 
generally trigger higher abnormal returns compared to cross-border operations, and furthermore 
that the premiums paid to a large extent depend on the location of the target. 
Focused versus diversified 
A number of studies have also investigated the difference in value creation depending on whether 
the takeover firm is in the same industry as the acquirer or not, i.e. diversified or focused 
acquisitions. Goergen and Renneboogs´ (2004) study finds that diversified M&A announcements 
do not have any short-term announcement effect on the bidder, claiming that the market considers 
realizing synergy effects harder in these types of deals.  
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Several other researchers have also found a general diversification discount for firms (Berger & 
Ofek, 1995, Lang & Stultz, 1994). According to Gaughan (2007), the track record of diversified 
acquisitions is not very impressive, although certain types of diversified transactions, not 
involving a movement to a very different business category, have a better track record. Firms 
generally experience greater success performing horizontal M&As resulting in an increase in 
market share.  
Doukas et al (2002) study the short-term shareholder wealth effect for acquisitions performed by 
Swedish firms, and find similar results indicating that focused acquisitions result in greater 
synergies and operating efficiencies. They conclude that investors can diversify their portfolios 
themselves to achieve a lower portfolio risk, and hence firms should stick to their core activities.  
Form of the transaction 
In general, there are two forms of business acquisitions. First of all, firms can acquire all or most 
of the assets and liabilities of the target, i.e. an asset purchase. Secondly, firms can be acquired by 
acquiring the shares of the firm (Burton & Nussbaum, 2012). According to Bieshaar et al (2001), 
the form of the transaction is important to explain differences in abnormal returns, where 
acquisitions of shares generally generate higher abnormal returns for the acquiring firm compared 
to acquisitions of assets. They perform a regression analysis to analyze the stock market return 
following M&A announcements and find that the market is more positive to acquisitions of 
stocks in the target firm. When they instead acquire the assets of the target company, the market 
shows no particular reaction.  
One possible explanation is that the cash-flows generated by specific assets are generally harder 
to separate and estimate compared to the cash-flows for the whole firm. This increases the 
information asymmetry and therefore a discount for acquisitions is applied. Thus, assumed 
synergies are more likely to be captured by the acquirer in acquisition of shares rather than in 
acquisition of assets. (Biershaar et al, 2001) 
Method of payment 
Previous studies and literature show some consensus regarding the influence of the payment 
method on the announcement effect. According to Yook (2003), previous studies examining the 
29 
 
effect of the payment method on bidder returns in M&As have found significant differences 
between stock and cash deals. Several researchers provide evidence that cash bids are generally 
associated with higher abnormal returns than stock bids in the short run (Travlos, 1987; Asquith 
et al, 1987; Draper & Paudyal, 1999; Andrade et al, 2001; Dong et al, 2005).  
Several different hypotheses have been presented to explain the results. One of the most common 
explanations is the signaling role of debt, derived from the signaling hypothesis. Firms 
performing acquisitions financed with equity are likely to issue new common stock, whereas 
firms undergoing cash acquisitions are likely to issue new debt. According to the signaling 
hypothesis the type of security issued conveys information about the firm, and debt issues are 
generally issued with higher returns compared to equity issues. Moreover, there is generally tax 
benefits associated with debt and debt also has a higher disciplinary power than equity. (Yook, 
2003) 
Another study is performed by Travlos´ (1987), in which he compares the effect of the method of 
payment for public and private targets respectively. For private targets, he finds negative 
abnormal returns for acquiring firms financing a takeover with common stock and no abnormal 
returns for those financing with cash. For public targets, the results differ a bit. The results show 
that cash or combination offers lead to insignificant bidder returns, whilst stock offers result in 
significantly negative returns.  
Relative size 
Several previous studies have also examined the relationship between the relative size of the 
target to the acquirer and the abnormal return for the acquirer. Even though the authors have used 
different methods to calculate the relative size, most of them have found that the bidders´ 
abnormal returns are positively related to the relative size of the target (Asquith et al, 1983, 
Loderer et al, 1990). However, in a comprehensive study by Madura and Susnjara (2013), over 
8000 acquisitions in the U.S. and Western Europe during 1997-2009 are studied. They find that 
the premium paid for private targets is inversely related to the size of the target, i.e. bidders tend 
to justify a relative high payment for small targets without destroying bidder value.  
Fuller et al (2002) further analyze the effect of relative size by investigating the differences in 
abnormal returns for large public firms acquiring both public and private targets. Interestingly, 
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they find that, in announcements of public targets, relative size was inversely related to the 
abnormal return. In contrast, in private target deals, the relationship between relative size and 
abnormal return for the bidder is positive. Draper and Paudyal (1999) further examine the impact 
of private takeovers of listed UK acquirers over the period 1981 to 2001. Their results show that 
acquirers earn significant positive returns during the announcement period, but bidders acquiring 
very small firms relative to their own size are shown to not achieve any noticeable gain. The 
monetary value of the assumed synergies results in significantly higher excess returns when the 
target is large, at least during the short event-period window. 
Table 2.2 Summary of previous research on value-creating characteristics 
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2.5 Differences between private and public targets 
As discussed earlier, several previous studies have determined that bidders, on average, receive 
slightly positive, zero or negative abnormal returns when acquiring public firms but are on 
average able to gain a significant positive abnormal return when acquiring private firms. Several 
researchers have also attempted to determine the factors driving this private firm discount, 
although the causes of the market reactions are not yet fully determined (Officer et al, 2008). The 
discount is obviously driven by several factors, and the main differences between public and 
private firms are discussed below.  
2.5.1 Illiquidity 
Liquidity is the ability to convert an asset into cash at a low and relatively predictable cost. 
Hence, a liquid stock market is a market with many buyers and sellers, where the stocks can be 
bought and sold at their intrinsic value at any given time (Koller et al, 2010, pp. 252). All of the 
public firms included in this study are traded at large, liquid markets, and hence can be bought 
and sold whenever wanted. In contrast, private firms are referred to as illiquid because they are 
not traded at a public marketplace. These stocks are more difficult to both buy and sell and their 
current value may not always mirror the real value of the firm.  
Several authors, among them Capron and Shen (2007), claim that the illiquidity of private firms 
is the main reason for the private firm discount. The reasons for the illiquidity discount have also 
been argued for back and forth, and several researchers have presented different theories. Pratt et 
al (2000) argue that the lack of liquidity reduces the investor’s free cash flow and makes it more 
costly to allocate their capital to other assets. Moreover, Damodaran (2003) argues that liquidity 
is correlated with the current market conditions. This would imply that illiquid stocks should 
have a higher market risk and hence a premium should be included to reflect the higher risk. 
Altogether, this implies that a private firm discount should be applied when acquiring private 
firms. Taking this into consideration, it would also imply that the acquirers could create an 
implicit synergy based on liquidity when acquiring a private target. Put differently, the target firm 
is worth more for a public acquirer than for the target firms´ shareholders, and given that the 
premium paid does not increase by the same amount, a larger value creation for the acquiring 
firm might be possible.  
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2.5.2 Information asymmetry 
One key difference between private and public firms is the availability of information to assess 
and value the firm (Capron & Shen, 2007). Publicly traded firms operate under strict regulatory 
requirements and more information to the investors. Moreover, they are also constantly 
monitored and evaluated by analysts and other stakeholders who further decrease the uncertainty 
about their value. In contrast, private firms usually operate less transparent and their managers 
typically have better control over the information they want to communicate (Reuer and 
Ragozzino, 2007). As mentioned above, information asymmetry puts buyers at a risk of 
overpaying, and hence the response from the acquirer is to reduce the offer price. When a buyer 
targets a private firm it may discount its offer to reflect the possibility of the target to turn out to 
be a lemon (Akerlof, 1970). 
2.5.3 Lower bidder competition  
Another factor influencing the acquisition is the competition in the bidding process. Capron and 
Shen (2007) argue that bidders face less competition in the market for private firms due to the 
lack of visibility, transparency, and market price associated with private firms which create 
frictions when buying these. The selling process for public firms is often auction-like, involving 
many buyers which create a high price competition. In contrast, private targets are often sold in 
private negotiations with fewer potential buyers and the negotiations are most often based on 
voluntary exchange (Koeplin et al, 2000). The lower number of bidders decreases the bargaining 
power of the target relative to the acquirer. In the end, the lower bidder competition decreases the 
final premium paid and the acquirer will receive a larger part of the synergies between the firms. 
Hence, this should result in a higher positive abnormal return for the acquirer (Capron & Shen, 
2007).  
2.6 Hypotheses  
As stated earlier the first purpose of this study is to examine the announcement effect, resulting 
from an M&A, for acquiring firms with emphasis on the difference between acquiring public 
versus private targets. Stated more specifically, the study aims to examine if a difference in the 
announcement effect for an acquiring firm exists when a bid is made for a public target versus a 
private target.  
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Based on existing theory and the current state of knowledge within the field, the following 
hypotheses have been formulated: 
2.6.1 Hypotheses examining abnormal returns 
1. Total Sample 
H0: M&A announcements do not generate a cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer during 
the event window (t-1…t+1) 
H1: M&A announcements do generate a cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer during the 
event window (t-1…t+1) 
2. Acquirers of publicly held targets 
H0: M&A announcements for publicly held targets do not generate a cumulative abnormal return 
for the acquirer during the event window (t-1…t+1) 
H1: M&A announcements for publicly held targets do generate a cumulative abnormal return for 
the acquirer during the event window (t-1…t+1) 
3. Acquirers of privately held targets 
H0: M&A announcements for privately held targets do not generate a cumulative abnormal return 
for the acquirer during the event window (t-1…t+1) 
H1: M&A announcements for privately held targets do generate a cumulative abnormal return for 
the acquirer during the event window (t-1…t+1) 
4. Difference between acquirers of public versus private targets 
H0: There is no difference in cumulative abnormal return between M&A announcements for 
privately held versus publicly held targets during the event window (t-1…t+1) 
H1: There is a difference in cumulative abnormal return between M&A announcements for 
privately held versus publicly held targets during the event window (t-1…t+1) 
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Table 2.3 Summary of the study’s hypotheses (event study) 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
 
2.6.2 Hypotheses examining value-creating characteristics 
Table 2.4 Summary of the study’s hypotheses (regression analysis) 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
Hypothesis Tests if
H1 (1)  Private target deals are positively related to CAR acquiring all targets
H1 (2) Cash deals are positively related to CAR acquiring all targets
H1 (3) Focused deals are positively related to CAR acquiring all targets
H1 (4) Domestic deals are positively related to CAR acquiring all targets
H1 (5) Equity deals are positively related to CAR acquiring all targets
H1 (6) Deal size is positively related to CAR acquiring all targets
H1 (7) The relative size is positively related to CAR acquiring all targets
H2 (1) Cash deals are positively related to CAR acquiring public targets
H2 (2) Focused deals are positively related to CAR acquiring public targets
H2 (3) Domestic deals are positively related to CAR acquiring public targets
H2 (4) Equity deals are positively related to CAR acquiring public targets
H2 (5) Deal size is positively related to CAR acquiring public targets
H2 (6) The relative size is positively related to CAR acquiring public targets
H3 (1) Cash deals are positively related to CAR acquiring private targets
H3 (2) Focused deals are positively related to CAR acquiring private targets
H3 (3) Domestic deals are positively related to CAR acquiring private targets
H3 (4) Equity deals are positively related to CAR acquiring private targets
H3 (5) Deal size is positively related to CAR acquiring private targets
H3 (6) The relative size is positively related to CAR acquiring private targets
Total Sample
Public Targets
Private Targets
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter the study´s research approach, sample selection and criteria, models and 
calculations are outlined. Lastly, the reliability and validity of the study is addressed.  
3.1 Research approach 
3.1.1 Inductive and deductive approach 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011, pp.11), there are two approaches when it comes to 
empirical evidence; a deductive and an inductive approach. The deductive approach implies that 
the researcher, based on existing theory, derives a hypothesis which then has to be empirically 
tested. The inductive approach implies that the researcher derives conclusions based on empirical 
experiences. This means that the results of the study are analyzed and consequences are drawn 
which then leads to a probable conclusion. 
3.1.2 Research method 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011, Ch. 4), a study can be constructed in two ways; 
quantitatively or qualitatively. A quantitative study comprises of a deductive approach where 
different theories are tested and the phenomenon is studied from an objective point of view. 
Knowledge in a quantitative study is furthermore based on empirical methods. Contrary to this is 
the qualitative approach, where the emphasis is on generating theories and studying the 
phenomenon by trying to examine how individuals experience the studied event (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011, Ch. 1).  
This study is based on a thorough walk-through of theory, previous studies and empirical 
evidence within the field of M&As. Based on this the authors choose a deductive approach. In 
combination with quantifiable data that is empirically tested through an event study, which is a 
well-established method within M&A-studies (Tuch & O´Sullivan, 2007) to examine how the 
value of the acquiring firm´s shares changes in conjunction with the announcement, and 
furthermore a regression analysis to examine how different deal characteristics affect the 
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Our hypotheses will be tested with a 95 % 
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confidence interval since this is a common interval in statistical studies (Körner & Wahlgren, 
2006, Ch. 8). 
3.2 Data set 
3.2.1 Data collection 
In order to investigate the value creation surrounding M&A announcements a large amount of 
data is collected from various different sources and databases. Previous research on the topic is 
collected from the Lund University library database, LUBsearch, and Google Scholar, a web 
search engine indexing scholarly literature. 
In addition to this, different databases are used to gather raw data that is used in the event study 
and regression analysis. All of the data is gathered from secondary sources, i.e. the data is 
originally collected by other organizations and institutions. In order to mitigate the risk of 
measurement error and incorrect data, only well-known sources that should be considered reliable 
are used. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Eikon is used to collect data regarding the M&A announcements for the specified time period and 
markets. Furthermore, it is also used to collect necessary information concerning deal- and firm 
characteristics to perform the event study and regression analysis. The sample selection process is 
presented in section 3.2.2. 
Thomson Reuters Datastream 
Datastream is used to collect historical daily share prices for the acquiring firms, both during the 
estimation window and event window. In addition, the market capitalization of the target firms is 
also collected to be able to calculate two of the variables used in the regression analysis.  
Daily observations are used for both stock prices and indices returns in order to increase the 
power of the statistical tests and closing prices are used to capture the price movements during 
the entire day (MacKinlay, 1997). Moreover, adjusted stock prices are used to eliminate the effect 
of stock splits, dividends, rights offerings, etc.  
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Public target Private target Total
All Announcements Reported in Eikon 418,188 165,125 944412
Announcement Date 1-jan-2009 to 1-feb-2015 41719 127121 277400
Acquirer Nation
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 5543 31363 59659
Acquirer Public Status Public 2395 7628 15722
Target Public Status Public or Private 2395 7628 10023
Percentage Acquired > 50 % 347 4835 5182
Deal Size > $ 50 mn 234 440 674
Acquirer- and Target Industry All except alternative Financial Investments, asset management, banks, brokerage, credit institutions, insurance, other financials188 397 585
Critera for data quality set by the authors Criteria Public target Private target Total
Data availability Reported in Datastream 173 378 551
Control for clustering Event Window does not overlap 172 367 539
Number of observations
Criteria for delimitations set in Eikon Criteria
Both Thomson Reuters Eikon and Thomson Reuters Datastream are well-known databases used 
by both academics and professionals at various institutions and the information gathered is 
therefore considered reliable.  
 
Datastream Global Equity Indices 
Datastream Global Equity Indices are used as benchmarking indices in the regression analysis. 
These indices are value-weighted price indices covering all listed shares in each of the 17 studied 
markets, making them good for benchmarking purposes. Since the firms in the study are listed on 
different exchanges, each stock is benchmarked to its respective index to increase the accuracy of 
the study.  
It is important to note that these indices are affected by a number of factors and that smaller and 
more relevant industry indices could be used to make the research even more reliable. Though, 
considering the research’s time limit and the size of the sample, these indices have been 
deselected.   
3.2.2 Sample selection 
Table 3.1 Sample selection and loss of data 
Source: Created by the authors 
Delimitations set in Eikon 
In table 3.1 the sample selection process is presented and divided into two steps. In the first part 
of the process our data is delimited in Eikon using a number of different criteria. The criteria are 
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chosen both for practical and theoretical reasons and limit the sample to a total of 585 M&A 
announcements.  
First of all the sample is reduced to 59 659 announcements by limiting the time period of the 
announcements to the 1
st
 of January 2009 to the 1
st
 of February 2015 and by setting the acquirer 
nation to the countries chosen for this study (see appendix 2). Furthermore, only M&A-
announcements from public acquirers are considered since the firm has to be public in order to be 
able to observe the impact on the value of the firm following the announcement. The target legal 
status is set to public or private, excluding subsidiaries, joint ventures and government-owned 
firms, which further reduces the sample to 10 023 announcements.  
The deal size is also important since the deals have to be large enough to have a significant 
impact on the acquiring firm. The authors have decided to follow Bouwman et al. (2009) and 
only include deals at or above $ 50 million. Similar criteria are used in several previous studies, 
among them Loderer & Martin, (1990), Goergen & Renneboog, (2004), Gordon et al (2009) and 
Fuller et al (2011), and furthermore, the bidder must intend to acquire more than 50% of the 
target´s shares, which is a common delimitation to ensure that a controlling position is attained 
(Bouwman et al, 2009).  
Both acquirers and targets from finance-related industries are excluded from the study since they 
belong to a different sector of the economy, serving under different regulations and practicing 
different accounting principles, essentially making it harder to value them correctly and 
comparing them with non-financial firms (Koller et al, 2010). According to Foerster & Sapp 
(2005) the exclusion of financial firms is also justified since their capital structure normally 
differs a lot from other industries. This results in a total sample from Eikon of 585 
announcements, where 188 announcements are for public targets and 397 are for private targets. 
Delimitations to ensure data quality 
In the second stage of the sample selection process the observations are filtered to ensure that the 
necessary data is available and meets predetermined criteria. First of all the necessary data on 
daily share prices for the bidder must be available during both the estimation- and event window. 
If the bidder was listed within a year of the announcement the expected return cannot be 
estimated accurately and 36 of the announcements are excluded for this reason.  
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When controlling for clustering, an additional 12 observations are excluded due to overlapping 
event windows. This occurs when an acquirer has acquired more than one firm during a three-day 
period, and therefore it is impossible to separate the effects of the individual acquisitions. 
Another reason to control for clustering is to avoid serial autocorrelation and violation of OLS 
assumption 3 (Bernard, 1987). A list of all the excluded announcements can be found in appendix 
4. Following this loss of data the total sample consists of 539 observations where 172 are for 
public targets and 367 are for private targets.  
Since the reasons for the loss of data cannot be linked to any specific deal- or firm characteristics, 
e.g. firm industry or deal size, the authors consider it to have no effect on the results or the 
accuracy of the study.  
3.3 Measuring the Abnormal Return 
3.3.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was developed by Eugene Fama in 1970. According to 
the efficient market hypothesis, market prices fully reflect all available information. This 
implicates that investors cannot earn abnormal returns by trading on currently available public 
information (Jensen & Smith, 1984). New information released to the market will immediately be 
reflected in the stock price and hence investors will not be able to earn abnormal returns by using 
historical prices to predict future price movements.  
According to Fama (1970), there are three main underlying assumptions for the market to be 
considered efficient: 
 There are no transaction costs when trading securities 
 All relevant information about firms is available to all market participants 
 All market participants interpret available information in the same way 
In reality, all these assumptions are rarely met. Though, according to Fama (1970), these 
conditions may not necessarily be required for the market to be efficient, even if they are 
preferred. Furthermore, according to Fama (1970) markets can be classified into three categories 
based on their market efficiency: 
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Weak market efficiency 
In a weakly efficient marketM all historical data is already reflected in the stock price. Investors 
will not be able to earn abnormal returns by using technical analysis, i.e. by predicting future 
price movements based on trends and historical data. However, private and public information is 
not incorporated immediately, and hence investors with this kind of information will be able to 
exploit it to earn abnormal returns.  
Semi-strong market efficiency 
In a semi-strong market, the stock price reflects all public information concerning the firms, e.g. 
financial reports, press releases, etc. Information that is private is not reflected in the stock price 
and hence, investors with inside information can use their informational advantage to earn 
abnormal returns.  
Strong market efficiency 
Strong market efficiency implies that all firm-specific information, both public and private, is 
incorporated in the stock price immediately. Hence, no investors will be able to earn abnormal 
returns without taking on additional risk.  
Critique against the efficient market hypothesis 
The efficiency of the stock markets is a central question in the financial world and a question that 
has been argued about for a long time. Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate the 
efficiency and the empirical evidence is mixed. In this section some of the most common critique 
against the efficient market hypothesis is presented.  
Lo, Mamaysky & Wang (2000) examine the U.S. stock market from 1962 to 1996 to evaluate the 
effectiveness of technical analysis. They prove that some models and patterns in historical data 
can be used to predict future price movements, and hence their study implies that the market in 
fact is not even weakly efficient.  
Another researcher, Robert Shiller (2003), argues that behavioral finance may be important to 
understand the underlying market mechanisms. He presents a number of anomalies in the overall 
stock market that are not consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. For example, he states 
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that “There is a clear sense that the level of volatility of the overall stock market cannot be well 
explained with any variant of the efficient market model in which stock prices are formed by 
looking at the present discounted value of future returns”. 
According to Fama (1998) there are two basic faults in the literature on behavioral finance. The 
first is that the anomalies that are discovered tend to be over-reactions as often as under-
reactions. The second is that the anomalies tend to disappear, either as time goes by or as the 
methodologies improve. 
The relevance of the theory to the study 
The implications of the efficient market hypothesis are important for the study in regards to the 
analysis and interpretation of the results. If the market is efficient, the implications of M&A 
announcements will immediately be reflected in the new value of the firm. All the available 
information will be incorporated in the stock price and future price movements should only 
reflect new information. 
If there are discrepancies between the managements´ and investors’ expectations of the 
implications of new information, misalignments in the stock price may occur, but they are most 
likely to be only temporary. It may also be the case that the management overestimates the value 
of the expected synergies and pays and hence end up paying an excessive premium for the target. 
This is value-destroying for the acquiring firm and may have long-term effects on future 
performance. 
3.3.2 Event Study 
An event study is used to measure to what degree a specific event affects the price of a security. 
It aims to separate firm-specific events from market movements to be able to draw conclusions of 
an events effect on the firm. It is a well-known method used, especially within the financial field, 
but also within econometrics, science of law, etc. (MacKinlay, 1997) 
The stock returns during the days surrounding the announcement are compared to an expected 
return if the event had not occurred. The difference between the two, i.e. the abnormal return, is 
interpreted as the effect of the announcement on the stock price. The effect of the event is 
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expected to immediately be reflected in the stock price and hence, the model assumes that 
investors are rational and that the markets are efficient (MacKinlay, 1997). 
According to MacKinlay (1997) the event study procedure can be divided into the following 
seven steps: 
 
Step 1: Definition of event and timeframe 
The purpose of this paper is to measure the effect of M&A-announcements on the value of the 
bidder following M&A announcements, and the event is thus defined as the announcement itself. 
First, an event window has to be defined, i.e. the period surrounding the event during which the 
abnormal return is measured. In order to capture possible insider trading and information leakage 
prior to the event and delayed effects due to possible weaker market efficiency, it is common 
practice to include a few days prior and after the actual event in the event window (Benninga, 
2008). In this thesis the event window is defined as a three day period, t-1 to t+1, where the 
announcement day is day 0. The three-day event window is one of the most commonly used 
event studies when it comes to the field of M&As (Andrade et al, 2001).  
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There are several benefits of using short event windows. First of all, it decreases the risk of 
clustering which may cause biased estimations of standard errors. Several researchers also 
criticize long-term event studies since according to them, the most reliable results come from 
short event studies (Andrade et al, 2011). Fama (1998), on the other hand, criticizes long-term 
event studies based on the fact that a large proportion of the results can be due to chance. See 
figure 3.1 for a graphical explanation of the event window.  
Step 2: Sample selection 
See section 3.2.2. 
Step 3: Model for estimating the expected returns 
To be able to measure if the M&A announcements have any effect on the market value of the 
firms, an expected return is calculated and then compared to the actual return of the stocks during 
the event window. The expected return is defined as the return that would occur if the event had 
not taken place, and there are several different models used to estimate that return. Usually the 
models are categorized as either economic or statistical models, and each model has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Statistical models rely on statistical assumptions regarding the 
stock price behavior, whereas economic models also include some economic restrictions, usually 
based on economic arguments (MacKinlay, 1997). 
The most common economic models are the arbitrage pricing model (APM) and the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM). Even though the models theoretically should have greater explanatory 
power, several authors have criticized them claiming they skew the results and are unreliable 
when calculating abnormal returns (Banz, 1981; Seyhun, 1988). 
The most common statistical models are the constant mean return model, the market model and 
different multi-factor models (MacKinlay, 1997). The market model can be described as an OLS 
regression model in which the stock return is the independent variable and an index return is the 
explanatory variable. The main critique against the market model is the underlying assumption of 
constant stock betas during the estimation window, which according to Dimson (1979) may not 
be a reasonable argument. Though, when tested empirically, the market model usually provides 
strong results when compared to more sophisticated models (MacKinlay, 1997). Multifactor 
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models try to increase the explanatory power of the models by introducing additional explanatory 
variables. However, empirical results indicate that the gains of introducing additional variables 
are small since the explanatory effect increases only marginally. Additionally, empirical results 
also indicate that multifactor models work best when the sample shares common characteristics, 
which is not the case in this study. Due to the arguments above, the market model is considered 
the best fit and is assumed to provide reliable results, and will therefore be used in this study.  
Equation 1: Market Model 
The expected return is calculated using the market model formula below: 
                         
        = Expected return on security i during period t 
    = Alpha value for security i 
    = Beta value for security i 
       = Return on market portfolio during period t 
      = Zero mean disturbance term 
Source: MacKinlay, 1997 
Equation 2: Actual return 
To apply the market model, daily stock returns and market returns for all cross-sectional units are 
calculated using logged returns according to the formula below: 
      
   
     
 
     = Return on security i during period t 
     = Price of security i on day t 
Source: Strong, 1992 
Logging the returns increases the chance of the results being normally distributed, which is a 
requirement for performing some statistical tests and regressions further ahead (Strong, 1992).  
  
45 
 
Equation 3: Beta values for the individual stocks 
The beta coefficient for the cross-sectional units is calculated using the formula below: 
   
              
       
 
    = Beta value for security i 
     = Return on security i during period t 
        = Return on market portfolio during period t 
        = Variance for the market index on day t 
Source: MacKinlay, 1997 
Equation 4: Alpha value for the individual stocks 
The alpha values for the cross-sectional units are calculated using the formula below: 
                
    = Alpha value for security i 
     = Return on security i during period t 
    = Beta value for security i 
        = Return on market portfolio during period t 
Source: MacKinlay, 1997 
Estimation window 
In order to calculate the expected return using the market model the alpha and beta values of the 
individual stocks have to be estimated during a time period called estimation window. It is 
important that the event window and estimation window do not overlap since it could bias the 
estimation of the parameters. The estimation window used for this study extends from day t-2 to 
t-253, i.e. one year, or 252 trading days. According to Benninga (2008, pp. 371-396) this is the 
most common length used and one benefit of using a whole year is that it captures the possible 
seasonal variation in the stock market. The chosen estimation window and event window are 
graphically visualized in figure 3.1 below: 
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Figure 3.1 Estimation and event window 
 
 
 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
Step 4: Aggregating abnormal returns 
Equation 5: Abnormal returns 
The abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting the expected return from the actual return:  
                
      = Abnormal return of security i during period t 
     = Actual return on security i during period t 
        = Expected return on security i during period t 
Source: MacKinlay, 1997 
Equation 6: Average abnormal return 
The average abnormal return is calculated by aggregating the abnormal returns for each cross-
sectional unit and then dividing it by the number of events in the sample. 
     
 
 
∑    
 
   
 
      = Average abnormal return during period t 
   = Number of events in the sample 
      = Abnormal return of security i during period t 
Source: MacKinlay, 1997 
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Equation 7: Cumulative abnormal return 
The cumulative abnormal return is calculated by aggregating the abnormal returns for each 
security during the event window. CAR will be used as the main measure of abnormal returns 
since the announcement effect is expected to be captured over the entire event window.  
             ∑     
  
    
 
             = Cumulative abnormal return for security i during the period t-1 to t+2 
      = Abnormal return of security i during period t 
Source: MacKinlay, 1997 
Equation 8: Cumulative average abnormal return 
Lastly, in order to make conclusions about the average effect of the events, the cumulative 
average abnormal return is calculated by aggregating the abnormal returns for each event and 
then dividing it by the total number of events.  
            
 
 
∑           
 
   
 
            = Cumulative average abnormal return for security i during the period t1-t2 
           = Cumulative abnormal return for security i during the period t1-t2 
Source: MacKinlay, 1997 
Step 5: Statistical tests 
To examine if the empirical results are statistically significant a number of non-parametrical tests 
are conducted. These tests are further discussed in chapter 4.2. 
Step 6: Results 
The empirical results are presented in chapter 4. 
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Step 7: Conclusions 
In chapter 6 the empirical results are discussed and analyzed. This is done based on the previous 
empirical findings and economic theories presented in chapter two.  
3.4 Statistical Tests 
3.4.1 General process 
In order to test the hypotheses presented in section 2.6 and draw general conclusions about the 
population based on the sample, statistical tests need to be conducted. According to Körner & 
Wahlgren (2006), the process of hypothesis testing can be divided into five steps: 
1. The first step is to define the relevant null hypothesis (H0) and the alternative hypothesis 
(H1). The null hypothesis denotes that no statistically significant difference can be 
identified in the data, i.e. that no abnormal return can be identified. The alternative 
hypothesis states the opposite, i.e. that statistically significant abnormal returns can be 
identified surrounding the announcement.  
2. Consider the statistical assumptions underlying the different tests, i.e. if the sample has to 
be normally distributed etc. 
3. Choose the appropriate test and test the sample against the test specifications. In this study 
Wilcoxons Rank-Sum test and Wilcoxons Signed-Rank test are used to test the 
significance of the results. 
4. Select a significance level, i.e. a probability threshold below which the null hypothesis is 
rejected. In this study a significance level of 5 % is used. 
5. Conduct the test and decide to either reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis or not reject it.   
There are two conceptual types of errors (Type 1 and Type 2) that can occur: 
 A type 1 error is the incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis 
 A type 2 error is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis 
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The probability of a type 1 error is the same as the chosen test significance level, i.e. 5 % in this 
study. The chosen significance level is therefore a measure of the tests strength (Körner & 
Wahlgren, 2006). 
3.4.2 Statistical tests conducted 
There are several different statistical tests to choose from when testing the significance level of 
the abnormal returns (ARs) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). The two main 
categories are parametric and non-parametric tests. Parametric tests have stricter underlying 
assumptions than non-parametric tests, but if the assumptions are met they are considered 
stronger (Körner & Wahlgren, 2006, Ch. 7). One main assumption is that the sample follows a 
normal distribution. If the studied population is not normally distributed, the usage of non-
parametric tests is preferred (Körner & Wahlgren, 2006, Ch. 12).  
In order to determine which test(s) to use, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov is conducted to examine if the 
abnormal returns are normally distributed. There are several different normality tests to use, but 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov is usually recommended when the number of observations is more than 50 
(Shapiro et al, 1968).  
The test shows that none of the samples are normally distributed (see appendix 5) and therefore 
this study uses the two non-parametric tests, Wilcoxon signed rank test and Wilcoxon rank sum 
test/Mann-Whitney U-test, to test the statistical significance of the results. The chosen tests 
examine the significance of the abnormal returns for the entire sample and also for the divided 
samples of public and private targets over the event window. The statistical tests are conducted in 
SPSS and Eviews. 
Below follows a thorough description of the conducted statistical tests and their advantages and 
disadvantages.  
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is used when the data are paired and the aim is to examine if two 
populations follow the same distribution. The advantage of this method is that it does not 
presuppose that the sample follows a normal distribution. Another advantage is that this method 
eliminates the effect of extreme values. To conduct this test all the individual events are arranged 
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by the size of the abnormal returns and are then assigned a number between 1 and n, where 1 is 
the lowest value and n the highest. This sample is then compared to 0 to determine if the 
abnormal returns are statistically different from zero (Körner & Wahlgren, 2006, Ch. 12). 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test/Mann-Whitney U-test 
This test is used when the data are not paired and when comparison is made between two 
independent groups (Körner & Wahlgren, 2006, Ch. 12). The test is performed in three steps; 
1. All observations are ranked according to their order of magnitude independent of which 
group they come from.  
2. Add up the ranks in the smaller of the two groups. If they are of equal size, it does not 
matter which group is chosen. 
3. Calculate a P-value. 
(Whitley & Ball, 2002) 
Advantages and disadvantages with non-parametric tests 
Advantages: 
 require no or very limited assumptions to be made about the format of the data 
 can be useful for dealing with unexpected, outlying observations that might be 
problematic with a parametric approach 
 often useful in the analysis of ordered categorical data in which assignation of scores to 
individual categories may be inappropriate.  
Disadvantages: 
 may lack power as compared with more traditional approaches. Especially when the 
sample size is small or if the assumptions for the corresponding parametric method hold. 
 geared toward hypothesis testing rather than estimation of effects.  
3.5 Multiple linear regression 
In order to get theoretical insights and answer the second research question, the association 
between the magnitude of the abnormal returns and characteristics specific to the deals is studied. 
According to MacKinlay (1997), the preferred way to do this is to regress the abnormal returns 
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on the characteristics of interest in a cross-sectional regression. The basic regression model used 
to analyze the relationships can be seen in Equation 9, and the regression model is estimated 
using OLS (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Equation 9: Regression model 
                        
      = The  
   abnormal return observation 
       =1,..., N, are N characteristics for the  
  observation 
    = the zero mean disturbance term 
Source: MacKinlay, 1997 
3.5.1 Explanatory variables 
In our model we use CAR as the dependent variable and seven different other variables as 
independent, explanatory variables. The chosen explanatory variables are all motivated by theory 
and previous research examining their impact can be found in section 2.4.4. However, the 
inclusion of explanatory variables is limited by data availability which may lead to some 
problems with the OLS assumptions presented in section 3.5.2. Including irrelevant variables 
leads to inefficiency and loss of degrees of freedom, thus it is basically a trade-off between 
strength of the model and the goodness of fit (Brooks, 2008). These problems will be further 
discussed in section 3.5.2. 
Target legal status 
By including the target legal status as an explanatory variable the study aims to further analyze if 
the abnormal returns can be explained by that variable. The target legal status serves as a proxy 
for illiquidity in the stock, information asymmetry and bidder competition, as these aspects are 
assumed to be dependent on the legal status of the target and hence included in the variable.  
The target legal status variable is constructed as a dummy taking the value of 1 for publicly listed 
targets and 0 for privately held targets. 
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Deal size 
The deal size variable is defined as the initial bid price for the target at   , and the bid size is 
collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Furthermore, the bid price is adjusted for U.S. CPI 
inflation (Crawford et al, 2015) to remove the effect of inflation on the results.  
                   
Domestic versus cross-border 
The domestic versus cross-border explanatory variable measures if the target is registered in the 
same country as the acquirer or not. The country specifications for the firms are collected from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon.  
The variable is constructed as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for domestic acquisitions 
and 0 for cross-border deals.  
Focused versus diversified 
The focused versus diversified explanatory variable measures if the target acquired operates in 
the same industry as the acquirer or not. The industry classifications for the firms are collected 
from Thomson Reuters Eikon.  
The variable is constructed as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for focused acquisitions 
and 0 for diversifying acquisitions.  
Form of the transaction 
The form of the transaction is constructed as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for stock 
acquisitions and 0 for asset acquisitions.  
Method of payment 
The method of payment variable is constructed as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for 
cash offerings and 0 for equity offerings. 
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Relative size 
The relative size between the acquirer and target is calculated in accordance with Misra and 
Gupta (2007). The market value of the acquirer is defined as the average market value 15 days 
prior to the event window. Averaging the market value is done to even out temporary 
misvaluations and choosing the time period prior to the event window is done since the 
announcement should not be affect the variable. The bid price is used as a proxy of the market 
value of the target company to calculate the relative size between the companies. This is done 
because privately held targets per definition do not have a market value of equity, as they are not 
publicly traded. The difference between using the bid price and market value to calculate the 
relative size between the firms is that the bid price includes the premium paid for in the 
acquisition. In addition, both the bid size and market value of the acquirer are adjusted for U.S. 
CPI inflation (Crawford et al, 2015). 
Equation 10: Relative size between the target and acquirer 
              
       
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
 
        = The initial bid price for the target firm at the announcement day 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    = The average market value of the acquiring firm between      and     
Table 3.2 Variables included in the OLS regression 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
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3.5.2 The model specification and assumptions 
Since the announcement effect is expected to be captured over the entire event window, CAR 
will be used as the dependent variable. Moreover, the study aims to determine if the explanatory 
variables have different effects on public and private firms respectively. Therefore, the regression 
analyzes are conducted both on the total sample including all firms, and the public and private 
firms separately.  
In order to ensure that the regression results are reliable, a number of assumptions have to be 
fulfilled. First of all, multicollinearity is checked for by constructing a correlation matrix with all 
the explanatory variables. Multicollinearity occurs if the explanatory variables are highly 
correlated, and if it exists, it makes reliable inferences more difficult. As a rule of thumb, a 
correlation between explanatory variables above 0.8 is considered serious and may need 
attention. However, our correlation analysis (appendix 6) shows that the correlation between the 
included variables is low, and hence there is no multicollinearity problem. Moreover, in order to 
even out the skewed distributions, both the deal size and relative size are logged. (Brooks, 2008) 
In order to have an appropriate model with stable and unbiased parameters, the underlying 
assumptions for the OLS model must also be fulfilled. According to Brooks (2008), the five 
assumptions are: 
1.   (𝑢t) = 0 
2.   𝑟 (𝑢t) =  2 < ∞ 
3. 𝑐   (𝑢i, 𝑢j) = 0 
4. 𝑐   (𝑢t,  t) = 0 
5. 𝑢t ~ (0,  2) 
The first assumption states that the expected value of the error terms is zero. Since a constant 
term, alpha, is included in the model, this assumption is fulfilled.  
The second assumption states that the error terms should be homoscedatic, i.e. the variance of the 
error terms should be constant over the entire sample. If this assumption is not fulfilled the errors 
are instead heteroscedastic, which could lead to false inferences (Brooks, 2008). This eventual 
problem is dealt with by using White´s correction when running the regressions, where potential 
heteroscedasticity is corrected for (White, 1980).  
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The third assumption states that the errors should be uncorrelated with each other. In this cross-
sectional data set, the most likely cause of correlated errors is clustering (Bernard, 1987). In order 
to avoid this, clustering in the events is controlled for and therefore it is assumed that no serial 
correlation exists.    
Assumption number four states that there should be no correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error terms. In other words,  i should be uncorrelated with the x´s. If the 
explanatory variables in fact are correlated with the error terms, an endogeneity problem arises 
and this will lead to inconsistent estimators. Selection bias as a cause of endogeneity must be 
addressed, and this problem arises when there is correlation between some unobserved firm 
characteristic(s) and the probability that the event occurs (MacKinlay, 1997). However, since 
there is only week correlation between the independent and dependent variables, as shown in 
appendix 6, this problem may be less serious (MacKinlay, 1997). Other causes of endogeneity, 
and especially omitted variable bias, may be present though. Explanatory variables may be left 
out for various reasons; they might be unobserved by the researcher or they might be hard to 
quantify (Brooks, 2008). In this study both reasons could be possible since some of the data is not 
easily accessible. It is hard to tell which variables this would be and therefore also what effect it 
has on the study´s results.  
The last assumption states that the error terms should be normally distributed. This assumption is 
important for the hypothesis tests of the model parameters (Brooks, 2008) and is examined with a 
Jarque-Bera test that is performed in Eviews. If the assumption is fulfilled, inferences about the 
regression models´ parameters can be drawn with confidence intervals and hypothesis tests based 
on the t-distribution (Westerlund, 2005). The Jarque-Bera test also controls if the skewness and 
the kurtosis of the residuals probability distribution looks similar to the normality distribution. 
None of the models in the study pass the test (see appendix 7), but if the sample is large enough 
(>100), as it is in this study (539), non-normality is usually not a problem (Brooks, 2008). By 
logging the residuals, non-normality can be partially avoided. This is also one of the most 
common ways to approach the problem of non-normality.  
As seen in the table, the p-value is zero which indicates non-normality, but our sample size 
compensates for this (Brooks, 2008). The non-normality can be due to some outliers in the 
sample. The values for skewness and kurtosis can also be seen. A normally distributed sample 
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should have a skewness of zero and a kurtosis of three (Brooks, 2008). The skewness and 
kurtosis can be found in appendix 7.  
3.6 Reliability and validity 
3.6.1 Reliability 
Reliability in research methods concerns the quality of measurement and the repeatability of the 
studies (Bryman & Bell, 2011, Ch. 2). The authors strive to achieve this by only using public data 
when data is collected and processed. The information is also available for an eventual replication 
of this study, since only trustworthy databases such as Thompson Reuters Datastream and 
Thompson Reuters Eikon are used. Since the study should be replicable, the authors have been 
restrictive when it comes to possible exclusions of information and as accurate and detailed as 
possible when an M&A has been excluded to enhance the reliability of the study. Furthermore, 
the reliability is improved by using standardized approaches for data processing in line with 
MacKinlay (1997).  
Conducting an event study results in a lot of manual work. This since every event has a different 
event date and different estimation windows and event windows are used for every event. In 
order to make sure that the right dates and numbers are used in the calculation of the abnormal 
returns and in the regression, date controls are performed. To further minimize the risk of 
mistakes affecting the result of the study, the authors have switched which M&A-events to work 
with continuously. All these efforts help making the reliability stronger, even though the human 
factor needs to be taken into consideration.  
Literary sources are to a great extent collected from LUBsearch, which is the library search 
engine for Lund University. These sources have either been published in reputable academic 
journals, such as The Journal of Finance and The Financial Review, or actual, published course 
literature. The authors also try to stay objective when referring to previous work, with reservation 
for possible misinterpretations.    
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3.6.2 Validity 
Validity in research methods is the absence of systematic errors, and it can be split into internal 
and external validity (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Internal validity dictates how the research method 
is structured and is high if the method really measures the effect it is intended to measure.  
When using an event study, internal validity is always a bit problematic. The assumption of 
exogeneity is violated if any effect other than the one caused by the event is captured during the 
event window. By using a short event window of t–1 to t+1 the risk of an unwanted effect is 
mitigated. Further, by having a large sample size, the impact of undesired external influence 
decreases. Another aspect of the internal validity problem refers to the fact that the measurement 
of estimated returns will, without doubt, provide less than perfect estimations. However, the 
market model will provide sufficient estimations in comparison with other more sophisticated 
approaches. (MacKinlay, 1997) 
Loss of data is also a general problem since it could bias the sample selection (Westerlund, 
2005). Especially, this study does not include acquisitions made by firms listed within a year 
prior to the acquisition, since historical stock data for at least one year is necessary to calculate 
the expected return. If the frequency of such acquisitions is high it could lead to distorted results. 
To be able to conduct the research, these exclusions have to be made anyways.   
The internal validity is also challenged by the deal characteristic variables used in the regression 
analysis. An example of this is the relative size between the target and acquirer. When the 
relative size is estimated, the bid size is used as a proxy for the target´s market value. The bid size 
includes the premium, which can result in a potential problem since an increase in premium has a 
negative impact on abnormal returns, whereas the relative size as a measure is positively related 
with the abnormal returns. Therefore, this might result in an underestimation of the coefficient 
and significance of that variable. Nevertheless, there is a specific reason for using bid prices as 
proxies, namely that there is not an actual market price present for private firms.  
External validity for the study concerns the qualification and suitability of the method used. In 
other words, this means if the chosen models are appropriate regarding answering the research 
questions (Bryman & Bell, 2011). When it comes to investigating announcement effects, event 
studies are commonly used and furthermore MacKinlay´s (1997) steps of conducting an event 
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study are followed. Further, the statistical tests are performed in accordance with Körner & 
Wahlgren (2006). Lastly, the regression models used are based on Brooks (2008). The problem of 
endogeneity is discussed, but is not tested or controlled for, which could be a potential problem. 
Apart from that, the external validity of the research should be strong. 
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CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS  
In chapter four, the empirical results of the study will be presented in the form of tables and 
diagrams with comments to facilitate the interpretation. Statistical tests are also performed to 
examine if the results are statistically significant in regards to abnormal returns and 
characteristics. Outliers are controlled for and the hypotheses and results are summarized in the 
end.   
4.1 Descriptive statistics of data 
The total sample consists of 539 M&A deals between the 1
st
 of January 2009 and the 1
st
 of 
February 2015 (see appendix 10 for further details about the deals). Out of these deals, 78 % are 
paid in cash, 46 % are focused deals, 64 % are foreign deals, the transaction value in the different 
deals is on average 38 % of the acquiring firm´s market value the previous year, shares are 
bought in 50 % of the deals and the average deal size is $ 193.2 million.  
In appendix 1, the sample is divided into three different groups; the total sample, public targets 
and private targets.   
4.2 Presentation of the results 
The results of the study are classified by the total sample, public targets, private targets and 
public versus private targets. The results are built on the study´s short-term event window of t-1 
day to t+1 day, but the emphasis lies on the cumulative abnormal results (CAR). All the 
hypotheses that have been tested in the study are built on the formulation that the null hypothesis 
is accepted if the actual return does not differ from the expected return and otherwise, the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted.  
4.3 Event Study  
4.3.1 Tables and figures 
The table below shows the average abnormal returns for day t-1, the event day (t) and the day t+1 
and it also shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for the total event window. 
The results are shown for the total sample, public targets, private targets and public versus private 
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targets respectively. The table also shows the results of the non-parametric statistical tests that 
have been performed on the data.    
Table 4.1  Tests of significance 
Source: Created by the authors 
As can be seen in table 4.1, the average abnormal returns are positive for the total sample during 
all days in the event window. The abnormal returns are significantly different from zero on the 
event day, t (0.62 %), and on the day t+1 (0.22 %), as well as a significant CAAR (cumulative 
average abnormal return) over the entire three day event window (0.94 %). Both AAR on the 
event day, t, and CAAR are statistically significant at the 1 % level, whilst AAR t+1 only is 
significant on a 10 % level.  
The results of the statistical tests therefore conclude that H0 for the total sample is rejected.  
Complete information regarding the normality tests and statistical tests, see appendix 5 and table 
4.1 respectively.  
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Figure 4.1  Abnormal returns (total sample) 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) for the total sample over the entire event window. The markets´ reaction is 
shown mainly on the event day, t, and the day after the event, t+1.  
When public targets are examined, table 4.1 shows that there are no statistically significant 
results, neither in AAR nor the CAAR over the entire event window. None of the results are even 
close to being significant and therefore it is concluded that H0 for the public targets is not 
rejected.  
The sample of private targets, on the other hand, looks completely different. The sample has 
AARs significantly different from zero on the event day (1.05 %), t, and the day after the event, 
t+1 (0.35 %). The sample also shows a CAAR that is statistically significant over the entire event 
window (1.52 %). The AAR on the event day, t, and CAAR are statistically significant on a 1 % 
level and the AAR on the day after the event, t+1, is statistically significant on a 5 % level. This 
implies that H0 for private targets is rejected.  
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To see if the arguments for a private firm discount holds, the public targets need to be compared 
to the private targets. This since the above results only show if the public and private targets, 
respectively, are statistically different from zero. The results in table 4.1 show that the public 
targets are statistically different from the private targets regarding AAR on the event day, t, and 
CAAR for the whole event window. AAR on the event day, t, is statistically significant on a 1 % 
level, whereas CAAR is statistically significant on a 1 % level, which indicates strong 
significance. The AAR on the event day, t, is - 0.29 % for public targets whereas the number is 
1.05 % for private targets. The CAAR is further - 0.29 % for public targets in comparison to 1.52 
% for private targets. The result of the differences between public and private targets implies that 
H0 for public versus private targets is rejected. This difference is illustrated in figure 4.2 below.  
Figure 4.2  Abnormal returns (public and private targets) 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
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Figure 4.3  Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
 
In figure 4.3 the above results are illustrated, dependent on if the cumulative abnormal return for 
the total sample, public targets or private targets is examined. 
Table 4.2  Summary of the study’s hypotheses and results 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
 
Table 4.2 summarizes the study´s hypotheses and also the results of the study.  
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4.4 Regression analysis 
Table 4.3 Regression output – total sample 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
The regression model is statistically significant on a 1 % level, which can be seen in the Prob(F-
statistic) in table 4.3. Furthermore, the fit of the model is 8.5 %.  
The main variable target legal status is statistically significant on a 1 % level, which implies that 
acquirers of private targets should gain higher abnormal returns than acquirers of public targets.  
Deal size is not statistically significant and therefore it cannot be stated whether deal size has a 
positive or negative relationship with abnormal returns.  
If the deal is domestic or cross-border or if the deal is focused or diversified are further also non-
statistically significant and nothing can therefore be said about the relation with abnormal returns.  
On the other hand, the form of the deal, i.e. if shares or assets are acquired, as a variable is 
statistically significant, but only on the 10 % level. This implies that it is more profitable to 
acquirer a target through shares than by acquiring the assets.  
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Another variable that is statistically significant on the 10 % level is the method of payment. The 
market reacts therefore more positively when the deal is paid in cash than stock.  
Finally, as can be seen in table 4.3, the relative size is statistically significant on a 1 % level. This 
means that variable relative size has a positive relationship with abnormal returns, i.e. the more 
the relative size increases, the larger abnormal returns to gain. 
Table 4.4 Regression output – public targets 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
The only variable that is statistically significant (on a 10 % level) is the method of payment, but 
the model as a whole is not statistically significant (Prob(F-statistic) of 0.32). Therefore, the 
coefficients are assumed to be unstable, which then implies unreliable results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR
Included observations: 171 after adjustment
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability
Deal Size 0.001361 0.001748 0.778832 0.4372
Domestic versus Cross-Border -0.004783 0.007310 -0.654336 0.5138
Focused versus Diversified -0.000208 0.007520 -0.027668 0.9780
Form 0.001785 0.009799 0.182135 0.8557
Method of Payment 0.015360 0.008382 1.832404 0.0687*
Relative Size -0.004845 0.005185 -0.934299 0.3515
R-squared 0.047421
F-statistic 1.159195
Prob(F-statistic) 0.329144
* significant at a 10% level
**  significant at a 5% level
*** significant at a 1% level
Public Targets
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Table 4.5 Regression output – private targets 
 
Source: Created by the authors 
When examining private targets, it can be seen in table 4.5 that the model is significant on a 1 % 
level (strong significance) and the fit of the model is approximately 8.6 %.  
Deal size, if the deal is domestic or cross-border and if the deal is focused or diversified are just 
as for the whole sample statistically insignificant. Therefore nothing can be concluded about the 
relationship between these variables and abnormal returns.  
The form of the deal is something the market reacts to. Being statistically significant at a 10 % 
level, this shows again that acquisition of shares is more profitable than acquisition of assets.  
Regarding private targets, the method of payment seems uninteresting to the market, since the 
variable is not even close to being statistically significant.  
Finally, the relative size is, again, statistically significant on a 1 % level, implying a strongly 
positive relationship with abnormal returns.   
Dependent Variable: CAR
Included observations: 366 after adjustment
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability
Deal Size 0.001746 0.002551 0.684483 0.4941
Domestic versus Cross-Border 0.008053 0.005729 1.405713 0.1607
Focused versus Diversified 0.006441 0.004633 1.390060 0.1654
Form 0.009245 0.004797 1.927373 0.0547*
Method of Payment 0.003167 0.008654 0.365911 0.7146
Relative Size 0.002916 0.000876 3.328760 0.0010***
R-squared 0.086204
F-statistic 4.824597
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000033***
* significant at a 10% level
**  significant at a 5% level
*** significant at a 1% level
Private Targets
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CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSIS 
The analysis aims to compare the results of this study to previous research as well as discuss the 
theories which the study is built on in comparison to the actual result.  
5.1 Analysis of the event study 
5.1.1 Total sample 
The abnormal returns surrounding M&A announcements for the total sample is noticeably 
positive since the market reacts both on the event day, t, and the day after, t+1. Despite the 
indications of abnormal returns on day t+1, the results should be interpreted with caution due to 
the fact that they are only statistically significant on a 10 % level. However, the CAAR (0.94 %) 
is statistically significant on a 1 % level and the results of these tests therefore conclude that H0, 
which states that the CAAR is not statistically different from zero for the acquiring firms in the 
total sample over the entire event window, is rejected. 
No significant abnormal returns are shown on day t-1, which means that there is no significant 
leakage of information prior to the announcement. The largest part of the abnormal returns is 
found on the event day t, but since abnormal returns are also found on day t+1, this indicates that 
it takes some time for the market to completely incorporate the announcement in the share price.  
Another explanation for the effect on day t+1 could be the problem of estimating exactly when 
the announcement is released. If the announcement is released after the market has closed then 
the actual effect and reaction of the market is reflected on the day after instead, t+1. 
Either way, there is evidence of at least semi-strong market efficiency since the abnormal returns 
are seen immediately following the announcements, as illustrated in table 4.1. 
The average positive M&A announcement effect for the acquiring firm in this study is contrary to 
what most previous research has suggested. Previous research has concluded the target´s 
shareholders to be the “winners”, and that the acquiring firm´s shareholders earn negative, 
insignificantly different from zero or at best, slightly positive abnormal returns (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983, Andrade et al, 2001, Bruner, 2002, Moeller et al, 2003). There are, however, some 
possible aspects that should be taken into consideration when comparing previous empirical 
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findings to this study´s results. This study is performed on Western Europe, whilst a lot of the 
previous research, as stressed earlier, has been conducted on the U.S. or the UK market. The 
different sample populations examined may affect how the markets react. A thorough analysis of 
this is however beyond the scope of this study. 
Another possible explanatory factor is that this study is conducted during another time period, 
which also might affect how the market reacts. The fact that most previous studies have excluded 
private targets may also be a great part of the explanation of the contrary result, especially since 
the largest part of this study´s sample are private targets (which show positive abnormal returns).   
Furthermore, the results for the total sample find no evidence for Roll´s (1986) hubris hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, the motive for acquiring a target is that managers act under hubris 
and as a result of this generally overpay for the target. This is due to the fact that managers 
overestimate the increase in economic value of the combined entity and hence, destroy value for 
the acquiring firm´s shareholders. The implication of this theory would therefore be that around a 
takeover, the value of the target should increase, while the value of the bidding firm should 
decrease as shareholders oppose the deal. 
The result of this study also contradicts the agency theory´s underlying motives for pursuing 
M&As. When managers obtain a large enough personal gain, the firm´s market value is sacrificed 
to pursue the M&A and this further leads to an overpayment for the target and value destruction 
for the acquiring firm´s shareholders (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). The results of the total 
sample show, however, a CAAR of 0.94 % for the whole event window for the acquiring firm. 
5.1.2 Public targets 
When only considering acquisitions of public targets, the result shows no significant positive or 
negative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. None of the results are close to being 
significant and therefore H0, stating that acquisition announcements of publicly held targets do 
not produce CAAR for the acquiring firm over the event window, is not rejected. 
Since the market apparently does not react neither positive nor negative surrounding an M&A 
announcements, it is hard to conclude anything about the market efficiency.  
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The failure to significantly distinguish the AAR and CAAR from zero when it comes to public 
targets implies more or less that there is no effect on the share price surrounding the M&A 
announcement. This is partly in accordance with previous empirical findings, since the main part 
of previous studies show either zero, as this study does, or negative abnormal returns. For 
example, Fuller et al (2002) find a significantly negative CAR that is increasing the larger the 
relative size is, whereas Faccio et al (2006) find that acquirers of public targets earn zero or even 
slightly negative abnormal returns. 
The findings can be explained by the information hypothesis. It can be argued that public firms, 
which are strictly regulated regarding information disclosure and are highly monitored by other 
stakeholders, have low information asymmetry and are correctly priced. The acquirer pays the 
correct price for the public target plus the expected value of the synergies, which implies that the 
acquiring firms´ market value should remain unchanged. Since public firms are correctly priced 
to start with, no market reactions, and therefore, no abnormal returns occur.  
In line with this, the theory of information asymmetry and the signaling hypothesis state that 
managers can send signals to the market even before the M&A is actually announced. This can be 
done in various ways such as by communicating the M&A strategy or acquisition plans, or 
simply their past M&A record. If these signals are credible, the market will adapt to this 
information, resulting in a small, or non-existing, announcement effect. This implies that an 
acquisition of a publicly held firm, which often are large deals, is already expected by the market. 
In that case, the share price has already adapted to this information (according to the efficient 
market hypothesis). The effect of the announcement should then be smaller or totally absent, 
depending on how strong the signals have been to start with and to which extent the market relies 
on these. Moreover, insiders can have gained abnormal returns already prior the announcement of 
the deal due to the fact that they can act on their informational advantage resulting in an 
adjustment of the stock price. From the outside it still looks as if the bidder gains negative, zero 
or slightly positive abnormal returns but this may not reflect the actual value creation.  
5.1.3 Private targets 
If only private targets are considered instead, the result looks completely different. Noticeably 
positive abnormal returns are shown, particularly on the event day and if the whole event window 
is considered, but also on the day after the event, t+1. With a CAAR of 1.52 % it is therefore 
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concluded that the H0 for private targets, stating that announcement acquisitions for privately 
held targets do not produce any CAAR for the acquirer during the event window, is rejected. 
Regarding the market efficiency, the same can be concluded about the market as for the total 
sample, since the results are similar. The largest abnormal return is shown on the event day, 
which implies that the market is efficient and incorporates most of the announcements fast. No 
significant abnormal return during day t-1 implies that there is no significant information leakage 
prior the announcement. Finally, a small, but significant abnormal return on day t+1 implies that 
it takes some time for the market to fully incorporate the M&A announcement in the share price. 
So, yet again there is evidence of at least semi-strong market efficiency.   
The findings regarding the private targets in this sample are in line with what previous empirical 
research has concluded. Among them are Chang (1998), Fuller et al (2002), Conn et al (2005) 
and Faccio et al (2006) who all find significant positive abnormal returns for the acquiring firm´s 
shareholders when acquiring public targets. 
The reason for the positive abnormal returns is most likely due to the so called private firm 
discount, which itself can be explained by several reasons. These reasons will be discussed 
further in section 5.1.4 below, but among them are information asymmetry, reduced bidder 
competition and illiquidity in the stocks.   
5.1.4 Private versus public targets 
A comparison between the two subsamples has also been made to test if there is evidence of a 
private firm discount. The results of this comparison shows a significant difference in abnormal 
returns during both the event day, t, and over the entire event window, between the two groups. 
This result implies that the H0 for private versus public targets, stating that there is no difference 
in CAAR between private and public firms regarding M&A announcements, is rejected. 
When comparing to previous research that has compared private and public targets, the results of 
this test is supported. Chang (1998) means that the positive wealth effect for private targets is 
related to monitoring activities and reduced information asymmetries, and Fuller et al (2002) 
continue along the same line with the private firm discount explaining the positive CAR return in 
acquisitions of private targets. According to Fuller et al (2002), this discount is what investors 
demand for less liquid assets and the information asymmetry that exists. Furthermore, two studies 
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on the U.S. market, Officer (2007) and Block (2007) both show a high private firm discount of 
15-30 % and 20-25 % respectively. When the European market is studied instead, as in Klein and 
Scheibel (2012), this discount is still significantly positive, but considerably lower (5 %). 
Madura and Susnjara (2013), on the other hand, show a completely different result, namely that 
private targets receive relatively higher valuation multiples than comparable public targets. 
Madura and Susnjara find their result to be intriguing because of the illiquidity and asymmetric 
information that private targets show. However, it supports their hypothesis of an acquiring 
firm´s ability to pay a high multiple for a target in which there is lack of transparency.  
This is questionable when studying this research’s results, but Madura and Susnjara´s  argument 
for it is as follows; when private targets are acquired the liquidity disadvantage disappears and 
since the value of the private target is a bit uncertain, the valuation could be discounted. 
However, this uncertainty also gives the acquiring firm an incentive to set a payment without 
constraints. Important to keep in mind here is though that Madura and Susnjara´s study examines 
both the U.S. and the Western European market, which differ greatly in a lot of ways, e.g. market 
settings to mention one, and since the other previous empirical findings are in line with this 
study´s results, the results should be reliable. 
Furthermore, as stated earlier, there are several potential reasons for the private firm discount. 
The first reason is illiquidity. Private targets are not traded at a public marketplace and are 
therefore referred to as illiquid. Several authors, among them Capron and Shen (2007), claim that 
the illiquidity of private firms is the main reason for the discount, since the acquirer can capture a 
larger part of the combined value if the premium paid does not increase by the same amount. 
Altogether this implies that a private firm discount should be applied when acquiring private 
targets. Furthermore, the implication of this is that an implicit synergy based on liquidity could be 
created by the acquirer when acquiring a private firm. In other words, the target firm is worth 
more for a public acquirer than for the target firms´ shareholders, and given that the premium 
paid does not increase by the same amount, there may be room for a larger value creation for the 
acquiring firm. 
The second reason is information asymmetry, which is one of the key differences between private 
and public firms. Private firms usually operate less transparent than public firms and their 
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managers typically have better control over the information they want to communicate (Reuer 
and Ragozzino, 2007). The effect of this difference on abnormal returns is that it, according to 
Akerlof (1970), puts bidders at risk of overpaying, and hence the response from the acquirer is to 
reduce the offer price. This is done to adjust for the possibility of the target being a lemon. This 
study finds, in line with Cheng et al (2008), a positive relation between information asymmetry 
and abnormal returns for the acquiring firm, assuming that private firms in fact have higher 
information asymmetry. This relation could also be explained by investors´ belief in that 
managers incorporate the discount in their valuation. 
The third reason is the lower competition in the bidding process. Capron and Shen (2007) argue 
that bidders face less competition in the market for private firms due to the lack of visibility, 
transparency, and the market price associated with private firms, which creates frictions when 
acquiring private firms. This was previously discussed in section 2.3. The lower number of 
bidders decreases the bargaining power of the target relative to the acquirer. In the end, the lower 
bidder competition decreases the final premium paid and the acquirer receives the larger part of 
the synergies between the firms. Hence, the acquirer would earn a higher abnormal return, which 
is also supported by this study. (Capron & Shen, 2007) 
5.2 Analysis of value-creating characteristics 
5.2.1 Total sample 
The fit of the model, R
2
, is 8.5 % and should adopt as high a value as possible. In a similar study 
by Draper and Paudyal (2006), the R
2
 for the total sample is 6.35 %. A possible explanation for 
the low R
2
-values is the presence of noise in the models and that there are many different 
unobserved factors that affect the value creation surrounding an M&A.   
The variable target legal status is statistically positive on a 1 % level, i.e. there is a positive 
relationship between acquiring private instead of public targets and the cumulative abnormal 
return. This is in line with most previous research, such as Fuller et al, 2002; Conn et al, 2005; 
Draper & Paudyal, 2006; Faccio et al, 2006. As discussed in the previous section, the reason for 
this positive relationship can probably be derived from the so called private firm discount and the 
fact that the acquirer captures a larger share of the combined value of the firms when acquiring 
private targets.   
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Deal size is not statistically significant and can therefore not be stated to have neither a positive 
nor a negative impact on the abnormal returns surrounding the announcements. 
Previous research on the effect of deal size on the abnormal returns is mixed and the findings 
cannot be generalized. Alexandridis et al (2011) argue that larger deals destroy value for the 
shareholders of the acquiring firms’ due to increased uncertainty and complexity in the deals and 
Loderer and Martin (1990) claim that larger deals increases the risk of overpayment due to an 
increased risk of hubris and managerial over-confidence. On the contrary, Tuch & O’Sullivan 
(2007) and Gordon, Kahl & Rosen (2009) found that larger deals create more value for the 
acquiring company, mainly because fewer companies are capable of buying such large firms, and 
hence the bidder competition and acquisition premiums decrease. 
A possible explanation for the insignificant results may be that only deals above $ 50 million are 
included in this study. Even though similar delimitations have been used in previous studies, the 
limit is set relatively high and many smaller transactions are excluded, which may impair the 
results of the regression. If a lower limit had been used it is possible that the effect of deal size 
would have been higher. It is also worth noticing that it is possible that larger deals get more 
coverage from both media and analysts, often even before the actual announcement, which 
provides the market with relevant information and thus evens out the expectations. Hence, the 
market reaction should be smaller when the deal is finally announced. It should also be noted that 
the average deal size is higher for public targets than for private targets, and since acquisitions of 
public firms on average generate smaller abnormal returns this also weakens the relationship. 
Furthermore, the variable domestic versus cross-border is not statistically significant in 
determining the abnormal returns for the total sample. In a large study performed by Conn et al 
(2005), domestic acquisitions of public targets generally resulted in negative abnormal returns, 
but in contrast, both domestic and cross-border acquisitions of private targets resulted in positive 
abnormal returns for the acquirer. Overall they concluded that domestic acquisitions resulted in 
higher abnormal returns for the acquirer following M&A announcements. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) performed a similar study and also found that domestic M&A announcements 
generally trigger higher abnormal returns compared to cross-border operations. 
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It is not clear why the results of this study are not in line with the previous research. One possible 
explanation could be that this study is conducted in a subsequent time period in comparison to 
previous empirical studies. The global business world is constantly developing and is becoming 
increasingly international and interconnected. As the country borders are of less importance and 
new communication possibilities make it easier to realize synergies across country borders, it is 
possible that the geographical position of the target becomes increasingly insignificant. 
According to the regression, the variable focused versus diversified does not have any statistically 
significant impact either. A number of previous studies have investigated this relationship and 
most of them find that the relationship is positive. Goergen and Renneboogs’ (2004) study finds 
that diversifying M&As do not have any short-term announcement effect on the bidder, claiming 
that the market thinks that it is harder to realize synergy effects in these types of deals. Several 
other researchers have also found a general diversification discount for firms (Berger & Ofek, 
1995, Lang & Stultz, 1994). 
The results of this study are not in line with most of the previous research, and it can only be 
speculated about the potential reasons. First of all, it is important to notice that a larger portion of 
the public acquisitions in this study are focused compared to the private target acquisitions. Since 
the abnormal returns following acquisition announcements for public firms are lower, this also 
impairs the results for this variable. Another possible explanation is that the markets studied 
simply consider diversifying M&As as good and hence the stock prices react accordingly, instead 
of interpreting the announcement negatively. The shareholders seem to trust the management 
teams’ ability to realize synergies from diversifying acquisitions to a higher degree than in 
previous studies. 
The variable form of the transaction is statistically significant on a 10 % level. This implies that 
it is more profitable to acquire a target by acquiring the outstanding shares compared to acquiring 
certain assets in the company. Bieshaar et al (2001) finds that the form of the transaction is 
important to explain differences in abnormal returns, where acquisitions of shares generally 
generate higher abnormal returns for the acquiring firm compared to acquisitions of assets. The 
results of this study are in line with Bieshaar et al’s (2001) research, and the reason for this result 
is probably reduced information asymmetry, since the cash-flows from the entire firm are easier 
to estimate than the cash-flows from separate assets. Thus, a discount is applied for acquisition of 
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assets and it is likely that a bigger part of the value is captured by the acquirer. It has to be kept in 
mind however that the variable only is significant at a 10 % level. 
The variable method of payment also has a statistically significant coefficient, which implies that 
the market reacts more positively when the deal is paid in cash compared to stock. Several 
researchers have provided evidence that cash bids are associated with higher abnormal returns 
than stock bids in the short run (Travlos, 1987, Asquith et al, 1987, Draper & Paudyal, 1999, 
Andrade et al, 2001, Dong et al, 2005). 
The results of this study is therefore in line with previous research, i.e. that the method of 
payment has a significant impact on the announcement effect. As stated in 2.3.3, there are several 
possible hypotheses to explain this. First of all, firms performing acquisitions financed with 
equity are likely to issue new common stock, and firms paying with cash are likely to issue new 
debt. According to the signaling hypothesis the type of security issued conveys information about 
the firm, and debt issues are generally viewed as a preferred alternative over equity issues. 
Moreover, there are generally tax benefits associated with debt and debt also has a higher 
disciplinary power over management than equity (Yook, 2003). The above arguments seem to be 
applicable for the markets examined in this study as well and the results further strengthens the 
current empirical research. 
Finally, the regression analysis for the total sample shows that the relative size has a statistically 
significant impact on the announcement effect at the 1 % level. The higher the relative size 
between the bidder and the target, the higher the average cumulative average abnormal return. 
Several researchers have examined this relationship before, and even though different methods 
have been used to calculate the relative size, most studies have found a positive relation between 
the bidders’ abnormal returns and the relative size to the acquirer (Asquith et al, 1983, Loderer et 
al, 1990). The results of this study are hence in line with these previous findings. However, the 
results are not in line with a study by Madura and Susnjara (2013) in which they examine 
acquisitions in the U.S. and Western Europe during 1997-2009. This is interesting considering a 
part of their sample overlaps the sample of this study, and hence one could expect similar results. 
Though, one possible explanation for the differences can be that Madura and Susnjara only look 
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at premiums paid for private targets and they also use a different method to estimate the 
acquisition premiums. 
One possible explanation for the results of this study is simply that deals with lower relative size 
between the target and the acquirer are not financially significant enough to affect the stock 
returns. Hence, only larger deals have a significant impact on the cumulative average abnormal 
return, which seems to be the case in this study. 
5.2.2 Public Targets 
The fit of the model is 4.7 % and the only statistically significant variable in the regression of 
public target abnormal returns is the method of payment, but since the model as a whole is not 
statistically significant, the coefficients are assumed to be unstable, leading to unreliable results. 
Therefore, the results from this regression will not be further analyzed. The main reason for the 
unstable model is probably the lower number of observations included, which makes the model 
more sensitive and therefore causes problems with the underlying OLS assumptions. 
 
5.2.3 Private Targets 
The fit of the model is 8.6 %. The arguments for this low R
2
- value are the same as for the total 
sample.  
The regression analysis for the sample of private targets yields statistically significant results for 
the coefficients of form of the transaction and relative size. The other variables are insignificant 
and fail to explain any of the cumulative abnormal return. The model as a whole is significant at a 
1 % level. 
As in the case of the total sample, deal size is still insignificant, and the reasoning is most likely 
the same as previously argued. First of all, the relatively high delimitation of $50 million 
excludes many smaller transactions which probably impairs the results. Secondly, there is a 
higher probability that larger deals are anticipated by the market and hence the reaction from the 
market is smaller when the announcement is released. Another possible explanation is that the 
actual spread of deal size is too narrow to have an influence on the abnormal returns. 
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Moreover, both domestic versus cross-border and focused versus diversified are still 
insignificant, and most of the reasons presented above hold for acquisitions of private targets as 
well. Domestic versus cross-border is probably not relevant since a more globalized economy and 
better communication possibilities make country borders less important and nowadays it is easier 
to realize synergies even if the firms are not located in the same country. The insignificance of 
focused versus diversified implies that the shareholders in the markets examined seem to believe 
that companies are able to realize synergies in diversifying M&As as well. 
The form of the transaction is still significant at a 10% level with the difference that the 
coefficient is a bit higher in the total sample regression. A possible explanation for the higher 
explanatory power is that the information asymmetry is higher when acquiring private firms, and 
therefore the difference in uncertainty when estimating cash flows for specific assets and the 
entire firm is lower. Hence, the difference in abnormal return for the two alternatives should be 
smaller as well. Again, it has to be kept in mind that this result needs to be interpreted with 
caution, since the variable only is significant on a 10 % level.  
The method of payment was significant for the total sample but is far from significant when 
examining private targets only. One theory is that the shareholders of private firms are more 
informed about the prospects of the acquiring firms, and as a result they are more prone to accept 
stock as payment method (Chang, 1998). The result is that the difference in abnormal return 
between paying deals in stock or cash decreases, and the variable becomes less significant in 
these deals. 
Again, the relative size between the target and acquirer is a significant variable, i.e. a higher 
relative size tends to generate higher abnormal returns. In line with the previous argument, deals 
with smaller relative size may not be financially significant enough to affect the stock returns, 
and hence no abnormal return is detected in these deals.   
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter a concluding discussion regarding the results of the study is held. The 
purpose of the study and our research questions are tied to the results and analysis and potential 
reasons and causes that led us there are reflected over and analyzed in a wider perspective. 
Finally, proposals for future research within the field are presented.  
6.1 General conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to examine the abnormal returns surrounding M&A 
announcements for the acquiring firms, where the emphasis lay on the difference between 
acquiring public versus private targets. Secondly, the thesis aimed to get theoretical insights by 
examining the relationship between the magnitude of abnormal returns and different deal 
characteristics. With this in mind our purpose was divided into two different research questions: 
1. Are there abnormal returns following M&A-announcements, and if so, is there a 
difference in the announcement effect depending on if the target is public or private? 
2. How much relevance has each deal characteristic, previously found to be value 
creating, for the abnormal returns in public and private deals respectively? 
The event study shows an overall significant positive announcement effect following acquisitions 
of the total sample, i.e. both public and private targets included. When public and private targets 
are studied individually instead, the findings in line with the expectations. When acquiring a 
private firm, the acquiring firm´s shareholders receive a CAAR of 1.52 %. In bids for public 
firms, on the other hand, no value creation is shown over the three day event window since the 
results are not statistically significant. The abnormal returns for the two sub-samples, public 
targets and private targets, are then compared, and since a statistical difference is found between 
the two groups, we conclude that there exists a private firm discount. The first research question 
can thus be answered as follows: There are abnormal returns following M&A announcements, 
but only when private firms are acquired, and hence a difference exists in the announcement 
effect depending on if the target is public or private. 
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6.2 Event study and private firm discount 
When analyzing the results, the markets seem to be at least semi-strong, since most of the 
abnormal returns are generated on the event day, following the announcement. 
This implies, however, that the markets do not seem to anticipate the announcements and hence 
this unpredicted part results in abnormal returns. Efficient markets is also a necessary assumption 
for the result of the event study to be valid. Important to notice is that no announcement effect is 
found for public targets. Possible causes for this, in terms of efficient markets, are that 
acquisitions of public targets on average involve larger deals and a greater risk of information 
leakage before the actual announcement exists. This results in an earlier adjusted stock price in 
comparison to acquisitions of private targets. The expectations of the markets seem to be largely 
based on the information in the announcement and hence the content of the announcement 
becomes extremely important. The implication of this is that in order for the market to be able to 
make a correct judgment of the deal, transparency of the acquiring firm´s management regarding 
the deal, the motives behind it, the expected synergy effects and so on is of greatest importance. 
However, the above analysis is built on the assumption of rational markets, i.e. that all 
information is rationally analyzed. Abnormal returns are then generated when the expected value 
of acquiring the “new” firm exceeds the price paid for the same. 
Some previous empirical findings also indicate that the markets are not always rational and 
investors are influenced by a variety of biases and heuristics in their judgment of firms. There is 
always a risk that deals are misjudged. Therefore, it is harder to assess how the market will 
respond to different types of deals. The further implication of this is that managers to a lesser 
extent can affect the stock price by acting rationally.   
Important to consider is that M&A deals can be pursued due to other reasons than pure financial 
motives. A lot of acquisitions are made with the purpose to get rid of a competitor on the market 
or get access to specific patents, know-how, assets, key employees and so on. Then the value of 
short-term abnormal returns becomes less important. It is however impossible to determine the 
effect of this in our study since we do not have any information regarding exact motives behind 
the different deals. 
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Why does the difference in abnormal returns exist between private and public firms? 
In line with previous empirical findings, we believe that this difference depends on the private 
firm discount, which in its turn results from, among other things, a higher degree of information 
asymmetry, less liquid stocks and lower bidding competition. 
These factors combined result in the acquiring firm being able to pay less for private targets in 
comparison to public targets, and in the long run they also get the largest part of the value of the 
combined entity. 
The largest contribution of our research is that these findings also seems consistent with our 
studied market and time period. Even if Western Europe consists of different markets regarding 
size, development, market efficiency, type of investors, etc., they still seem to react as expected 
when aggregated. The financial crisis does not seem to have a huge impact either on the market 
view of these different deals, since our findings are in line with previous research that was 
conducted on data prior the financial crisis. 
What is the implication of this in a wider perspective? 
Despite the widespread knowledge about the private firm discount and the knowledge about the 
acquiring firm receiving a discount when acquiring private targets, the targets fail to demand a 
higher premium in these deals. The main part of the synergy effects and the value creation simply 
ends up in the acquiring firm, in comparison to an acquisition of a public target.   
If firms are rational and confide in previous empirical findings, they should to a larger extent 
concentrate their M&A strategies on private targets. However, it should be added that the 
market´s reaction largely depends on how well synergies can be realized between firms. 
Therefore, finding the “right” firm is still probably more important than the target legal status. 
Previous research shows that the discount for private firms largely is dependent on a higher 
degree of information asymmetry, illiquidity and lower bidding competition. This can imply that 
these firms could increase their value through: 
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 Lowering the information asymmetry. By becoming more transparent (as public firms), 
and supplying the bidder with all information needed, the risks of becoming a lemon 
decreases and the acquirer will be willing to pay a larger amount. 
 Improving the liquidity of the stock. This can be done in several ways, among them 
organizing some kind of trade in the stock, if the firms stocks are not publicly listed on an 
organized stock exchange already. This should be possible if the firm is owned by several 
smaller shareholders. The only thing opposing this would be legal rules. 
Since our results mostly conforms to previous studies, we cannot discern any large changes in 
neither the firms´ tendency to pursue M&As (since the M&A-market has recovered as discussed 
in the background) or in the valuation of private versus public targets (there still exists a private 
firm discount). 
What we on the other hand find is that the percentage of acquisitions of private targets steadily 
has increased from the crisis year 2008 to later years. 
A theory about this is linked to the firm´s risk appetite. Under financial crises, when economies 
and markets are characterized by high uncertainty, it is possible that firms to a greater extent 
avoid acquisitions of private targets, since the uncertainty in those deals is higher due to a larger 
degree of information asymmetry and the like. 
Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration when analyzing the results is the effect 
of the benchmark indices chosen to calculate the expected return. In this study, Datastream 
Global Equity Indices is used as the benchmarking indices. These indices are value-weighted 
price indices covering all listed shares in each of the 17 markets studied. These indices are 
affected by a number of factors that do not need to be of importance for all the studied firms. By 
using smaller and more relevant industry indices the research could be considered even more 
reliable. Such indices are, however, difficult to obtain and the complexity of the research would 
also increase significantly. Considering the research’s time limit and the size of the sample, these 
indices have been deselected.   
A factor that restricts the applicability of the results in this study is that we have studied 17 
different markets. Even if these markets share many common characteristics and all are both 
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developed and liquid, there can be regional differences that make the results inapplicable and not 
generalizable in each individual country. There is also a risk of the results being biased towards 
the largest markets, where most of the acquisitions are completed, e.g. the UK who alone stands 
for approximately 37 % of all the M&As. 
6.3 Value-creating characteristics 
When turning to our second research question, regarding the relevance of several deal 
characteristics, the results of the regression show that for the total sample, the variables target 
legal status, form of the transaction, method of payment and the relative size all are statistically 
significant. When instead public targets are analyzed, the method of payment is the only variable 
that is statistically significant. However, since the regression model as a whole is not statistically 
significant, the results are not reliable. Lastly, the regression output for private targets shows that 
the form of the transaction and the relative size are significant explanatory factors. 
Even if the above analysis does not guarantee any success in M&As, we believe that managers of 
acquiring firms in Western Europe have a lot to learn from the empirical research in order to 
maximize the value-creation for their shareholders. 
First and foremost, the managers, somewhat surprising, do not need to consider the absolute deal 
size, whether the target operates in the same country or whether the target operates within the 
same industry. These are deal characteristics that have been shown to be important in other 
markets and during other time periods, but based on our results these characteristics are not 
critical. The reasons for this can be many and different theories are presented in chapter 5, but 
generally our choice of market differs from a lot of previous studies, and there are also 
differences between the countries that need to be considered. One reason why studies on the U.S. 
market have found e.g. cross-border transactions to be significantly negative can be that the 
actual geographical distances are larger than in our study. In Western Europe a cross-border deal 
may well be aimed at a neighbor country, where the physical distance is smaller and synergies are 
therefore easier to realize. It should also be kept in mind that we have studied a subsequent time 
period, which probably has made e.g. cross-border transactions more attractive since we live in 
an increasingly global economy. Another thing that should be added is that the markets no longer 
only consist of traditional industrial firms and the like. Nowadays, rather large IT firms and the 
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service sector take more room and they also operate under completely different market settings 
which in the end can affect which acquisitions that are successful or not. 
If managers should draw any lessons from this study, it is that the markets to a higher degree 
reward (1) stock deals in favor of asset deals (important to remember the 10 % significance level 
though), (2) that the relative size between the firms is as large as possible, and (3) that the 
acquisition is paid in cash instead of stock. 
The third conclusion is however not possible to ensure when only examining private targets, 
which probably depends on the fact that the shareholders in these firms to a greater extent get 
involved in different prospects of acquiring firms and therefore also are more susceptible to 
accept stock as payment method. 
Of course there are a bunch of other factors that affect the success in deals, but managers that 
choose not to follow this advice should logically expect a more skeptical reaction from the 
market. To minimize these problems managers should as far as possible identify and 
communicate the expected synergy effects to the market and explain why this particular type of 
transaction is to prefer. This study has also specifically focused on the short-term announcement 
effect and therefore nothing can be said about the long-term implications of the deals.   
The most relevant findings in our study can be summarized as follows: 
 Our result shows that the announcement of M&As (regarding the total sample) lead to 
short-term abnormal returns for the acquiring firms in Western Europe. 
 The markets seem to a greater degree prefer acquisitions of private targets in comparison 
to public targets, which is supported by the theory of a private firm discount. 
 The markets prefer to a greater extent (1) stock deals in favor of assets deals, (2) that the 
relative size between the firms is as large as possible, and (3) that the acquisitions is paid 
in cash instead of stock. The third conclusion is however not possible to ensure when only 
examining private targets. 
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6.4 Proposed future research 
This study has found some new conclusions regarding acquisitions of private versus public 
targets. However, a number of untested parts and parts that can be improved remain. 
 
 This study has comprised of all M&A announcements (fulfilling the criteria) of $ 50 
million or more between January 2009 and February 2015. Future research could perform 
a similar study but with a smaller deal size limit. Since this variable was shown to not be 
significant, a smaller deal size limit could create a larger variance in the variable and thus 
improve the results. 
 The study could also be performed on another/other markets to see if the results hold, 
since there are few empirical studies based on post-financial crisis data. It would also be 
interesting to thoroughly look at the causes of why the different markets potentially differ 
from each other. 
 The market model has been used in this study to determine the stock´s expected return. 
Future research could use other models such as the arbitrage pricing model or the capital 
asset pricing model and then compare the results. This could improve and make the 
results more reliable.  
 Insiders can act on their informational advantage prior the M&A announcements and 
thereby gain abnormal returns even if it, from the outside, looks like the returns are 
negative, zero or slightly positive at best. For this reason, it would be interesting to study 
a longer event window prior the announcements, e.g. one week, to see how the results of 
the study are affected.  
 Since this study only concludes that a private firm discount is to be found on the West 
European market and not how large this discount is, it would be of great interest to further 
investigate this with another method than an event study. The causes of this discount can 
be more thoroughly examined as well.  
 The business cycle affects the stock market. Therefore it would be interesting to see if 
managers and investors´ behavior and the possibility of gaining abnormal returns changes 
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as the stock market changes. A suitable comparison would be to examine a period before 
the financial crisis and then compare it with a period after the crisis, e.g. the period we 
have chosen. 
 The reliability of the study could also be increased by using smaller and more relevant 
industry indices for each country to be able to calculate the shares´ expected returns in a 
more appropriate way. It would be interesting to see how this would affect the result. 
 The study includes 17 different West European countries, but as stated earlier they differ 
in a lot of ways and some countries also pursue a larger share of the total amount of M&A 
deals. The results could therefore be more generalizable if the countries were studied one 
by one and then compared to each other. 
 Further, the scope of the study could be widened by including more deal characteristics 
that have been found to be significant in previous empirical findings, e.g. key metrics and 
other synergy motives.   
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Appendix 5 – Normality tests (abnormal returns) 
 
Appendix 6 – Correlation matrix 
 
Appendix 7 – Normality Regression Tables 
Total sample CAR 
0
40
80
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160
200
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Series: Residuals
Sample 2 539
Observations 538
Mean       5.88e-16
Median  -0.002192
Maximum  0.297955
Minimum -0.164136
Std. Dev.   0.044852
Skewness   1.031795
Kurtosis   9.596910
Jarque-Bera  1071.015
Probability  0.000000
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Public targets CAR 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 2 172
Observations 171
Mean      -3.12e-16
Median   0.002566
Maximum  0.171726
Minimum -0.144898
Std. Dev.   0.045493
Skewness  -0.121839
Kurtosis   4.977840
Jarque-Bera  28.29502
Probability  0.000001
 
Source: Created by the authors using Eviews  
 
Private targets CAR 
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Observations 366
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Median  -0.004507
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Minimum -0.156660
Std. Dev.   0.043905
Skewness   1.591128
Kurtosis   11.77114
Jarque-Bera  1327.660
Probability  0.000000
 
Source: Created by the authors using Eviews  
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Appendix 8 – Regression results 
Total Sample - CAR 
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Public Targets - CAR 
 
 
  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C___DEAL_SIZE_LN__M_USD_ 0.001361 0.001748 0.778832 0.4372
C___DOMESTIC_VS__CROSS_B -0.004783 0.007310 -0.654336 0.5138
C___FOCUSED_VS__DIVERSID -0.000208 0.007520 -0.027668 0.9780
C___FORM__SHARES_1_ 0.001785 0.009799 0.182135 0.8557
C___PAYMENT_METHOD__CASH 0.015360 0.008382 1.832404 0.0687
C___RELATIVE_SIZE__INFLA -0.004845 0.005185 -0.934299 0.3515
C -0.015975 0.013633 -1.171826 0.2430
AR(1) -0.014280 0.085386 -0.167236 0.8674
R-squared 0.047421 -0.002939
Adjusted R-squared 0.006512 0.046611
S.E. of regression 0.046459 -3.254823
Sum squared resid 0.351831 -3.107845
Log likelihood 286.2874 -3.195186
F-statistic 1.159195 1.975022
Prob(F-statistic) 0.329144 1.488959
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.184944
    Wald F-statistic
    Mean dependent var
Public Targets - CAR
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance
    S.D. dependent var
    Akaike info criterion
    Schwarz criterion
    Hannan-Quinn criter.
    Durbin-Watson stat
Dependent Variable: CAR_3
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/15   Time: 16:30
Sample (adjusted): 2 172
Included observations: 171 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations
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Private Targets - CAR 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: CAR_3
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/15   Time: 16:33
Sample (adjusted): 2 367
Included observations: 366 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C___DEAL_SIZE_LN__M_USD_ 0.001746 0.002551 0.684483 0.4941
C___DOMESTIC_VS__CROSS_B 0.008053 0.005729 1.405713 0.1607
C___FOCUSED_VS__DIVERSID 0.006441 0.004633 1.390060 0.1654
C___FORM__SHARES_1_ 0.009245 0.004797 1.927373 0.0547
C___PAYMENT_METHOD__CASH 0.003167 0.008654 0.365911 0.7146
C___RELATIVE_SIZE__INFLA 0.002916 0.000876 3.328760 0.0010
C -0.005571 0.016032 -0.347503 0.7284
AR(1) -0.026656 0.053319 -0.499933 0.6174
R-squared 0.086204     Mean dependent var 0.015359
Adjusted R-squared 0.068336     S.D. dependent var 0.045929
S.E. of regression 0.044332     Akaike info criterion -3.372603
Sum squared resid 0.703587     Schwarz criterion -3.287300
Log likelihood 625.1864     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.338706
F-statistic 4.824597     Durbin-Watson stat 1.985577
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000033     Wald F-statistic 3.698553
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.001401
Private targets - CAR
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Uppköp av privata företag attraktivare än på länge 
I Skadden´s 2015 Insights* kunde man tidigare i år utläsa att 
M&A aktiviteten, enbart i Europa, ökade med 40.5 %  under 
föregående år. Europa har därmed sett sin högsta nivå av M&A 
aktivitet sedan den finansiella krisen. I en aktuell studie vid 
Lunds Universitet har M&As på den västeuropeiska marknaden 
studerats och skillnaden mellan uppköp av publika respektive 
privata företag analyserats. Studien konstaterar att uppköp av 
privata företag i en högre grad är värdeskapande.  
       Studien täcker alla tillkännagivanden av uppköp och 
sammanslagningar som uppgår till ett värde av $ 50 miljoner eller 
mer på 17 börser i Västeuropa mellan januari 2009 och februari 
2015. Baserat på företagens tillkännagivanden har effekten på 
aktiekurserna studerats över sammanlagt tre dagar (+/- en dag från 
tillkännagivandet) och även olika karaktärsdrag på uppköpen har 
studerats för att kunna konstatera vad som är värdeskapande vid ett 
M&A. Resultaten visar på att aktieägare till företag som köper upp 
publika företag varken kan förvänta sig en positiv eller en negativ 
överavkastning, medan en signifikant positiv överavkastning, om 
1.52 %, finns att vinna vid uppköp av privata företag.  
 
De två masterstudenterna som står bakom undersökningen är inte 
överraskade av upptäckten.  
     – Ser man till vår data består 68 % av alla M&As  i Västeuropa av 
privata företag, därav skulle det vara förvånande om resultaten 
visade att dessa inte är värdeskapande. Tidigare studier har även 
visat på signifikanta skillnader i överavkastning i uppköp av privata 
företag i jämförelse med publika företag, även om dessa studier inte 
genomförts på en Europeisk marknad, säger Isabella Lendt.  
 
 
 
 
Största anledningen bakom detta fenomen sägs vara en så kallad 
private firm discount, där privata företag säljs billigare på grund av 
bland annat illikviditet i bolagen, en större mängd 
informationsasymmetri och lägre budgivningskonkurrens.  
Att just privata bolag inte handlas på marknaden och därmed också 
att aktierna i dessa bolag är svårare att både köpa och sälja brukar 
framhävas som den största anledningen till att dessa säljs billigare 
än publika företag.  
 
Vidare visar studien på att marknaden generellt föredrar 
aktieförvärv före tillgångsförvärv, att den relativa storleken mellan 
det uppköpande företaget och målföretaget ska vara så stor som 
möjligt och att uppköpen bör betalas kontant istället för med aktier.  
 
Vad som dock förvånar studenterna är att varken storleken på 
budet eller om uppköpet är fokuserat eller diversifierat spelar någon 
roll, och vad gäller privata företag så verkar inte heller 
betalningsmetod spela roll. De tre variablerna har nämligen visats ha 
betydelse i tidigare studier.  
     – Enligt tidigare studier bör större affärer resultera i högre 
värdeskapande för det uppköpande företaget. En trolig anledning till 
att vi inte kan se något liknande i våra resultat är att större affärer är 
mer övervakade av både media och analytiker, vilket gör att 
marknaden är mer informerad och således förutser uppköpen i en 
högre utsträckning, säger Petter Lindkvist.  Även om det rent intuitivt 
känns som att fokuserande uppköp borde belönas mer, då de hålls 
inom ens kärnverksamhet, så verkar vår studerade marknad även tro 
på diversifierande uppköp, fortsätter Isabella Lendt. Att 
betalningsmetoden inte spelar någon roll tror författarna beror på 
att aktieägarna i privata företag är mer informerade om det 
uppköpande företagets prospekt och är därmed mer villiga att 
acceptera aktier som betalningsmetod.  
 
Slutligen finner undersökningen att andelen uppköp av privata 
företag har ökat ständigt sedan finanskrisen. En möjlig förklaring till 
detta är enligt författarna att uppköp av privata företag omges av en 
högre grad av osäkerhet i form av bland annat 
informationsasymmetri. I takt med att marknaderna gradvis 
stabiliserats har dessa affärer återigen blivit mer intressanta.  
    Även om det finns en hel del andra faktorer att ta hänsyn till vid 
ett M&A än vad vi undersökt, så tror vi definitivt att 
företagsledningen i uppköpande västeuropeiska företag har mycket 
att lära av denna undersökning för att maximera värdeskapandet för 
aktieägarna, säger Petter Lindkvist. 
 
Kort och gott är den västeuropeiska marknaden en allt viktigare 
aktör på den internationella M&A-marknaden och att köpa upp 
privata företag  är ytterst lönsamt med dagens marknadsläge. Om 
företagsledningen bara kan identifiera och kommunicera de 
förväntade synergieffekterna till marknaden finns mycket att vinna. 
Dock får inte glömmas att detta bara gäller på kort sikt, och såvida 
inte kan ge några implikationer på lång sikt, avslutar Isabella Lendt 
med.   
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Appendix 9 – Article 
Appendix 10 – Total Data Sample 
 
 
 
Announcemen
t  
date 
 
Acquirer 
 
Target 
 
Target 
legal status 
 
Public = 1 
Private = 0 
 
Domestic vs. 
cross-border 
 
Domestic =1 
Cross-border = 0 
 
Focused vs. 
diversified  
 
Focused = 1 
Diversified = 0 
 
Payment 
method  
 
Cash = 1 
Other = 0 
 
Form  
 
 
Shares = 1 
Assets = 0 
 
Deal 
Size  
(M USD) 
 
Relative 
Size 
 
AR (t-1) 
 
AR (t) 
 
AR 
(t+1) 
 
CAR  
2009-01-09 Peter Hambro Mining 
PLC 
Aricom PLC 1 1 1 0 1 280 62% -3,04% 3,55% 0,52% 1,03% 
2009-01-12 RWE AG Essent NV 0 0 1 1 1 11,489 0% -3,29% -1,70% 1,06% -3,92% 
2009-01-22 Autonomy Corp PLC Interwoven Inc 1 0 1 1 1 596 19% 6,11% 3,69% 2,74% 12,54% 
2009-02-09 H Lundbeck A/S Ovation Pharmaceuticals 
Inc 
0 0 1 1 1 900 21% -2,20% 5,10% 5,48% 8,39% 
2009-02-09 BG Group PLC Pure Energy Resources Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 714 2% 1,34% -1,61% -1,56% -1,83% 
2009-02-10 GERRY WEBER 
International AG 
GERRY WEBER 
International AG 
1 1 1 1 1 325 61% 0,30% 0,25% -0,12% 0,42% 
2009-02-16 Dana Petroleum PLC Bow Valley Energy Ltd 0 0 1 1 1 344 29% 4,71% 2,08% -3,39% 3,40% 
2009-03-10 Sodexo SA Radhakrishna Hospitality 
Services Pvt Ltd 
0 0 0 1 0 100 1% 2,59% -0,87% -0,07% 1,65% 
2009-03-13 TDC A/S Fullrate A/S 0 1 0 1 0 73 1% 1,79% 1,11% -1,12% 1,78% 
2009-03-18 Koninklijke Boskalis 
Westminster NV 
Smit Internationale NV 1 1 0 1 1 1,603 0% 0,40% -9,78% -0,71% -
10,09% 
2009-04-07 Corio NV Tekira Shopping Centre 0 0 0 1 0 90 3% 0,69% -0,89% 3,30% 3,10% 
2009-04-14 Avocet Mining PLC Wega Mining ASA 1 0 1 0 0 75 59% 0,29% 1,71% 5,42% 7,43% 
2009-04-15 Sanofi-Aventis SA BiPar Sciences Inc 0 0 0 1 0 500 1% -3,03% 1,64% -0,20% -1,60% 
2009-04-17 Peab AB Annehem Fastigheter AB 1 1 0 1 1 59 6% -1,12% -3,64% 2,19% -2,57% 
2009-04-20 GlaxoSmithKline PLC Stiefel Laboratories Inc 0 0 1 1 1 3,6 0% -0,37% 0,93% 1,73% 2,29% 
2009-04-22 Hunting PLC National Coupling Co Inc 0 0 0 1 0 60 7% -4,91% 0,79% 1,94% -2,18% 
2009-04-28 TNT NV Expresso Aracatuba 
Transportes e Logistica 
Ltda 
0 0 0 1 0 71 1% -0,42% 1,11% 4,57% 5,26% 
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2009-05-06 Micro Focus 
International PLC 
Borland Software Corp 1 0 1 1 1 73 8% 4,56% 15,82% -2,52% 17,87% 
2009-05-22 Segro PLC Brixton PLC 1 1 0 0 1 1,6 0% -3,49% 4,60% 0,28% 1,40% 
2009-05-25 Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics NV 
Saeco International Group 
SpA 
1 0 0 1 1 280 2% -0,23% 0,42% 0,12% 0,31% 
2009-05-25 Ruukki Group Oyj Mogale Alloys Ltd 0 0 1 1 0 243 43% -1,09% 2,76% -7,10% -5,43% 
2009-05-28 Unipapel SA Adimpo SL 0 1 0 1 1 63 36% 2,06% 0,28% 2,68% 5,02% 
2009-05-29 The Conygar Investment 
Co PLC 
The Advantage Property 
Income Trust Ltd 
1 1 1 0 1 211 303% 0,21% -0,31% 0,54% 0,44% 
2009-06-10 AMEC PLC GRD Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 112 3% -0,04% -2,74% 0,82% -1,96% 
2009-06-17 British American 
Tobacco PLC 
Bentoel Internasional 
Investama Tbk PT 
1 0 1 1 0 645 1% 0,64% 1,08% 1,70% 3,42% 
2009-06-19 BIC SA Norwood Promotional 
Products Inc 
0 0 0 1 0 162 6% -0,39% 0,37% -0,37% -0,39% 
2009-06-25 Arcadis NV Malcolm Pirnie Inc 0 0 1 0 1 221 24% 3,67% 4,37% 2,18% 10,23% 
2009-06-26 Fastighets AB Balder Din Bostad Sverige AB 1 1 0 0 1 626 623% 4,18% -3,57% -0,55% 0,05% 
2009-06-29 Celesio AG Panpharma Participacoes 
SA 
0 0 0 1 0 282 8% 0,10% 2,65% 3,13% 5,89% 
2009-07-01 RPS Group PLC Conics Ltd 0 0 1 1 1 52 7% 0,10% -0,72% 1,79% 1,18% 
2009-07-20 Realia Business SA Torre Realia 0 1 0 1 0 178 27% 2,76% -1,47% -0,80% 0,50% 
2009-07-23 Mobimo Holding AG LO Holding Lausanne-
Ouchy SA 
1 1 1 0 1 345 58% -0,44% 0,71% 0,26% 0,53% 
2009-08-13 Volkswagen AG Porsche Holding GmbH 0 0 1 1 0 4,546 0% 2,06% 2,53% -4,29% 0,31% 
2009-08-25 Aker Exploration ASA Det norske oljeselskap ASA 1 1 1 0 1 277 130% 1,02% 0,00% -0,76% 0,27% 
2009-09-07 bwin Interactive 
Entertainment AG 
Gioco Digitale SpA 0 0 0 0 1 164 13% 0,15% 3,60% -0,98% 2,78% 
2009-09-10 Weatherford 
International PLC 
Integrity Energy 
International LLC 
0 0 0 0 1 108 1% -1,34% 0,06% 0,04% -1,24% 
2009-09-14 Alcon Inc ESBATech AG 0 1 0 1 1 589 1% -1,05% -0,69% 0,05% -1,70% 
2009-09-16 Eurasian Natural 
Resources Corp Plc 
Central African Mining & 
Exploration Co PLC 
1 1 1 1 1 913 5% 0,78% 2,34% -4,21% -1,09% 
2009-09-16 Chemring Group PLC Hi-Shear Technology Corp 1 0 1 1 1 129 10% 0,89% 0,64% 4,28% 5,81% 
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2009-09-17 Balfour Beatty PLC Parsons Brinckerhoff 0 0 1 1 1 490 18% -3,28% 7,06% -6,05% -2,28% 
2009-09-18 AerCap Holdings NV Genesis Lease Ltd 1 0 0 0 1 302 41% -0,16% 1,21% 0,57% 1,62% 
2009-09-23 Qiagen NV DxS Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 130 3% -1,17% -3,92% -1,17% -6,27% 
2009-09-30 Fonciere 
Developpement 
Logements SA{FDL} 
Housing Units(422) 0 1 0 1 0 183 16% -1,13% 0,05% 32,40% 31,32% 
2009-10-02 Compagnie des Alpes SA Deux Alpes Loisirs SA 0 1 0 1 0 68 6% 0,92% -0,33% 2,88% 3,47% 
2009-10-12 Jeudan A/S Undisclosed Real Estate 
Portfolio,Copenhagen 
0 1 0 1 0 238 41% 0,56% 2,17% -0,37% 2,36% 
2009-10-15 Siemens AG Solel Solar Systems Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 418 72% 3,51% -0,81% -2,16% 0,55% 
2009-10-15 Outotec Oyj Larox Oyj 1 1 1 0 0 99 7% 0,62% 4,79% -0,22% 5,19% 
2009-10-20 Adecco SA MPS Group Inc 1 0 1 1 1 1,157 0% -0,68% -5,30% -1,73% -7,71% 
2009-10-30 Immobiliare Grande 
Distribuzione SIIQ SpA 
Katane Shopping Center 0 1 0 1 0 145 21% 7,01% -1,57% -2,42% 3,01% 
2009-11-04 Novartis AG Zhejiang Tianyuan Bio-
pharmaceutical Co Ltd 
0 0 1 1 0 125 0% 0,51% -1,11% 0,26% -0,35% 
2009-11-05 Biovitrum AB Swedish Orphan 
International AB 
0 1 1 0 1 584 137% 0,11% 5,75% 0,86% 6,72% 
2009-11-05 Metso Oyj Tamfelt Oyj Abp 1 1 0 0 1 301 7% -0,22% 0,65% 1,57% 2,01% 
2009-11-09 Qiagen NV SABiosciences Corp 0 0 1 1 0 90 2% 0,39% 1,55% 3,17% 5,11% 
2009-11-10 Logitech International 
SA 
LifeSize Communications 0 0 0 1 0 405 12% 0,02% -0,02% 0,43% 0,42% 
2009-11-23 Inmarsat PLC Segovia Inc 0 0 0 1 0 110 2% 0,42% 0,51% 2,08% 3,01% 
2009-11-23 G4S PLC Champions of the West Inc 0 0 1 1 0 60 1% 0,30% -0,98% 0,73% 0,05% 
2009-12-09 Meyer Burger 
Technology AG 
3S Industries AG 1 1 1 0 1 270 36% 0,59% 7,31% -1,16% 6,75% 
2009-12-11 Whitbread PLC coffeeheaven international 
PLC 
1 1 1 1 1 57 2% -0,74% 2,68% 2,75% 4,69% 
2009-12-16 Essilor International SA FGX International Holdings 
Ltd 
1 0 1 1 1 562 5% 0,61% 0,27% -0,23% 0,65% 
2009-12-17 Gruppo Coin SpA Upim Srl 0 1 1 0 1 63 7% 1,10% 4,23% -3,16% 2,17% 
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2009-12-18 Mears Group PLC Supporta PLC 1 1 0 0 1 72 22% -0,14% -1,45% 2,19% 0,60% 
2009-12-18 TAG Immobilien AG Undisclosed Residential 
Real Estate Portfolio, 
Berlin 
0 1 0 1 0 62 83% 4,01% 9,60% -7,83% 5,77% 
2009-12-21 Sanofi-Aventis SA Chattem Inc 1 0 1 1 1 2,107 0% 2,68% -0,58% 0,79% 2,89% 
2009-12-21 Fiat SpA Zastava Automobili 0 1 1 1 0 143 1% -1,38% -0,82% -1,14% -3,33% 
2009-12-21 The Capita Group PLC Synetrix(Holdings)Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 120 2% 0,40% 1,10% 0,75% 2,25% 
2009-12-23 Icade SA Cie la Lucette SA 1 1 0 1 0 1,703 0% -0,92% -1,27% 3,89% 1,70% 
2009-12-23 Novartis AG Corthera Inc 0 0 0 1 1 620 0% 0,52% 0,09% 0,01% 0,62% 
2009-12-23 AstraZeneca PLC Novexel SA 0 0 1 1 1 505 1% 1,65% -0,18% 0,50% 1,98% 
2009-12-23 Telefonica SA JAJAH Inc 0 0 1 1 0 208 0% 0,06% 0,21% -0,04% 0,23% 
2009-12-23 HMV Group PLC MAMA Group PLC 1 1 0 1 1 55 8% 1,13% -1,70% 1,36% 0,79% 
2010-01-06 Sonova Holding AG InSound Medical Inc 0 0 1 0 0 75 1% -0,15% 2,12% -2,09% -0,13% 
2010-01-18 Tyco International Ltd Brink's Home Security 
Holdings Inc 
1 0 1 0 1 1,855 0% 1,85% -0,07% 0,22% 2,00% 
2010-02-03 Jacquet Metals SA International Metal Service 
SA {IMS} 
1 1 1 0 1 406 308% -2,56% -0,04% 0,30% -2,31% 
2010-02-09 Autonomy Corp PLC MicroLink LLC 0 0 0 1 0 55 1% -1,30% 0,01% -5,94% -7,23% 
2010-02-15 Babcock International 
Group PLC 
VT Group PLC 1 1 0 0 1 2,184 0% -1,22% -9,47% 7,28% -3,41% 
2010-02-18 Eurasian Natural 
Resources Corp Plc 
Enya Holding BV 0 0 1 1 1 300 2% 2,04% 0,88% -1,78% 1,14% 
2010-02-25 LBI International NV LBI International AB 1 0 0 0 1 150 132% 1,42% -1,14% -4,85% -4,57% 
2010-02-27 Corio NV Nailloux Outlet 
Management SARL 
0 0 0 1 0 60 1% -0,99% -1,05% 0,15% -1,89% 
2010-02-28 Merck KGaA Millipore Corp 1 0 0 1 1 6,869 0% 0,00% 2,10% -0,19% 1,90% 
2010-03-09 Foraco International SA Adviser Drilling SA 0 0 0 1 1 51 36% 1,08% 0,41% 3,72% 5,20% 
2010-03-14 Compagnie Financiere 
Richemont SA 
NET-A-PORTER Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 359 2% 0,56% 0,52% 0,45% 1,52% 
2010-03-15 Wilh Wilhelmsen ASA Wilh Wilhelmsen ASA 1 1 1 0 1 306 35% -0,66% 2,22% 1,96% 3,52% 
2010-03-16 Healthcare Locums PLC Healthcare Australia 
Holdings Pty Ltd 
0 0 1 1 1 118 30% -1,84% -0,98% 0,04% -2,78% 
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2010-03-30 Praesepe PLC Beacon Entertainments Ltd 0 1 0 0 1 68 228% 0,06% -4,40% -1,33% -5,67% 
2010-04-21 Vallourec SA Serimax SAS 0 1 0 1 1 201 2% -0,11% -0,01% 0,91% 0,78% 
2010-05-06 Rheinmetall AG Simrad Optronics ASA 1 0 0 1 1 95 3% -2,29% 3,90% -2,22% -0,60% 
2010-05-11 Hochtief AG EE Cruz & Co Inc 0 0 1 1 0 53 1% 1,67% -0,42% -2,94% -1,70% 
2010-05-18 Britvic PLC Fruite Entreprises SA 0 0 1 1 1 294 5% -3,73% 3,62% 2,35% 2,25% 
2010-05-19 Pearson PLC Melorio PLC 1 1 0 1 0 156 1% 0,62% -1,62% -1,06% -2,06% 
2010-05-19 Sanofi-Aventis SA Nepentes SA 0 0 1 1 0 77 0% -0,77% 0,90% -4,38% -4,25% 
2010-05-24 RusForest AB Nord Timber Group 0 0 1 0 1 67 102% 0,59% 17,30% -4,05% 13,84% 
2010-05-28 Royal Dutch Shell PLC East Resources Inc 0 0 1 1 0 4,7 0% 0,84% 0,01% -0,83% 0,02% 
2010-05-28 Travis Perkins PLC The BSS Group PLC 1 1 0 0 1 924 40% -3,12% 6,07% -0,04% 2,91% 
2010-06-01 The Capita Group PLC Premier Medical Group Ltd 0 1 1 1 1 88 1% 0,01% 0,15% -0,26% -0,10% 
2010-06-08 Compass Group PLC SSC Service Solutions 0 0 0 1 1 65 0% 0,57% -0,61% 1,94% 1,90% 
2010-06-09 Dassault Systemes SA Exalead SA 0 1 1 1 0 162 2% -1,29% 1,39% 0,97% 1,07% 
2010-06-10 GlaxoSmithKline PLC Laboratorios Phoenix 
SACyF 
0 0 1 1 1 253 0% -0,08% -0,38% 2,63% 2,17% 
2010-06-11 Danone SA Medical Nutrition USA Inc 1 0 0 1 1 50 0% -0,57% -0,90% 0,08% -1,40% 
2010-06-15 Conwert Immobilien 
Invest SE 
Eco Business-Immobilien 
AG 
1 1 0 1 1 643 73% 0,12% 2,81% -1,09% 1,84% 
2010-06-17 Rhodia SA Jiangsu Feixiang Chemical 
Co Ltd 
0 0 1 1 1 489 29% 0,55% 2,84% -0,12% 3,27% 
2010-06-23 YIT Oyj caverion GmbH 0 0 1 1 1 90 4% -0,25% 1,90% -0,50% 1,15% 
2010-06-28 Noble Corp FDR Holdings Ltd 0 0 1 1 1 2,16 0% 2,32% 2,93% 4,30% 9,55% 
2010-06-29 Gemalto NV Cinterion Wireless 
Modules GmbH 
0 0 0 1 0 199 6% 1,76% 0,28% 1,04% 3,08% 
2010-06-30 Sanofi-Aventis SA TargeGen Inc 0 0 1 1 0 560 1% 0,23% 1,52% -0,49% 1,27% 
2010-06-30 Shire PLC Lexington Technology 
Park, 
Lexington,Massachusetts 
0 0 0 1 0 165 1% -1,26% -0,22% -1,37% -2,85% 
2010-07-02 Landi Renzo SpA AEB Srl 0 1 1 1 1 53 13% 1,74% -5,38% -0,08% -3,72% 
2010-07-06 Hexagon AB Intergraph Corp 0 0 0 1 0 2,125 0% 0,01% 0,89% 5,46% 6,36% 
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2010-07-06 Alcon Inc LenSx Lasers Inc 0 0 0 1 0 744 2% -0,06% 0,60% -0,24% 0,29% 
2010-07-07 DS Smith PLC Otor SA 1 0 0 1 0 238 34% 0,13% 0,50% -0,66% -0,03% 
2010-07-09 UNIT4 NV Teta SA 0 0 1 1 1 56 9% -0,53% -0,53% -0,11% -1,18% 
2010-07-21 Reckitt Benckiser Group 
PLC 
SSL International PLC 1 1 0 1 1 3,872 0% -1,25% 2,51% -1,26% 0,00% 
2010-07-21 Firestone Diamonds PLC Kopane Diamond 
Developments PLC 
1 1 1 0 1 79 121% 1,52% -
13,67% 
-2,62% -
14,77% 
2010-07-26 Pace PLC 2Wire Inc 0 0 0 1 0 475 60% 2,86% 12,74% -1,83% 13,77% 
2010-07-29 Aegis Group PLC Mitchell Communication 
Group Ltd 
1 0 1 0 1 300 15% -0,20% 2,07% -1,00% 0,87% 
2010-08-02 WS Atkins PLC The PBSJ Corp 0 0 1 1 1 296 27% -1,49% 2,38% 2,01% 2,90% 
2010-08-25 Compass Group PLC VSG Group Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 99 1% 2,87% 1,20% 0,75% 4,82% 
2010-08-29 Sanofi-Aventis SA Genzyme Corp 0 0 0 1 1 23,525 0% 0,79% 0,98% -0,61% 1,16% 
2010-08-30 Meda AB Alaven Pharmaceutical LLC 0 0 1 1 0 350 15% 0,50% 5,59% -1,98% 4,12% 
2010-09-07 BAE Systems PLC OASYS Technology LLC 0 0 1 1 0 55 0% 0,20% 0,60% -0,16% 0,63% 
2010-09-09 Axel Springer SE SeLoger.com SA 1 0 0 1 0 732 19% -1,49% -1,89% 1,27% -2,11% 
2010-09-13 William Demant Holding 
AS 
Otix Global Inc 1 0 1 1 1 62 2% 1,45% 0,29% -0,37% 1,37% 
2010-09-20 Safran SA L-1 Identity Solutions Inc 1 0 0 1 1 1,595 0% 0,08% 3,40% 5,37% 8,85% 
2010-09-21 Experian PLC Mighty Net Inc 0 0 1 1 0 208 2% 0,08% -0,24% 0,34% 0,19% 
2010-09-27 Unilever PLC Alberto-Culver Co 1 0 0 1 1 3,728 0% -0,47% 1,54% 1,02% 2,08% 
2010-09-27 Temenos Group AG Odyssey Financial 
Technologies SA 
0 0 1 1 0 101 6% -1,92% 1,05% 2,09% 1,23% 
2010-09-28 UPM-Kymmene Oyj Myllykoski Oy 0 1 1 0 0 1,128 0% -1,98% 3,76% -0,34% 1,45% 
2010-10-01 Spectris PLC N-TRON Corp 0 0 0 1 0 51 3% 2,26% 0,24% 0,40% 2,91% 
2010-10-06 Johnson Matthey PLC Intercat Inc 0 0 1 1 0 56 1% 0,55% 0,26% 0,85% 1,65% 
2010-10-11 Electrolux AB Olympic Group for 
Financial Investments SAE 
1 0 1 1 0 249 3% 0,81% 3,45% -0,32% 3,94% 
2010-10-11 Assa Abloy AB ActivIdentity Inc 1 0 0 1 1 76 1% -2,09% -0,60% 0,20% -2,49% 
2010-10-13 Balfour Beatty PLC Halsall Associates Ltd 0 0 1 1 0 53 2% 0,07% -1,20% 1,86% 0,73% 
2010-10-18 Eurasian Natural 
Resources Corp Plc 
Mineracao Minas Bahia SA 0 0 1 1 1 304 2% 1,01% -2,44% -0,46% -1,88% 
2010-10-20 OMV AG Petrol Ofisi AS 1 0 0 1 0 1,392 0% -0,91% -0,94% -5,05% -6,90% 
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2010-10-22 Fagerhult AB LTS Licht & Leuchten 
GmbH 
0 0 1 1 1 85 37% -0,44% 6,15% -0,32% 5,39% 
2010-10-22 Dechra Pharmaceuticals 
PLC 
DermaPet Inc 0 0 1 1 0 64 13% -1,38% 7,09% 1,69% 7,39% 
2010-10-28 Stora Enso Oyj Inpac International Print & 
Packaging Co Ltd 
0 0 1 1 0 115 2% 1,29% -2,27% -0,98% -1,96% 
2010-10-28 Sanofi-Aventis SA BMP Sunstone Corp 1 0 1 1 1 533 1% 0,37% -0,04% 1,02% 1,35% 
2010-11-10 Daisy Group PLC SpiriTel PLC 1 1 1 1 1 63 15% -2,90% 2,72% -1,54% -1,72% 
2010-11-15 Nyrstar NV Farallon Mining Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 396 26% -2,35% 1,66% -
10,92% 
-
11,61% 
2010-11-15 SolarWorld AG Solarparc AG 1 1 0 0 1 76 5% -2,24% -3,25% -0,68% -6,17% 
2010-11-19 BTG PLC Biocompatibles 
International PLC 
1 1 0 0 1 234 22% 0,61% -7,68% -1,78% -8,85% 
2010-11-22 Prysmian SpA Draka Holding NV 1 0 0 0 1 1,647 0% 0,71% -3,41% -0,90% -3,60% 
2010-11-22 K+S AG Potash One Inc 1 0 0 1 1 420 3% 0,36% -1,72% 2,80% 1,44% 
2010-11-23 Laird PLC Cattron Group 
International Inc 
0 0 1 1 0 90 15% 0,79% 10,64% -4,62% 6,81% 
2010-11-24 Danone SA YoCream International Inc 0 0 1 1 1 103 0% -0,51% 0,07% -0,09% -0,53% 
2010-11-30 Inmeta ASA Crayon Group AS 0 1 0 0 1 55 131% -2,22% 0,07% 4,06% 1,92% 
2010-11-30 ABB Ltd Baldor Electric Co 1 0 1 1 1 3,886 0% 1,11% 1,41% -0,90% 1,61% 
2010-11-30 Obrascon Huarte Lain 
SA 
Judlau Contracting Inc 0 0 1 1 0 72 2% -0,07% -1,32% 3,99% 2,60% 
2010-12-02 Young & Co's Brewery 
PLC 
Geronimo Inns Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 93 36% -0,84% 0,00% -0,88% -1,73% 
2010-12-06 Rio Tinto PLC Riversdale Mining Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 3,661 0% 0,45% 0,07% -0,37% 0,15% 
2010-12-10 Assura Group Ltd AH Medical Properties PLC 1 1 1 0 1 196 83% -3,78% 3,40% -1,35% -1,74% 
2010-12-13 Assa Abloy AB Cardo AB 1 1 0 1 0 1,056 0% 1,58% -1,99% 1,45% 1,04% 
2010-12-13 John Wood Group PLC Production Services 
Network (UK)Ltd 
0 1 1 0 1 959 24% 0,17% 5,25% 2,34% 7,75% 
2010-12-21 DPA Group NV De Nederlandse Interim 
Groep BV{NIG} 
0 1 1 0 0 54 101% -0,07% 3,98% 0,01% 3,92% 
2010-12-22 BAE Systems PLC ETI A/S 0 0 0 1 0 211 1% 1,71% -0,96% 0,59% 1,34% 
2010-12-23 The Capita Group PLC BSI Holdings Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 66 1% -0,45% 0,45% 0,56% 0,57% 
2010-12-30 Digital Vision AB Image Systems AB 0 1 0 0 0 170 3649% - 41,39% 0,53% 19,94% 
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21,98% 
2010-12-31 Vivendi SA Digitick SA 0 1 0 1 0 60 0% -0,36% -0,57% 0,62% -0,31% 
2011-01-10 Biotie Therapies Oyj Synosia Therapeutics 
Holding AG 
0 0 1 0 1 119 112% 9,01% 2,89% 13,66% 25,56% 
2011-01-19 Glanbia PLC Bio-Engineered 
Supplements & Nutrition 
Inc 
0 0 0 1 0 145 10% -0,66% 3,87% -1,32% 1,90% 
2011-01-31 Greene King PLC Cloverleaf Restaurants Ltd 0 1 1 1 1 104 7% -0,83% 5,42% 0,49% 5,08% 
2011-02-07 Ensco PLC Pride International Inc 1 0 1 0 1 8,685 0% -1,34% -5,00% -2,13% -8,46% 
2011-02-09 Klepierre SA Romagna Retail Park 0 0 0 1 0 95 1% 0,52% 1,65% -1,29% 0,88% 
2011-02-11 Carillion PLC Eaga PLC 1 1 1 1 1 410 17% -0,37% 1,87% 0,90% 2,40% 
2011-02-14 Sinclair Pharma PLC IS Pharma PLC 1 1 1 0 1 89 63% -0,95% 1,56% 1,01% 1,62% 
2011-02-14 Nutreco NV Shihai Co Ltd 0 0 1 1 1 54 2% 5,42% -1,61% -0,08% 3,74% 
2011-02-14 Fluidra SA Aqua Products Inc 0 0 1 1 1 50 13% -0,94% 2,89% 0,31% 2,27% 
2011-02-15 Wm Morrison 
Supermarkets PLC 
Kiddicare.com Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 113 1% -0,57% 2,07% -0,15% 1,34% 
2011-02-16 Clariant AG Sued Chemie AG 1 0 1 1 0 1,597 0% 0,94% -
14,74% 
-0,74% -
14,55% 
2011-02-21 CSR PLC Zoran Corp 1 0 1 0 1 224 19% -0,09% -8,95% -2,54% -
11,57% 
2011-02-21 AMEC PLC The qedi Group 0 1 0 1 0 54 1% -0,90% 0,90% -0,61% -0,62% 
2011-02-24 Henkel AG & Co KGaA Schwarzkopf Inc 0 0 0 1 1 57 1% -0,08% -2,87% 0,97% -1,97% 
2011-02-25 TiGenix NV Cellerix SA 0 0 1 0 1 86 1% -0,70% 4,26% 0,10% 3,65% 
2011-03-02 BBA Aviation PLC GE Aviation Systems LLC-
Legacy fuel measurement 
business 
0 1 0 1 0 62 4% -1,01% -5,81% -0,77% -7,59% 
2011-03-07 LVMH Moet Hennessy 
Louis Vuitton SA 
Bulgari SpA 1 0 1 0 0 3,001 0% -0,42% 1,76% 0,42% 1,76% 
2011-03-07 Pearson PLC Education Development 
International PLC 
1 1 0 1 1 166 1% 3,58% 1,02% 0,02% 4,62% 
2011-03-08 Halma PLC Medicel AG 0 0 0 1 0 75 4% 0,53% -0,12% 5,15% 5,56% 
2011-03-09 DCC PLC Advent Data Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 52 2% 0,06% 0,55% 0,29% 0,90% 
2011-03-15 Serco Group PLC The Listening Co Ltd 0 1 1 1 0 90 2% 1,56% -0,94% -1,73% -1,12% 
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2011-03-16 NH Hoteles SA Undisclosed Hotels(10) 0 0 1 1 0 321 21% -1,43% 3,11% 2,20% 3,88% 
2011-03-21 Tyco International Ltd KEF Holdings Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 300 1% -0,48% 0,91% -0,84% -0,41% 
2011-03-24 Schneider Electric SA Summit Energy Services 
Inc 
0 0 0 1 0 268 1% -0,93% -0,30% -0,12% -1,34% 
2011-04-04 Solvay SA Rhodia SA 1 0 1 1 1 5,981 0% -1,11% 1,71% -1,50% -0,90% 
2011-04-05 Evolva Holding SA Abunda Nutrition Inc 0 0 1 0 1 65 29% 2,27% -6,23% -1,17% -5,13% 
2011-04-05 Capgemini SA Avantias SAS 0 1 1 1 1 57 1% 0,62% 0,86% -1,64% -0,16% 
2011-04-07 Synergy Health PLC BeamOne LLC 0 0 1 1 0 55 7% 1,16% -1,27% 1,22% 1,11% 
2011-04-11 NIBE Industrier AB Schulthess Group AG 0 0 0 0 0 471 35% 0,86% -1,30% -0,58% -1,01% 
2011-04-11 Medivir AB BioPhausia AB 1 1 1 0 1 101 16% -1,33% -1,15% -1,58% -4,06% 
2011-04-11 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical 
Co ASA 
Stingray Geophysical Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 80 3% 2,18% -1,01% 1,48% 2,66% 
2011-04-15 Nieuwe Steen 
Investments NV 
VastNed Offices/Industrial 
NV 
1 1 1 0 1 1,171 0% 1,21% 0,47% 1,65% 3,33% 
2011-04-15 The Capita Group PLC Right Document Solutions 
Holdings Ltd 
0 1 1 1 0 65 1% 1,41% 1,26% 0,71% 3,38% 
2011-04-19 Svenska Capital Oil AB Misen Enterprises AB 0 1 1 0 1 135 6264% 0,48% 15,30% -0,32% 15,46% 
2011-04-19 Buongiorno SpA Dada SpA 1 1 1 1 1 104 51% 2,60% 2,30% 0,80% 5,70% 
2011-04-26 Pearson PLC SchoolNet Inc 0 0 0 1 0 230 2% -0,01% 0,23% 1,61% 1,82% 
2011-04-27 Mediq NV PBG Groep BV 0 1 0 1 0 59 5% 1,35% 2,18% -1,38% 2,15% 
2011-05-02 QSC AG INFO Gesellschaft fuer 
Informationssysteme AG 
1 1 1 1 0 50 10% -1,24% -2,16% -4,33% -7,73% 
2011-05-03 Experian PLC Computec SA 1 0 0 1 0 382 3% -0,08% 0,68% 0,43% 1,04% 
2011-05-05 Capital Product Partners 
LP 
Crude Carriers Corp 1 1 1 0 1 403 96% 0,02% -
11,72% 
1,60% -
10,10% 
2011-05-11 TDC A/S OnFone ApS 0 1 0 1 1 55 1% 1,22% 1,71% 0,17% 3,10% 
2011-05-17 Shire PLC Advanced Biohealing Inc 0 0 1 1 0 750 4% -1,38% -1,21% 1,78% -0,80% 
2011-05-23 Bigben Interactive SA ModeLabs Group SA 1 1 0 1 1 79 52% 0,17% 0,53% -0,10% 0,60% 
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2011-05-26 British American 
Tobacco PLC 
Productora Tabacalera de 
Colombia SA{Protabaco} 
0 0 1 1 1 452 1% -1,55% 1,14% -0,66% -1,07% 
2011-05-26 Sportingbet PLC Centrebet International 
Ltd 
1 0 0 1 1 158 41% -0,50% -
10,56% 
1,28% -9,78% 
2011-06-15 Nyrstar NV Breakwater Resources Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 480 22% 2,18% 3,58% 5,02% 10,78% 
2011-06-15 Qiagen NV Ipsogen SA 1 0 1 1 0 58 1% -0,74% 0,32% -1,59% -2,01% 
2011-06-16 austriamicrosystems AG Texas Advanced 
Optoelectronic Solutions 
Inc 
0 0 0 0 1 320 55% -0,73% -1,71% 2,10% -0,34% 
2011-06-16 Immofinanz AG Adama Holding Public Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 60 1% -0,42% 0,54% -0,64% -0,52% 
2011-06-21 Elekta AB Nucletron BV 0 0 1 1 0 526 13% 3,20% 3,78% -1,04% 5,94% 
2011-06-22 CompuGroup Medical 
AG 
LAUER FISCHER GmbH 0 1 1 1 0 75 9% -0,84% 0,69% 0,99% 0,84% 
2011-06-23 ERG SpA IVPC Power 3 SpA 0 1 0 1 1 143 7% 1,07% 0,24% 0,90% 2,21% 
2011-06-23 AB Sagax Properties(2),Stockholm 0 1 0 1 0 54 13% -1,36% 1,74% -0,17% 0,22% 
2011-06-28 Experian PLC Medical Present Value Inc 0 0 0 1 0 185 1% -1,18% 0,86% 1,13% 0,81% 
2011-06-29 Saab AB Sensis Corp 0 0 1 1 0 195 8% 0,69% 0,67% -0,31% 1,06% 
2011-06-30 Akzo Nobel NV Schramm Holding AG 1 0 0 1 0 206 1% 0,15% -1,35% -0,57% -1,78% 
2011-06-30 Corio NV Centre Saint Jacques 0 0 0 1 0 139 2% 0,62% 0,29% 0,72% 1,63% 
2011-07-01 Recordati SpA Dr F Frik Ilac Sanayi ve 
Ticaret AS 
0 0 1 1 1 130 6% 0,32% -0,36% 0,49% 0,44% 
2011-07-04 Nestle SA Hsu Fu Chi International 
Ltd 
0 0 1 1 0 1,698 0% 0,02% -0,03% 0,76% 0,75% 
2011-07-11 Lonza Group Ltd Arch Chemicals Inc 1 0 0 1 1 1,474 0% 1,09% 2,74% 2,59% 6,42% 
2011-07-11 Aegis Group PLC MediaVest(Manchester)Lt
d 
0 1 1 1 0 151 5% -0,19% -1,20% 2,76% 1,37% 
2011-07-14 BHP Billiton PLC Petrohawk Energy Corp 1 0 0 1 1 15,557 0% 0,59% -0,93% -1,88% -2,22% 
2011-07-18 Meridiana Fly SpA Air Italy Holding Srl 0 1 1 1 1 134 107% -0,88% 2,89% 2,91% 4,92% 
2011-07-19 Tyco International Ltd Chemguard Inc 0 0 0 1 0 130 1% -0,68% -0,10% -0,05% -0,82% 
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2011-07-19 Greene King PLC The Capital Pub Co PLC 1 1 1 1 1 136 8% -1,69% -0,11% 0,65% -1,15% 
2011-07-19 bioMerieux SA Argene SA 0 1 0 1 0 53 1% -0,40% -0,11% -1,75% -2,26% 
2011-07-20 Randstad Holding NV SFN Group Inc 1 0 1 1 1 730 10% 1,92% 1,63% 1,72% 5,26% 
2011-07-26 DryShips Inc OceanFreight Inc 1 1 1 0 1 242 16% -1,43% -0,78% 2,39% 0,19% 
2011-07-27 Eni SpA Nuon Belgium NV,Nuon 
Power Generation Walloon 
BV 
0 0 0 1 0 226 0% -0,82% 0,32% -0,59% -1,09% 
2011-07-27 Industria de Diseno 
Textil SA 
Undisclosed Real 
Estate,Milan 
0 0 0 1 0 148 0% -0,41% 0,97% -1,05% -0,49% 
2011-07-29 UBM PLC International Business 
Events Ltd 
0 1 0 1 0 83 4% -1,21% 6,03% -1,17% 3,65% 
2011-08-01 Telecity Group PLC Data Electronics Services 
Ltd 
0 0 1 1 0 144 8% 0,27% 1,47% -1,20% 0,54% 
2011-08-08 Aryzta AG Honeytop Speciality Foods 
Ltd 
0 0 1 1 0 130 3% -0,07% -1,96% -0,89% -2,92% 
2011-08-12 Hunting PLC Dearborn Precision 
Tubular Products Inc 
0 0 1 1 0 84 5% -0,65% -4,13% 2,83% -1,95% 
2011-08-15 Spectris PLC Omega Engineering Inc 0 0 1 1 0 475 17% 1,06% 3,33% -0,75% 3,65% 
2011-08-19 Electrolux AB CTI Cia Tecno Industrial SA 1 0 1 1 0 551 10% -2,98% 0,39% 0,62% -1,97% 
2011-08-26 San Leon Energy PLC Realm Energy International 
Corp 
1 0 1 0 1 116 42% -2,98% -4,02% -0,15% -7,14% 
2011-09-01 Svenska Cellulosa AB 
SCA 
Pro Descart Industria e 
Comercio Ltda 
0 0 1 1 0 70 1% -1,62% -1,58% 1,41% -1,79% 
2011-09-06 Sodexo SA Puras do Brasil SA 0 0 0 1 1 735 6% -1,69% 2,70% 1,05% 2,05% 
2011-09-15 Cobham PLC Trivec Avant Corp 0 0 0 1 1 144 4% -0,06% -1,61% -0,03% -1,70% 
2011-09-15 Tyco International Ltd Visonic Ltd 1 0 0 1 1 84 0% -1,36% 0,68% 2,54% 1,86% 
2011-09-21 DIC Asset AG Office Properties 
Karlsruhe,Leipzig(2) 
0 1 0 1 0 85 22% -2,08% 3,10% -1,40% -0,38% 
2011-09-29 Ultra Electronics 
Holdings PLC 
AEP Networks Inc 0 0 0 1 0 58 4% 0,91% -1,31% 0,01% -0,38% 
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2011-10-03 Hikma Pharmaceuticals 
PLC 
Societe de Promotion 
Pharmaceutique du 
Maghreb SA 
1 0 1 1 0 111 6% 0,76% -0,22% 2,82% 3,36% 
2011-10-05 Premier Oil PLC EnCore Oil PLC 1 1 1 0 1 289 12% 1,61% -4,20% 0,28% -2,32% 
2011-10-14 Unilever PLC OAO Kontsern "Kalina" 1 0 0 1 0 555 1% 1,36% 1,85% -0,88% 2,33% 
2011-10-17 Statoil ASA Brigham Exploration Co 1 0 1 1 1 4,782 0% 0,02% 0,21% 0,94% 1,16% 
2011-10-19 Rio Tinto PLC Hathor Exploration Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 564 1% -3,46% -1,81% -1,86% -7,13% 
2011-10-24 SDL PLC Alterian PLC 1 1 1 1 1 98 12% -0,21% -0,25% -1,77% -2,23% 
2011-10-24 Vistaprint NV Albumprinter BV 0 1 0 1 0 91 8% 1,53% 3,58% -0,64% 4,47% 
2011-11-03 BayWa AG Turners & Growers Ltd 1 0 0 1 0 125 9% 0,95% -1,12% 1,15% 0,98% 
2011-11-04 Oxford Instruments PLC Platinum Medical Imaging 
LLC 
0 0 1 1 0 55 8% 2,49% 0,01% -1,67% 0,83% 
2011-11-09 May Gurney Integrated 
Services PLC 
TransLinc Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 104 32% 1,06% -1,37% 0,55% 0,24% 
2011-11-14 Ingenico SA Xiring SA 1 1 0 1 0 63 3% 0,01% 2,97% 3,03% 6,02% 
2011-11-15 Velti PLC Mobile Interactive Group 
Ltd 
0 0 1 1 0 93 19% 3,27% -1,16% 7,20% 9,31% 
2011-11-18 Filtrona PLC Richco Inc 0 0 1 1 1 110 9% 1,53% -0,78% 1,62% 2,38% 
2011-11-21 Covidien PLC BARRX Medical Inc 0 0 1 1 1 325 1% 0,56% -3,37% 0,12% -2,69% 
2011-11-21 Pearson PLC Global Education & 
Technology Group Ltd 
1 0 0 1 1 162 1% 0,89% 1,26% -0,15% 1,99% 
2011-11-28 Senior PLC Weston EU Ltd 0 1 1 1 1 84 8% 1,69% -1,75% 5,39% 5,34% 
2011-12-01 Outotec Oyj Energy Products of Idaho 
Inc 
0 0 1 1 0 91 5% -0,27% 2,98% 0,13% 2,85% 
2011-12-02 Advanced Medical 
Solutions Group PLC 
RESORBA Wundversorgung 
GmbH & Co KG 
0 0 1 1 0 85 42% -5,23% 14,03% 0,30% 9,10% 
2011-12-05 Ultra Electronics 
Holdings PLC 
Zu Industries Inc 0 0 0 1 0 77 5% -0,27% 1,09% 1,29% 2,11% 
2011-12-12 Carrefour SA Guyenne et Gascogne SA 1 1 1 1 1 603 4% 1,89% -0,91% -0,87% 0,11% 
2011-12-12 ABB Ltd Newave Energy Holding SA 1 1 0 1 0 157 0% 0,29% -0,46% 0,49% 0,32% 
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2011-12-13 Icade SA Societe Immobiliere de 
Location pour l'Industrie et 
le Commerce SA 
1 1 1 0 1 3,387 0% -1,46% -1,77% -0,18% -3,41% 
2011-12-19 Vistaprint NV Webs Inc 0 0 0 0 0 118 9% 2,76% -6,87% -0,36% -4,46% 
2011-12-19 Sweco AB Finnmap Consulting Oy 0 0 0 0 1 85 14% 0,53% 5,01% 4,53% 10,08% 
2011-12-21 Alma Media Oyj LMC sro 0 0 0 1 0 51 8% 0,15% -0,34% -1,33% -1,52% 
2011-12-23 The Capita Group PLC Applied Language 
Solutions Ltd 
0 1 1 1 0 105 2% 1,01% -0,33% 0,02% 0,70% 
2012-01-03 Fastighets AB Balder Residential Block 
Oesterfaelled,Copenhagen 
0 0 1 1 0 189 35% 0,14% 0,75% 3,23% 4,13% 
2012-01-05 Cooper Industries PLC Blinda Industria e 
Comercio Ltda 
0 0 1 1 0 56 1% -0,32% -0,24% -0,96% -1,52% 
2012-01-06 Eurasia Groupe SA MB Retail Europe SA 1 1 0 1 1 254 323% 0,11% 0,01% 0,01% 0,14% 
2012-01-09 EnQuest PLC Canamens Energy North 
Sea Ltd, Canamens UK 814 
& 815 Ltd 
0 1 1 1 0 90 8% 2,03% 3,46% 0,74% 6,23% 
2012-01-25 Weir Group PLC Novatech LLC 0 0 0 1 0 176 3% 3,29% 2,52% 0,37% 6,18% 
2012-01-30 ABB Ltd Thomas & Betts Corp 1 0 0 1 1 3,924 0% 0,39% -0,40% 0,74% 0,73% 
2012-02-13 AB SKF General Bearing Corp 0 0 1 1 0 125 1% 0,07% 0,83% -0,64% 0,26% 
2012-02-22 Jeudan A/S Property Portfolio 0 1 0 1 0 81 11% 0,94% 2,24% -1,50% 1,68% 
2012-02-25 Atlantia SpA Autostrade Sud America 
Srl 
0 0 1 1 1 760 7% -0,19% -0,72% 0,07% -0,84% 
2012-02-25 Svenska Cellulosa AB 
SCA 
Everbeauty Corp 0 0 1 1 1 290 3% -0,15% 1,42% 1,28% 2,56% 
2012-03-05 Abcam PLC Epitomics International Inc 0 0 0 0 1 154 16% -1,00% 8,83% 0,55% 8,37% 
2012-03-07 Prosegur Compania de 
Seguridad SA 
Nordeste Seguranca de 
Valores Paraiba Ltda 
0 0 1 1 1 467 15% -1,09% 1,57% 10,78% 11,27% 
2012-03-15 Shire PLC Ferrokin Biosciences Inc 0 0 0 1 0 325 2% -0,07% -3,19% 0,47% -2,79% 
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2012-03-19 Covidien PLC superDimension Ltd 0 0 1 1 1 300 1% -2,33% -1,26% 0,66% -2,93% 
2012-03-22 Covidien PLC Newport Medical 
Instruments Inc 
0 0 1 1 1 108 0% 0,17% 0,04% -0,05% 0,16% 
2012-03-22 Huhtamaki Oyj Josco(Holdings)Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 88 6% 0,79% 0,00% 1,44% 2,23% 
2012-03-26 Aggreko PLC Cia Brasileira de Locacoes 0 0 1 1 1 255 3% -0,09% 0,17% -0,10% -0,02% 
2012-03-26 Monitise PLC ClairMail Inc 0 0 1 0 0 173 37% -1,73% -2,95% 5,86% 1,17% 
2012-04-03 Cairn Energy PLC Agora Oil & Gas AS 0 0 1 0 0 447 15% -2,99% 4,82% 3,19% 5,02% 
2012-04-05 Covidien PLC Oridion Systems Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 306 1% 1,73% 0,41% -0,02% 2,12% 
2012-04-18 Betsson AB Nordic Gaming Group Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 85 8% 1,84% 9,28% 2,10% 13,22% 
2012-04-19 GlaxoSmithKline PLC Human Genome Sciences 
Inc 
1 0 0 1 1 3,269 0% 0,51% 0,84% 0,81% 2,16% 
2012-04-23 AstraZeneca PLC Ardea Biosciences Inc 1 0 0 1 1 1,033 0% 1,20% -0,49% 0,35% 1,05% 
2012-04-24 Smiths News PLC Hedgelane Ltd 0 1 1 1 0 61 24% -0,20% 7,33% 0,52% 7,65% 
2012-04-26 Dassault Systemes SA Gemcom Software 
International Inc 
0 0 0 1 1 360 3% -1,06% 9,59% -3,72% 4,81% 
2012-04-30 Seat Pagine Gialle SpA Lighthouse International 
Co SA 
0 0 1 0 1 746 669% -1,61% 1,15% 0,16% -0,30% 
2012-05-03 Koninklijke DSM NV Kensey Nash Corp 1 0 0 1 1 349 3% 1,70% 0,36% -1,58% 0,48% 
2012-05-07 Lagardere SCA LeGuide.com SA 1 1 0 1 0 79 2% 4,81% -0,80% -4,40% -0,38% 
2012-05-15 GlaxoSmithKline PLC Cellzome Ltd 0 1 0 1 1 98 0% 0,62% 0,53% 0,11% 1,26% 
2012-05-25 Pearson PLC GlobalEnglish Corp 0 0 0 1 0 90 1% 0,81% 0,51% 0,83% 2,15% 
2012-05-31 Siegfried Holding AG Alliance Medical Products 
Inc 
0 0 0 1 0 58 14% -0,48% 0,31% 0,48% 0,31% 
2012-05-31 Ultra Electronics 
Holdings PLC 
Giga Communications Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 57 3% -0,08% 0,31% -1,56% -1,33% 
2012-06-01 Moneysupermarket.co
m Group PLC 
MoneySavingExpert.com 0 1 1 0 0 135 15% 3,12% 0,87% -0,04% 3,95% 
2012-06-08 Hera SpA Acegas-APS Holding Srl 0 1 0 0 1 180 12% -2,66% 1,86% -0,39% -1,20% 
2012-06-08 Air Liquide SA LVL Medical Groupe SA 1 1 0 1 0 288 1% 0,35% 0,15% 0,78% 1,29% 
2012-06-11 AEVIS Holding SA Swiss Healthcare 
Properties AG 
0 1 0 0 1 144 79% -0,11% -4,24% 2,73% -1,62% 
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2012-06-18 Industria de Diseno 
Textil SA 
Undisclosed Real Estate 
Property,London 
0 0 0 1 0 243 0% -1,15% 0,81% 1,48% 1,13% 
2012-06-20 TOM TAILOR Holding AG BONITA GmbH & Co KG 0 1 0 1 1 279 119% 0,56% 0,98% 4,70% 6,24% 
2012-06-28 Jeudan A/S Office 
Buildings,Copenhagen(7) 
0 1 0 1 0 58 7% -0,53% 0,17% -0,73% -1,09% 
2012-07-01 Linde AG Lincare Holdings Inc 1 0 0 1 1 4,327 0% 1,67% -2,66% 0,17% -0,82% 
2012-07-02 Covidien PLC MindFrame Inc 0 0 1 1 0 75 0% -0,83% 1,16% -0,41% -0,08% 
2012-07-09 Remy Cointreau SA Bruichladdich Distillery Co 
Ltd 
0 0 1 1 1 90 2% 0,78% -2,87% 3,00% 0,91% 
2012-07-11 Royal Dutch Shell PLC Gasnor AS 0 0 0 1 1 74 0% 0,84% 1,25% -0,02% 2,08% 
2012-07-26 Glanbia PLC Aseptic Solutions USA 0 0 1 1 0 60 3% 0,15% -0,71% -0,69% -1,26% 
2012-08-03 Zardoya Otis SA Enor SA 0 1 1 0 1 235 6% -1,60% 1,55% -0,91% -0,95% 
2012-08-08 Koninklijke DSM NV Tortuga Cia Zootecnica 
Agraria 
0 0 0 1 0 606 7% -4,68% -0,07% -0,03% -4,78% 
2012-08-08 Gunnebo AB Hamilton Safe 0 0 0 1 0 65 20% -0,55% 0,18% 1,15% 0,78% 
2012-08-17 Petroceltic International 
PLC 
Melrose Resources PLC 1 0 1 0 1 586 195% -0,58% -
10,11% 
0,28% -
10,41% 
2012-08-24 Tornier NV OrthoHelix Surgical 
Designs Inc 
0 0 1 0 0 186 25% 0,63% 1,19% 0,82% 2,64% 
2012-09-03 Davide Campari-Milano 
SpA 
Lascelles deMercado & Co 
Ltd 
1 0 1 0 1 294 7% -0,04% 7,24% 1,18% 8,38% 
2012-09-07 AF AB Advansia AS 0 0 1 1 1 52 8% 3,23% 0,01% 3,33% 6,56% 
2012-09-11 Patrizia Immobilien AG Real Estate Portfolio(1030) 0 1 0 1 0 321 96% 1,36% -0,56% -1,72% -0,92% 
2012-09-20 Publicis Groupe SA LBI International NV 1 0 1 1 1 559 5% -0,64% 0,99% 0,86% 1,21% 
2012-09-21 John Wood Group PLC Mitchell's Oil Field Services 
Inc 
0 0 1 1 0 135 3% -1,53% 0,75% -0,20% -0,98% 
2012-09-24 Smurfit Kappa Group 
PLC 
Orange County Container 
Group LLC 
0 0 1 1 0 340 17% -0,37% 3,75% -0,06% 3,33% 
2012-09-24 Fastighets AB Balder Stockholm Sparvagnen 4 
Property 
0 1 0 0 0 168 21% 3,25% -3,66% 1,74% 1,33% 
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2012-09-28 Fonciere 
Developpement 
Logements SA{FDL} 
Residential Portfolio(943), 
Berlin 
0 0 0 1 0 97 6% 1,17% 0,93% -0,02% 2,08% 
2012-10-08 Persimmon PLC Hillreed Homes Ltd 0 1 0 1 1 57 2% -0,93% 0,12% -1,22% -2,03% 
2012-10-11 Coca-Cola Hellenic 
Bottling Co SA 
Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling 
Co SA 
1 1 1 0 1 5,739 0% 1,10% -4,92% 4,28% 0,45% 
2012-10-17 ASML Holding NV Cymer Inc 1 0 0 0 1 2,343 0% 1,19% -6,01% 0,66% -4,16% 
2012-10-23 C&C Group PLC Vermont Hard Cider Co LLC 0 0 1 1 1 305 18% 0,83% 1,58% 0,95% 3,36% 
2012-10-23 Johnson Matthey PLC Axeon Holdings PLC 1 1 0 1 1 65 1% -1,89% -0,24% -0,70% -2,82% 
2012-11-02 Luxottica Group SpA Alain Mikli International 
SAS 
0 0 0 1 1 117 1% 0,75% 0,31% -0,48% 0,58% 
2012-11-05 Land Securities Group 
PLC 
The Printworks 0 1 0 1 0 150 1% 0,59% 0,25% 0,02% 0,87% 
2012-11-05 Capital & Counties 
Properties plc 
Wellington Portfolio(3) 0 1 0 1 0 69 3% 0,05% 0,04% 0,03% 0,12% 
2012-11-06 London & Stamford 
Property PLC 
Metric Property 
Investments PLC 
1 1 1 0 1 381 38% -0,36% -2,89% -0,45% -3,70% 
2012-11-08 Siemens AG LMS International NV 0 0 0 1 0 895 1% -0,08% 2,61% -0,27% 2,27% 
2012-11-08 Koninklijke DSM NV Fortitech Inc 0 0 0 1 0 634 7% 0,36% -0,42% 3,06% 2,99% 
2012-11-08 Hochschild Mining PLC Andina Minerals Inc 1 0 1 1 1 99 4% 3,48% -1,24% -1,37% 0,87% 
2012-11-08 Ricardo PLC AEA Technology PLC 1 1 0 1 1 87 29% -1,23% 0,16% 1,59% 0,52% 
2012-11-14 BT Group PLC Tikit Group PLC 1 1 0 1 1 88 0% 1,01% -0,38% 0,63% 1,26% 
2012-11-15 Reckitt Benckiser Group 
PLC 
Schiff Nutrition 
International Inc 
1 0 0 0 1 1,434 0% -0,53% -0,20% -0,63% -1,36% 
2012-11-19 TAG Immobilien AG TLG Wohnen GmbH 0 1 0 1 0 602 54% -2,23% -1,51% 2,63% -1,12% 
2012-11-19 Swiss Prime Site AG Riverside Business Park 0 1 0 1 0 95 2% -0,82% 0,69% -0,53% -0,66% 
2012-11-21 Gemfields PLC Faberge Ltd 0 0 0 0 1 133 62% -2,80% -6,80% -4,60% -
14,21% 
2012-11-28 Smith & Nephew PLC Healthpoint 
Biotherapeutics Ltd 
0 0 0 1 0 782 8% 0,38% -1,26% 0,67% -0,21% 
2012-12-03 Quindell Portfolio PLC Abstract Legal Holdings Ltd 0 1 0 0 0 98 12% 1,69% -1,93% -7,23% -7,46% 
2012-12-06 Cineworld Group PLC City Screen Ltd 0 1 1 1 0 76 14% -1,74% 3,32% 1,00% 2,58% 
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2012-12-10 Zodiac Aerospace SA Northwest Aerospace 
Technologies Inc{NAT} 
0 0 0 1 0 81 1% 0,46% 0,22% -1,60% -0,92% 
2012-12-11 Tullow Oil PLC Spring Energy Norway AS 0 0 1 1 0 672 3% 0,85% -8,81% 2,31% -5,66% 
2012-12-13 XANO Industri AB AGES Industrier i Unnaryd 
AB 
0 1 0 1 1 70 110% 3,29% 22,05% -4,83% 20,52% 
2012-12-17 Oxford Instruments PLC Asylum Research Corp 0 0 1 1 0 80 7% 1,00% 0,34% -0,18% 1,16% 
2012-12-18 Halma PLC MicroSurgical Technology 
Inc 
0 0 0 1 0 102 4% -0,70% -0,99% 1,08% -0,61% 
2013-01-02 Brenntag AG Altivia Corp 0 0 1 1 0 125 2% -0,04% -1,51% -0,05% -1,60% 
2013-01-08 Shire PLC Lotus Tissue Repair Inc 0 0 0 1 1 324 2% -0,45% 2,83% 1,72% 4,10% 
2013-01-09 Atlantia SpA Generale Mobiliare 
Interessenze Azionarie SpA 
{Gemina} 
1 1 1 0 1 4,104 0% -0,41% -1,56% -4,21% -6,19% 
2013-01-17 Rotork PLC Schischek GmbH 
Explosionproof 
0 0 0 1 1 57 2% -0,33% 1,18% 2,08% 2,93% 
2013-01-22 Dignity PLC Yew Holdings Ltd 0 1 0 1 1 92 10% 2,67% 2,37% 2,71% 7,74% 
2013-01-31 LondonMetric Property 
PLC 
Retail Warehouse 
Assets(6) 
0 1 0 1 0 146 15% -0,82% -0,71% -0,09% -1,61% 
2013-02-15 Opera Software ASA Skyfire Labs Inc 0 0 0 1 0 155 20% -1,75% -4,31% 2,88% -3,18% 
2013-02-20 Aryzta AG Klemme AG 0 0 1 1 0 372 7% 0,21% -2,62% -0,67% -3,08% 
2013-02-20 Inchcape PLC Trivett Classic Pty Ltd 0 0 1 1 0 103 3% 1,37% 2,09% 0,03% 3,49% 
2013-03-13 Tesco PLC Giraffe Concepts Ltd 0 1 1 1 1 73 0% 0,72% -1,04% 2,27% 1,95% 
2013-03-15 Technopolis Oyj UAB Domestas,UAB Urban 
housing ,UAB Gama 
projektai 
0 0 0 1 1 80 21% 0,21% -1,01% -0,65% -1,45% 
2013-04-19 Econocom Group SA Osiatis SA 1 0 0 0 0 113 15% -0,96% -0,96% 1,06% -0,86% 
2013-04-22 ABB Ltd Power-One Inc 1 0 0 1 1 821 2% -0,87% -0,91% 0,95% -0,83% 
2013-04-24 Kier Group PLC May Gurney Integrated 
Services PLC 
1 1 0 0 1 413 56% -0,70% -5,64% -1,36% -7,70% 
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2013-04-24 Quindell Portfolio PLC Crusader Assistance Group 
Holdings Ltd 
0 1 0 0 1 113 14% 0,07% -0,41% -1,28% -1,62% 
2013-04-29 Qiagen NV Ingenuity Systems Inc 0 0 0 1 0 105 2% 0,31% -0,10% -4,64% -4,44% 
2013-05-02 Wallenstam AB Commercial Properties, 
Gothenburg(9) 
0 1 0 1 0 59 3% -0,07% -0,30% -1,08% -1,46% 
2013-05-07 Adveo Group 
International SA 
Groupe BURO+ 0 0 0 1 0 497 257% 1,05% -1,06% 0,45% 0,44% 
2013-05-10 Cobham PLC Axell Wireless Ltd 0 1 0 1 1 131 3% 2,15% 0,83% 0,41% 3,39% 
2013-05-13 Ashtead Group PLC Accession Group Ltd 0 1 1 1 0 54 1% -1,58% 0,65% 1,34% 0,40% 
2013-05-17 Accenture PLC Acquity Group Ltd 1 0 0 1 1 316 1% 0,42% 0,75% 0,41% 1,58% 
2013-05-21 Ossur HF TeamOlmed Nord AB 0 0 1 1 1 54 9% 0,08% 1,39% 0,00% 1,48% 
2013-05-22 Victoria Park AB Property Portfolio 0 1 0 1 0 137 308% -0,24% 7,99% 1,21% 8,97% 
2013-05-23 BTG PLC EKOS Corp 0 0 0 1 0 220 13% 1,39% 1,91% 4,68% 7,98% 
2013-05-24 Waterlogic International 
Ltd 
Cool Clear Water 
Beverages Ltd 
0 0 0 1 0 58 26% -0,64% 0,29% -0,05% -0,40% 
2013-05-28 AstraZeneca PLC Omthera Pharmaceuticals 
Inc 
1 0 1 1 1 486 1% -0,05% 1,67% -0,82% 0,80% 
2013-05-29 GlaxoSmithKline PLC Okairos AG 0 0 0 1 1 324 0% 1,04% -2,30% -0,50% -1,77% 
2013-05-29 Dassault Systemes SA Apriso Corp 0 0 0 1 0 205 1% 0,93% 0,85% 0,85% 2,63% 
2013-06-10 AstraZeneca PLC Pearl Therapeutics Inc 0 0 0 1 1 1,15 0% -0,16% 0,25% -0,27% -0,18% 
2013-06-11 Swiss Prime Site AG TERTIANUM AG 0 1 0 1 1 535 12% 0,35% -2,29% 0,97% -0,97% 
2013-06-12 Jeudan A/S Properties Portfolio 0 1 0 1 0 146 15% 1,24% -0,30% -0,37% 0,57% 
2013-06-17 Sweco AB Vectura Consulting AB 0 1 0 1 1 143 16% -1,18% 7,20% -0,08% 5,94% 
2013-06-19 Tyco International Ltd Exacq Technologies Inc 0 0 0 1 0 150 1% 0,20% 0,46% -0,55% 0,11% 
2013-07-01 Noble Corp Noble Corp 1 1 1 0 1 9,973 0% -0,71% 0,15% 0,19% -0,37% 
2013-07-02 Dialog Semiconductor 
GmbH 
iWatt 0 0 1 1 0 345 36% 1,63% 8,70% -2,28% 8,04% 
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2013-07-03 Gecina SA Rue Marbeuf Office 
Building, Paris 
0 1 0 1 0 159 2% 3,05% -0,59% -0,73% 1,73% 
2013-07-08 LVMH Moet Hennessy 
Louis Vuitton SA 
Loro Piana SpA 0 0 0 1 0 2,574 0% 0,33% 1,07% 1,29% 2,69% 
2013-07-11 Schneider Electric SA Invensys PLC 1 0 0 0 1 4,636 0% -0,44% 0,81% -3,85% -3,48% 
2013-07-15 Ipsen SA Syntaxin Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 206 7% 0,31% -0,65% 0,09% -0,25% 
2013-07-15 LondonMetric Property 
PLC 
Argos Distribution 
Warehouse, Bedford 
0 1 0 1 0 78 8% -0,08% -0,08% -0,12% -0,28% 
2013-07-16 Cargotec Oyj Hatlapa Uetersener 
Maschinenfabrik GmbH & 
Co KG 
0 0 1 1 0 211 14% -0,04% 0,80% 0,72% 1,47% 
2013-07-25 Helical Bar PLC Tech Belt 0 1 0 1 0 54 11% 0,63% 1,84% -0,05% 2,42% 
2013-07-31 Eutelsat 
Communications SA 
Satelites Mexicanos SA de 
CV {SATMEX} 
0 0 1 1 1 1,119 0% -0,18% -6,42% 0,16% -6,44% 
2013-08-06 STADA Arzneimittel AG Thornton & Ross Ltd 0 0 1 1 0 346 13% -0,02% 1,28% -0,63% 0,63% 
2013-08-15 L'Oreal SA Magic Holdings 
International Ltd 
1 0 0 1 1 718 1% -0,11% 0,39% -0,27% 0,01% 
2013-08-19 Atlas Copco AB Edwards Group Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 1,606 0% 0,18% 1,69% 0,59% 2,46% 
2013-08-19 Rockwool International 
A/S 
Chicago Metallic Corp 0 0 0 1 0 140 8% -1,84% -1,12% 0,77% -2,19% 
2013-08-20 Deutsche Wohnen AG GSW Immobilien AG 1 1 0 0 0 2,224 0% 0,01% -4,11% 1,49% -2,62% 
2013-08-21 Altisource Portfolio 
Solutions SA 
Equator LLC 0 0 0 1 1 150 5% -0,51% 7,06% -2,77% 3,78% 
2013-08-27 Tamedia AG Ziegler Druck- und Verlags-
AG 
0 1 1 1 0 54 5% -0,14% -2,00% 1,56% -0,58% 
2013-08-30 Meda AB Acton Pharmaceuticals Inc 0 0 1 1 0 145 4% 1,30% -0,29% 1,94% 2,95% 
2013-09-03 bioMerieux SA BioFire Diagnostics Inc 0 0 1 1 1 450 11% 1,53% 0,21% -2,21% -0,47% 
2013-09-05 Hera SpA AMGA Azienda Multiservizi 
SpA 
0 1 0 0 1 278 10% -1,98% -0,09% -0,81% -2,88% 
2013-09-05 AB SKF Kaydon Corp 1 0 1 0 1 1,243 0% -0,48% -0,18% -0,68% -1,34% 
2013-09-05 iomart Group PLC Redstation Ltd 0 1 1 0 1 242 52% 0,66% 0,71% 3,73% 5,11% 
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2013-09-05 Monitise PLC Grapple Mobile Ltd 0 1 1 0 1 60 5% 15,49% -5,02% 2,59% 13,06% 
2013-09-09 Recordati SpA Laboratorios Casen Fleet 
SL 
0 0 1 1 1 123 5% 0,75% 1,06% -0,19% 1,62% 
2013-09-11 Assura Group Ltd Trinity Medical 
Developments Ltd 
0 1 0 1 1 99 35% -0,04% 1,74% -0,71% 0,99% 
2013-09-16 Delticom AG Tirendo Holding GmbH 0 1 0 1 1 67 11% 2,29% 9,13% -1,78% 9,63% 
2013-09-25 Origin Enterprises PLC Origin Enterprises PLC 1 1 1 0 1 127 11% -0,63% 3,47% -0,01% 2,83% 
2013-09-30 Fonciere 
Developpement 
Logements SA 
Undisclosed Residential 
Real Estate Portfolios, 
Berlin& Dresden(4) 
0 0 0 1 0 475 30% 0,00% 0,01% 0,29% 0,30% 
2013-10-03 Falkland Oil & Gas Plc Desire Petroleum PLC 1 1 1 0 1 88 60% 1,37% -2,33% 2,11% 1,15% 
2013-10-07 Solvay SA Chemlogics Group LLC 0 0 1 1 0 1,345 0% -0,52% 1,53% -0,22% 0,78% 
2013-10-10 CANCOM SE Pironet NDH AG 1 1 0 1 0 55 15% -1,22% 1,16% -1,35% -1,41% 
2013-10-18 RPS Group PLC OEC Consulting AS 0 0 1 1 0 51 5% 0,67% 0,71% 1,73% 3,11% 
2013-10-23 Pace PLC Aurora Networks Inc 0 0 0 1 0 323 24% -1,99% 11,18% -3,16% 6,03% 
2013-10-23 Capita PLC ParkingEye Ltd 0 1 0 0 0 95 1% -1,16% 0,60% -0,88% -1,45% 
2013-10-24 Chime Communications 
PLC 
Just Marketing Inc 0 0 1 1 0 76 17% 0,06% 0,14% -2,12% -1,92% 
2013-10-24 AEVIS Holding SA Victoria-Jungfrau 
Collection AG 
1 1 0 1 0 59 12% -0,05% 1,08% -0,95% 0,09% 
2013-11-06 Experian PLC Passport Health 
Communications Inc 
0 0 0 1 0 850 4% 0,71% -6,61% 0,41% -5,49% 
2013-11-08 Essilor International SA Costa Inc 1 0 1 1 1 303 1% -0,80% 1,71% -0,37% 0,54% 
2013-11-10 Deutsche Telekom AG GTS Central Europe 0 0 1 1 0 730 1% 0,03% -1,36% -0,32% -1,65% 
2013-11-11 Shire PLC ViroPharma Inc 1 0 1 1 1 3,94 0% 0,25% 0,55% -0,12% 0,67% 
2013-11-18 Korian SA Medica SA 1 1 1 0 1 2,093 0% -0,33% -3,16% -1,24% -4,72% 
2013-11-19 Intertek Group PLC Architectural Testing Inc 0 0 0 1 0 95 1% 0,53% -2,19% 0,22% -1,44% 
2013-11-27 Wirecard AG PT. Aprisma Indonesia 0 0 0 1 0 120 3% 0,85% -0,28% -0,26% 0,30% 
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2013-11-29 CALIDA Holding AG Lafuma SA 1 0 1 1 0 56 23% -0,81% 0,68% 0,01% -0,12% 
2013-12-03 Pearson PLC Multi Brasil Franqueadora 
e Participacoes Ltda 
0 0 0 1 1 828 5% -0,04% -0,25% -2,64% -2,93% 
2013-12-03 blinkx PLC Rhythm NewMedia Inc 0 0 1 0 0 65 5% -1,50% 0,48% 0,87% -0,15% 
2013-12-08 Covidien PLC Given Imaging Ltd 1 0 1 0 1 858 3% -0,10% -0,10% -0,23% -0,42% 
2013-12-16 Ekornes ASA IMG AS 0 1 1 1 0 88 17% -1,27% -0,72% 0,94% -1,04% 
2013-12-17 Ascencio SCA Moyennes Surfaces 
Specialisees SA 
0 1 0 1 1 117 38% -0,72% 0,60% -0,12% -0,24% 
2013-12-17 Babcock International 
Group PLC 
Context Information 
Security Ltd 
0 1 0 1 0 52 1% 0,82% -0,23% -0,41% 0,19% 
2014-01-13 AMEC PLC Foster Wheeler AG 1 1 1 1 1 2,761 0% 1,47% 2,16% -3,53% 0,10% 
2014-01-22 Svenskt Stal AB Rautaruukki Oyj 1 0 0 0 1 2,488 0% -1,69% 11,10% 0,28% 9,69% 
2014-01-23 IP Group PLC Fusion IP PLC 1 1 0 0 1 81 8% 2,73% -2,07% -0,87% -0,21% 
2014-01-23 Alternative Networks 
PLC 
ControlCircle Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 66 17% 7,73% 4,16% -2,74% 9,16% 
2014-02-03 Smith & Nephew PLC ArthroCare Corp 1 0 1 0 1 1,525 0% -0,78% 1,63% -1,27% -0,42% 
2014-02-04 TAG Immobilien AG Undisclosed Residential 
Portfolio,Germany(4,000) 
0 1 0 1 0 163 10% -0,53% 0,48% -0,60% -0,66% 
2014-02-10 ADLER Real Estate AG Estavis AG 1 1 0 0 0 84 100% -1,15% 1,41% 0,17% 0,43% 
2014-02-13 Rexam PLC United Arab Can 
Manufacturing Co 
0 0 1 1 0 122 2% -0,15% 1,74% 0,54% 2,13% 
2014-02-13 Schibsted ASA Milanuncios SL 0 0 0 1 0 68 1% -0,23% 5,74% -3,85% 1,66% 
2014-02-27 Bayer AG Dihon Pharmaceutical 
Group Co Ltd 
0 0 0 1 1 580 1% -0,63% 0,20% 2,15% 1,72% 
2014-02-27 Essilor International SA Coastal Contacts Inc 1 0 1 1 1 379 2% 0,22% -3,19% -1,23% -4,20% 
2014-03-03 St Ives PLC Realise Holdings Ltd 0 1 0 0 0 72 19% -0,36% 0,73% -0,25% 0,11% 
2014-03-11 Cape PLC Motherwell Bridge Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 63 11% 0,16% 7,79% 1,65% 9,59% 
2014-03-12 Davide Campari-Milano 
SpA 
Forty Creek Distillery Ltd 0 0 1 1 0 167 46% 0,88% -3,66% -0,13% -2,90% 
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2014-03-13 Vectura Group Plc Activaero GmbH 0 0 1 0 1 178 19% -0,88% 0,41% -3,48% -3,95% 
2014-03-17 Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics NV 
General Lighting Co JSC 0 0 0 1 0 235 1% -0,23% 0,20% -0,25% -0,27% 
2014-03-20 EKF Diagnostics 
Holdings PLC 
Selah Genomics Inc 0 0 0 0 1 56 34% -2,12% -1,08% 2,98% -0,22% 
2014-03-24 Segro PLC Magna Park 0 1 0 1 0 56 1% -1,20% 0,79% 0,70% 0,29% 
2014-03-31 ICON PLC Aptiv Solutions LLC 0 0 0 1 0 144 5% -2,37% 2,41% -0,33% -0,29% 
2014-03-31 Regenersis PLC Blancco Oy Ltd 0 0 0 0 1 83 28% 3,22% 9,74% -3,89% 9,06% 
2014-04-02 TE Connectivity Ltd SEA CON Group 0 0 0 1 0 490 2% -0,97% 1,97% -0,18% 0,82% 
2014-04-04 Loomis AB Via Mat Management AG 0 0 0 1 1 224 13% -1,40% 6,66% 0,53% 5,79% 
2014-04-08 Sopra Steria Group SA Steria SA 1 1 1 0 0 893 62% 0,07% -0,02% -
12,30% 
-
12,25% 
2014-04-14 Glencore Xstrata PLC Caracal Energy Inc 1 0 0 1 1 1,311 0% 1,04% 1,94% -0,66% 2,32% 
2014-04-15 Informa PLC Informa PLC 1 1 1 0 1 4,898 0% -3,31% 0,14% 0,93% -2,24% 
2014-04-15 Davide Campari-Milano 
SpA 
Fratelli Averna SpA 0 1 1 1 1 143 3% 2,24% 0,47% 0,65% 3,36% 
2014-04-16 BioAlliance Pharma SA TopoTarget A/S 1 0 0 0 1 88 38% -1,60% -1,28% 0,21% -2,67% 
2014-04-28 Ultra Electronics 
Holdings PLC 
Forensic Technology WAI 
Inc 
0 0 1 1 0 91 5% -0,63% 0,00% -0,27% -0,91% 
2014-05-01 RPC Group PLC ACE Corp Holdings Ltd 0 0 1 0 0 427 25% -1,66% 3,42% -1,06% 0,69% 
2014-05-01 Savills PLC Studley Inc 0 0 1 0 1 285 20% 0,07% 0,52% 0,86% 1,45% 
2014-05-01 St Ives PLC The Health Hive Group Ltd 0 1 0 0 0 85 21% -0,61% 1,62% -1,32% -0,31% 
2014-05-02 Tyco International Ltd Tyco International Ltd 1 1 1 0 1 18,097 0% -0,42% 0,16% -0,43% -0,69% 
2014-05-07 ITV PLC Leftfield Entertainment 
Group 
0 0 0 1 0 360 3% 1,00% 0,84% -0,11% 1,73% 
2014-05-08 H Lundbeck A/S Chelsea Therapeutics 
International Ltd 
1 0 0 1 1 611 11% -1,68% 1,45% 0,75% 0,52% 
2014-05-09 IGas Energy PLC Dart Energy Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 143 31% -1,87% 1,11% -3,60% -4,36% 
2014-05-12 Shire PLC Lumena Pharmaceuticals 
Inc 
0 0 1 1 0 260 1% -2,50% -1,44% 1,36% -2,58% 
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2014-05-15 Staffline Group PLC Avanta Enterprise Ltd 0 1 1 1 0 76 23% 4,36% 14,39% 0,51% 19,26% 
2014-05-16 Swisscom AG PubliGroupe SA 1 1 0 1 0 485 2% 0,79% -0,14% 0,94% 1,59% 
2014-05-20 Cobham PLC Aeroflex Holding Corp 1 0 0 1 1 1,434 0% 0,46% -4,38% 0,78% -3,15% 
2014-05-20 Eurosic SA SIIC de Paris SA 1 1 0 1 0 1,394 0% -0,31% 0,24% -0,03% -0,10% 
2014-05-20 Braemar Shipping 
Services PLC 
ACM Shipping Group PLC 1 1 1 0 1 80 42% 3,71% -4,76% 0,90% -0,15% 
2014-05-23 Rockhopper Exploration 
PLC 
Mediterranean Oil & Gas 
PLC 
1 1 1 0 1 59 12% 0,02% -1,44% 0,15% -1,27% 
2014-05-26 Atos SE Bull SAS 1 1 1 1 0 775 9% -0,60% 5,54% -0,85% 4,08% 
2014-06-02 Halma PLC Rohrback Cosasco Systems 
Inc 
0 0 1 1 0 116 3% 1,84% 0,02% 1,74% 3,61% 
2014-06-04 Ebro Foods SA Pastificio Lucio Garofalo 
SpA 
0 0 1 1 0 85 2% -1,11% -0,52% -0,04% -1,67% 
2014-06-09 Acando AB Connecta AB 1 1 1 0 1 80 55% 0,03% -4,42% -2,23% -6,62% 
2014-06-13 Assura Group Ltd MP Realty Holdings Ltd 0 1 0 0 1 181 47% -1,23% 0,19% -0,37% -1,42% 
2014-06-13 Luxfer Holdings PLC Innotech Products Ltd 0 0 0 1 0 64 13% -0,34% 0,67% -2,18% -1,85% 
2014-06-18 TE Connectivity Ltd Measurement Specialties 
Inc 
1 0 1 1 1 1,556 0% 0,07% -0,61% 0,26% -0,27% 
2014-06-23 NIBE Industrier AB WaterFurnace Renewable 
Energy Inc 
1 0 0 1 1 323 11% -0,13% 3,86% 7,31% 11,03% 
2014-06-23 Stora Enso Oyj Virdia Inc 0 0 0 1 1 62 1% 0,00% -1,00% 1,12% 0,11% 
2014-06-26 Monitise PLC Markco Media Ltd 0 1 1 1 0 89 4% -0,89% 0,74% -3,84% -4,00% 
2014-06-26 Aryzta AG Mette Munk A/S 0 0 1 1 0 68 1% -0,16% -1,05% 0,71% -0,49% 
2014-06-27 TUI AG TUI Travel PLC 1 0 1 0 0 4,633 0% 3,44% 5,27% -2,57% 6,14% 
2014-06-30 Hansteen Holdings PLC Multi-Let Industrial 
Property Portfolio 
0 0 0 1 0 145 12% -0,24% 0,40% 0,60% 0,75% 
2014-07-01 Distribuidora 
Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA 
Grupo El Arbol Distribucion 
y Supermercados SA 
0 1 1 1 1 71 1% 0,10% -0,77% 5,60% 4,93% 
2014-07-24 Dassault Systemes SA Quintiq Holding BV 0 0 0 1 0 337 2% 0,66% 4,83% -1,12% 4,37% 
2014-07-31 RTL Group SA SpotXchange Inc 0 0 0 1 0 144 1% 0,50% 0,84% -0,97% 0,38% 
2014-08-01 PZ Cussons PLC Five AM Life Pty Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 87 3% -0,11% 2,49% 1,46% 3,85% 
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2014-08-05 Yara International ASA Galvani Industria Comercio 
e Servicos SA 
0 0 1 1 0 315 2% 0,53% 0,41% -1,21% -0,27% 
2014-08-06 Palace Capital PLC Property Investment 
Holdings Ltd 
0 1 0 0 1 54 76% -0,18% -1,60% -0,11% -1,89% 
2014-08-11 NewRiver Retail Ltd Priory Meadow Shopping 
Centre,The Avenue 
Shopping Centre,Abbey 
Shopping Centre 
0 1 0 1 0 235 47% -3,19% -2,52% 1,70% -4,02% 
2014-08-20 Infineon Technologies 
AG 
International Rectifier 
Corp 
1 0 0 1 1 2,257 0% 0,44% -1,14% -1,11% -1,81% 
2014-08-24 Roche Holding AG InterMune Inc 1 0 0 1 1 7,989 0% 0,17% -0,15% -0,12% -0,10% 
2014-08-26 Eastern Property 
Holdings Ltd 
Business Center Berlin 
House 
0 0 0 1 1 148 77% 0,06% 0,06% 2,11% 2,22% 
2014-09-03 AVG Technologies NV Location Labs Inc 0 0 0 1 0 220 24% 0,37% 3,44% -0,39% 3,42% 
2014-09-12 Glanbia PLC The Isopure Co LLC 0 0 1 1 0 153 3% -1,77% 0,18% -0,56% -2,14% 
2014-09-12 Telefonaktiebolaget LM 
Ericsson 
Fabrix Systems 0 0 0 1 1 95 0% 1,31% -0,34% 0,17% 1,14% 
2014-09-15 TDC A/S Get AS 0 0 0 1 0 2,159 0% 0,48% -
11,12% 
4,22% -6,42% 
2014-09-25 KUKA AG Swisslog Holding AG 1 0 0 1 0 329 16% 0,73% 0,97% -0,57% 1,13% 
2014-09-29 VTG AG AAE Ahaus Alstaetter 
Eisenbahn Holding AG 
0 0 1 0 1 1,574 0% -2,39% -2,14% 9,26% 4,73% 
2014-09-30 Consort Medical PLC Aesica Holdco Ltd 0 1 0 0 1 193 41% -0,03% -1,99% 0,36% -1,66% 
2014-09-30 Melrose Industries PLC Eclipse Inc 0 0 0 1 1 158 4% 0,61% 4,71% 0,86% 6,17% 
2014-09-30 Eastern Property 
Holdings Ltd 
SEVERNOE SIYANIE 
Business Centre 
0 0 0 1 0 153 81% 0,97% 3,86% -0,04% 4,80% 
2014-10-01 UBM PLC Advanstar Inc 0 0 0 1 1 972 40% -1,13% -5,06% -0,46% -6,65% 
2014-10-01 LondonMetric Property 
PLC 
Dixons Retail distribution 
centre (Newark) 
0 1 0 1 0 111 8% 0,39% 0,56% -0,14% 0,82% 
2014-10-01 WS Atkins PLC Houston Offshore 
Engineering LLC 
0 0 0 1 0 73 3% -0,20% 1,33% 1,00% 2,12% 
125 
 
2014-10-03 Constellium NV Wise Metals Intermediate 
Holdings LLC 
0 0 0 1 0 1,4 0% -2,66% -6,40% -6,77% -
15,83% 
2014-10-03 Nemetschek AG Bluebeam Software Inc 0 0 1 1 1 104 10% -1,75% -0,21% 3,17% 1,20% 
2014-10-15 Mears Group PLC Omega Group Ltd 0 1 0 1 0 64 9% 0,62% 3,29% -1,44% 2,47% 
2014-10-17 Lafarge SA Ciments Kercim SASU 0 1 1 1 0 102 1% -0,35% -1,30% 1,66% 0,01% 
2014-10-21 BAE Systems PLC SilverSky Inc 0 0 0 1 0 232 1% -0,29% -0,65% 0,60% -0,34% 
2014-11-03 Publicis Groupe SA Sapient Corp 1 0 0 1 1 3,215 0% 0,72% -1,72% 2,13% 1,12% 
2014-11-03 Antofagasta PLC Duluth Metals Ltd 1 0 1 1 1 82 1% 0,54% -0,13% 0,50% 0,91% 
2014-11-06 Assura Group Ltd Metro MRI Ltd 0 1 0 0 1 99 13% -0,03% -0,62% -1,13% -1,79% 
2014-11-06 Hansteen Holdings PLC Portfolio of Multi-let 
Offices (7) & Industrial 
Estates (5) 
0 1 0 1 0 57 5% -0,65% -2,39% -0,39% -3,43% 
2014-11-06 DS Smith PLC Andorrana del Carton 
Ondulado SA 
0 0 0 1 0 55 1% -0,64% 3,72% 0,26% 3,34% 
2014-11-12 COLT Group SA KVH Co Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 161 9% 0,00% 1,37% 1,34% 2,71% 
2014-11-13 Tritax Big Box REIT Plc The Range UK National 
Distribution Centre 
0 1 0 1 0 76 12% 0,19% -0,72% -0,27% -0,80% 
2014-11-14 Clarkson PLC RS Platou ASA 0 0 1 0 1 441 65% 0,81% 1,19% -0,46% 1,55% 
2014-11-14 IMI PLC B&R Holding GmbH 0 0 0 1 0 191 4% 0,40% 1,17% -2,45% -0,89% 
2014-11-18 Evolva Holding SA Allylix Inc 0 0 0 0 1 61 17% -0,98% 2,24% -1,08% 0,18% 
2014-11-24 Derwent London PLC Angel Building 0 1 0 1 0 118 2% -0,45% 0,47% 0,08% 0,10% 
2014-11-25 Schoeller-Bleckmann 
Oilfield Equipment AG 
Resource Well Completion 
Technologies Inc 
0 0 0 1 0 79 6% 0,87% 0,48% 0,14% 1,49% 
2014-11-27 RPC Group PLC Promens hf 0 0 0 1 0 483 30% 1,25% 5,80% 1,39% 8,43% 
2014-12-01 Carillion PLC Rokstad Power Corp 0 0 0 1 0 52 2% -1,63% 0,24% -1,25% -2,64% 
2014-12-04 BTG PLC PneumRx Inc 0 0 0 1 0 475 10% 0,89% -1,48% -0,84% -1,43% 
2014-12-04 Atea ASA Axcess A/S 0 0 0 1 1 52 5% -0,78% 0,28% 0,11% -0,38% 
2014-12-08 Eurofins Scientific SE Boston Heart Diagnostics 
Corp 
0 0 0 1 0 200 6% 0,19% 2,09% 5,73% 8,01% 
2014-12-11 Spectris PLC Engineering Seismology 
Group 
0 0 0 1 0 56 2% 1,46% 0,88% 2,46% 4,80% 
2014-12-17 Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics NV 
Volcano Corp 1 0 0 0 1 1,183 0% 0,95% -1,84% 1,58% 0,69% 
126 
 
2014-12-19 Interpump Group SpA Walvoil SpA 0 1 0 0 1 141 9% 0,60% 1,24% 0,97% 2,82% 
2014-12-22 HEXPOL AB Rhetech Inc 0 0 1 1 0 112 4% -0,15% 3,24% -0,42% 2,67% 
2015-01-08 Industria de Diseno 
Textil SA 
503-511 Broadway,New 
York,New York 
0 0 0 1 0 280 0% 0,92% 1,88% 1,38% 4,18% 
2015-01-11 Shire PLC NPS Pharmaceuticals Inc 1 0 0 1 1 5,075 0% 2,43% -0,93% -4,08% -2,57% 
2015-01-28 Capita PLC Constructionline 0 1 0 1 0 53 0% 0,18% 1,97% -0,15% 2,01% 
 
